
















Cornell University Press gratefully acknowledges receipt of a grant from 
the Whitney and Betty MacMillan Center for International and Area Studies 
at Yale University, which helped in the publication of this book. The book 
was also published with the assistance of the Frederick W. Hilles Publication 
Fund of Yale University.
Copyright © 2011 by Cornell University
All rights reserved. Except for brief quotations in a review, this book, 
or parts thereof, must not be reproduced in any form without 
permission in writing from the publisher. For information, address 
Cornell University Press, Sage House, 512 East State Street, Ithaca, 
New York 14850.
First published 2011 by Cornell University Press
Printed in the United States of America
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Hyde, Susan D.
 The pseudo-democrat’s dilemma : why election observation became 
an international norm / Susan D. Hyde.
  p. cm.
 Includes bibliographical references and index.
 ISBN 978-0-8014-4966-6 (alk. paper)
 1. Election monitoring. 2. Elections—Corrupt practices. 
3. Democratization. 4. International relations. I. Title.
 JF1001.H93 2011
 324.6'5—dc22   2010049865
Cornell University Press strives to use environmentally responsible 
suppliers and materials to the fullest extent possible in the publishing 
of its books. Such materials include vegetable-based, low-VOC inks 
and acid-free papers that are recycled, totally chlorine-free, or partly 
composed of nonwood fi bers. For further information, visit our 
website at www.cornellpress.cornell.edu.
Cloth printing 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
To 
Howard Leichter, Dawn Nowacki, 
and Elliot Tenofsky, 
who introduced me to this profession, 
and David Lake, my mentor

CONTENTS
List of Figures and Tables  ix
Acknowledgments  xi
Introduction  1
1 Signaling Democracy and the Norm of Internationally 
Observed Elections  28
2 Sovereign Leaders and the Decision to Invite 
Observers  56
3 Democracy-Contingent Benefits  89
4 Does Election Monitoring Matter?  126
5 The Quality of Monitoring and Strategic 
Manipulation  158
Conclusion: Constrained Leaders and Changing 
International Expectations  185
Appendixes
A. Formalization of Signaling Game  211
B. Codebook  216





I.1. Internationally observed elections, 1960–2006  8
1.1.  International observation, election manipulation, 
and probability of victory  43
2.1. Total number of elections per year, 1960–2006  66
2.2. Diffusion of elections and election observation by region  67
2.3. Regime type in observed elections vs. global average  70
2.4. Elections with pre-election concerns about fraud  71
2.5. Elections held by transitional government  72
2.6. Elections held following suspended elections  72
2.7. First multiparty elections  73
3.1. Changes in democracy-contingent benefi ts over time  94
3.2.  Trends in observed elections and foreign aid to 
government and civil society  108
3.3.  Percentage of bilateral offi cial development assistance 
devoted to democracy assistance  108
3.4. Negative reports, 1975–2005  112
3.5. Bilateral foreign aid to Haiti  118
3.6. Bilateral foreign aid to Togo  122
3.7. Noninviting countries, 2000–2006  123
4.1.  Round one vote share for incumbent in monitored vs. 
unmonitored polling stations  142
x Figures and Tables
5.1.  Average number of reported short-term observers 
per observed election, 1960–2004  167
5.2. Trends in international observation missions  171
Tables
2.1.   Observed elections and Cold War alliances, 1962–1988  68
2.2.   Observed elections and Cold War alliance patterns, 1989–1994  69
2.3.  Binary logit, observed elections  77
2.4.   Effects of country characteristics on the probability 
of inviting observers  80
2.5.  Alternative explanations  83
4.1.  Armenia round one observer coverage by region  139
4.2.   Logistic regression of round two monitoring 
on background covariates  140
4.3.   Effects of observations on vote share for 
President Robert Kocharian  141
4.4.   Logistic regression of assigned-to-treatment group 
on registered voters  146
4.5.   Carter Center observation coverage of villages in Indonesia  148
4.6.   Summary statistics for all available village-level variables  149
4.7.   Estimated effects of intent to treat on total votes 
for Megawati  151
4.8.   Estimated effect of observers on total votes for 
Megawati in observed villages  153
5.1.   Election manipulation and observer response  168
B.1. Descriptive statistics for table 2.3  221
B.2. Countries included in analysis  222
B.3. Excluded countries by reason for exclusion  223
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Although I did not know it at the time, this book began its life in the fall 
of 2001 as my fi rst research paper in graduate school. As a result, nearly 
everyone with whom I have come in professional contact has helped me 
write this book, and my debts are immense. I have been fortunate to re-
ceive numerous sources of institutional support during the research, writ-
ing, and rewriting. My research has been made possible by grants and 
fellowship from the Brookings Institution’s Governance Studies Program, 
the Institute for Global Confl ict and Cooperation (IGCC) of the Univer-
sity of California, and the University of California, San Diego’s School 
of Social Sciences and Department of Political Science, the University of 
California’s Washington Center, George Washington University’s Insti-
tute for Global and International Studies, Princeton University’s Niehaus 
Center for Globalization and Governance, and the American Political 
Science Association’s Centennial Center. Yale University, including the 
Department of Political Science, the MacMillan Center, and the Insti-
tution for Social and Policy Studies, provided generous research funds, 
opportunities to present my research, and most important, time to write. 
The Carter Center’s Democracy Program gave me numerous opportuni-
ties to serve as an international election observer, invited me to spend a 
summer in their offi ces in Atlanta, and gave me the unique opportunity to 
work with the organization during the 2004 Indonesian elections, which 
is refl ected in this book.
I received extraordinarily helpful advice at a “book bash” in February 
2008, sponsored by Ken Scheve and the Leitner Program in International 
and Comparative Political Economy at Yale. For traveling to New Haven 
just for the workshop, I thank David Lake, Jon Pevehouse, Ken Schultz, 
and Duncan Snidal, all of whom read the entire manuscript and gave me 
extensive and exceptionally helpful comments, as did Sue Stokes, Bruce 
xii Acknowledgments
Russett, Matt Winters, Nikolay Marinov, Ken Scheve, Karissa Cloward, 
and Jonathan Monten.
I thank my editor at Cornell University Press, Roger Haydon, for his 
enthusiastic support and excellent comments throughout the process. The 
book was published with generous assistance from Yale’s MacMillan Cen-
ter for International and Area Studies and the Frederick W. Hilles Publi-
cation Fund of Yale University.
At Yale, my colleague Nikolay Marinov deserves special thanks for many 
reasons, including working with me for the past fi ve years to produce the 
NELDA dataset, from which this book draws heavily. The research as-
sistants on that project, particularly Shazan Jiwa, Mary Swartz, and Jerry 
Wei, deserve special thanks for their excellent work. I also thank my col-
leagues Chris Blattman, Keith Darden, Alex Debs, Thad Dunning, Don 
Green, Greg Huber, Stathis Kalyvas, Pierre Landry, Ellen Lust, Jason 
Lyall, Nuno Monteiro, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Frances Rosenbluth, Bruce 
Russett, Nicholas Sambanis, Ian Shapiro, Susan Stokes, James Vreeland, 
and Jessica Weiss. During my year of leave from Yale, my cofellows at 
Niehaus, Arang Keshavarzian, Heather McKibben, Christina Schneider, 
Ben Shepherd, Branislav Slantchev, Camber Warren, and Matt Winters 
were extremely helpful. I also thank Larry Bartels, Sarah Bush, Rafaela 
Dancygier, Christina Davis, Kosuke Imai, Amaney Jamal, Bob Keohane, 
Helen Milner, Andy Moravcsik, and Grigore Pop-Eleches for their sup-
port and comments on my research.
At UCSD, Gary Cox, Kristian Gleditsch, Clark Gibson, Peter Goure-
vitch, and Carlos Waisman played a crucial role in helping me start to think 
about this book. I also thank Karen Ferree, Miles Kahler, Mat McCubbins, 
Branislav Slantchev, and Phil Roeder, and my colleagues in international 
relations and comparative politics at UCSD, including Scott Bailey, Kyle 
Beardsley, Rob Brown, Barak Hoffman, Alejandra Rios-Cázares, Idean 
Salehyan, and Heather Smith.
David Lake was my advisor and remains my mentor and my friend. 
I cannot thank him enough for all of his help, advice, comments, and 
support, and hope that I can someday do for someone what he has done 
for me. Emily Beaulieu, Carew Boulding, David Cunningham, Kathleen 
Cunningham, Irfan Nooruddin, and Elizabeth Saunders have endured all 
of the ups and downs with me and helped me work through every (im-
portant and unimportant) detail. This project wouldn’t have been half as 
fun without them. I also thank Michael Barnett, Karisa Cloward, Suzanne 
Katzenstein, Judith Kelley, Sharon Lean, Tom Legler, Alberto Simpser, 
Jack Snyder, Zach Zwald, and my collaborators on other research projects: 
Mike Alvarez, Thad Hall, Emilie Hafner-Burton, and Angel O’Mahony. 
xiiiAcknowledgments
In addition, this book benefi ted from the advice, comments, and encour-
agement from faculty and graduate students participating in a number of 
workshops and seminars.
The project would not have come to fruition without the assistance of 
many members of the election observation community. Eric Bjornlund, 
David Carroll, David Pottie, and Avery Davis-Roberts deserve special 
thanks and have each had an enormous infl uence on my thinking on the 
subject. I also thank Glenn Cowan, Anders Erikson, Pat Merloe, Gerald 
Mitchell, Shelley McConnell, Jennifer McCoy, Vladimir Pran, and many 
others whom I cannot thank here.
My parents and brothers have been a constant source of support. Annie 
helped me and this book along at a particularly crucial time. Most of all, 
I thank my partner of ten years, Sean Smith, for sharing this adventure 
with me, pushing me further than I would have gone on my own, listen-








In October of 1958, the Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista was one of the 
fi rst leaders to seek international observation of his country’s elections. 
Facing declining U.S. support of his regime, pressure from the United 
States to hold elections, and a growing threat from Fidel Castro’s revolu-
tionary forces, Batista scheduled elections, announced he would not run 
again, and attempted to invite international observers from the Organiza-
tion of American States and the United Nations. Both organizations re-
fused to send monitors, stating that they lacked the “facilities to supervise 
elections.”1 The November 1958 elections were widely viewed as a cha-
rade.2 Shortly after these discredited elections, Batista resigned and fl ed 
into exile, clearing the way for Fidel Castro’s rise to power.3
Fifty years later, the idea that governments should invite foreign elec-
tion observers had become so widely accepted that the Iranian govern-
ment’s refusal to invite international observers to its 2009 elections was 
interpreted around the world as evidence that the Iranian elections had 
been stolen. Responding to questions about the conditions under which 
he would accept the announced results, U.S. President Barack Obama ex-
pressed doubts about the quality of the elections, stating that “we didn’t 
have international observers on the ground” and that therefore “we can’t 
say defi nitively what happened at polling places throughout the country.”4 
German Chancellor Angela Merkel called for a recount of the votes under 
international observation as a way for Iranians to “eliminate doubt” and 
1. “Doubtful Future Confronts Cuba: Tomorrow’s Elections May Begin Uncertain Era—
Rebels Ask Boycott,” New York Times, October 31, 1958.
2. Ibid.
3. “Cuba Will Accept Voting Observers,” New York Times, October 18, 1958.
4. “Text of President Obama Tuesday,” Associated Press, June 28, 2009.
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increase trust.5 Explaining why he believed the Iranian elections to be sto-
len, U.S. Senator Joseph Lieberman said that “one thing we know is that 
Iran would not let international monitors in, which most every country in 
the world does to supervise the elections.”6 The Bangkok Post in Thailand 
editorialized that the Iranian government was culpable in part because it 
had harassed foreign journalists and barred election observers.7 Iranian 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Shirin Ebadi called for European sanctions 
against the Iranian government and argued that “a new election must 
be held and this time it should be under the monitoring of international 
organizations.”8 This sentiment was echoed widely in forums as diverse 
as the editorial pages of the Jordan Times, USA Today, and the Washington 
Post, and by the Iranian League for the Defense of Human Rights.9
Between the 1958 Cuban elections and 2009 elections in Iran, invit-
ing international election monitors had become an international norm.10 
Cuba’s attempt to invite observers was anomalous, and international actors 
refused to send observers, but views regarding election monitoring had 
changed dramatically by the end of the 1990s; by then, the few govern-
ments choosing not to invite international observers were assumed to be 
hiding electoral manipulation.11 As of 2006, more than 80% of elections 
 5. “Germany’s Merkel urges Iranian Election Recount,” Reuters, June 21, 2009.
 6. Lieberman, “Interview with Senator Joseph Lieberman,” June 15, 2009.
 7. BBC Monitoring, “Thai Paper Says Iran Must Let ‘Outsiders’ Monitor Poll Probe,” 
June 17, 2009.
 8. Deutsche Presse-Agentur, “Iranian Nobel Peace Prize Winner Ebadi Calls for New 
Polls,” June 17, 2009.
 9. “Iran’s Fishy Election Results,” USA Today, June 15, 2009; “Iran Needs Another Elec-
tion,” Jordan Times, June 23, 2009; “Iran: Confi scated Election, FIDH and LDDHI Fear a 
Bloody Repression,” News Press, June 17, 2009; Medhi Khalaji, “Khamenei’s Coup,” Wash-
ington Post, June 15, 2009.
10. Below, I defi ne an international norm as a shared “standard of behavior appropriate 
for actors with a given identity.” Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and 
Political Change,” 891.
11. There are several borderline cases that precede the Organization of American States’ 
election observation in 1962, including internationally observed plebiscites before World 
War II. See Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites; Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World 
War. In addition, at least one internationally observed election was held in the immediate 
aftermath of World War II, although the international agreements pertaining to the case are 
unique and it is not referenced by later missions as a precedent. Citing the Yalta Declaration 
on Liberated Europe and the provision that the Allied powers would assist Axis-occupied 
countries in order “to form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of all 
democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest possible establishment 
through free elections of governments responsive to the will of the people; and to facilitate 
where necessary the holding of such elections,” the Greek government invited international 
observers from the United States, France, and Great Britain to the March 1946 elections. 
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in the world were internationally monitored. Even the most committed 
electoral autocrats—Russia’s Vladimir Putin, Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe, 
Belorussia’s Alexander Lukashenko, Peru’s Alberto Fujimori, and Yugo-
slavia’s Slobodan Milošević—sought reputable international observers 
to judge their elections. Many of these leaders went to great lengths to 
manipulate the elections and the monitors, and they were internationally 
condemned for election fraud. Why did incumbent governments begin 
inviting observers, and why do they continue to do so in such impressive 
numbers? Why did election monitoring become an international norm, 
even though it is costly for many governments to invite foreign election 
observers?
That states comply with international norms when it is consistent with 
their material interests is not a particularly controversial claim. When 
an international norm contradicts what would otherwise be viewed as a 
state’s rational self-interest, however, its creation is a puzzle. In this book, 
I present an alternative theory of norm creation, focused on explaining 
the mechanism by which costly behaviors are initiated, diffuse, and be-
come internationally expected behaviors, or international norms. In my 
theory, states seeking international benefi ts are motivated to send exter-
nally credible signals that they possess certain characteristics when they 
perceive that doing so will increase their share of internationally allocated 
benefi ts, such as foreign aid, increased foreign investment, tourism, trade, 
membership in international organizations, and legitimacy and prestige. 
When other states imitate successful benefi t-seeking signals, new behav-
iors become widespread, even in the absence of overt pressure on states to 
adopt the new behavior. If a signal is accepted by other international ac-
tors as a behavior common to all states possessing a valued characteristic, 
it becomes a new international norm. These unintended norms are more 
likely to exist in issue areas for which pressure from international activists 
or powerful states is insuffi cient to motivate governments to adopt new 
behavior, and typically there is no coalition of individuals or states pushing 
for the norm. In general, I suggest the conditions for norm generation and 
diffusion exist when any regime has the incentive and the ability to signal 
its characteristics to international audiences in order to increase its share 
of international benefi ts. In contrast to existing explanations that focus on 
how norms can be generated despite their costs to states, or explanations 
The mission included 1,155 observers and 240 teams from the three countries, the majority 
of which were military “acting in civilian capacity” ( Joseph Coy Green Papers, Seeley G. 
Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ., Report of the Allied Mission 
to Observe the Greek Elections.)
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that focus on mutually benefi cial norms, my argument explains that in-
ternational norms are generated in part because compliance with the new 
behavior is costly.
Within international politics, states engage in many puzzling behav-
iors, some of which become widely adopted practices and international 
norms.12 Inviting international election observers is one example of a con-
sequential international norm. This book focuses on election observation 
because it is a substantively important form of democracy promotion and 
international intervention in the domestic politics of sovereign states. My 
account of norm formation is useful to explain a variety of other similar 
empirical puzzles. For example, why have so many developing countries 
moved to create independent central banks, reduce capital controls, and 
adopt fi xed exchange rates? Why are countries such as Iraq and North 
Korea expected to allow the presence of international weapons inspectors 
and assumed to have illicit weapons if they do not? What explains the 
rapid adoption of bilateral investment treaties to ensure property rights 
protection for foreign investors? Why do all but a handful of countries in 
the world now hold national elections? Why have dozens of countries 
adopted legislative gender quotas, even in electoral autocracies?13 Why 
has hiring private credit-rating agencies become a necessary step for 
countries wishing to issue sovereign bonds? Why do some of the worst 
violators of human rights sign human rights treaties?14 Some of these ex-
amples are more controversial than others, but in each of these cases a 
convincing argument can be made that these practices would not have 
become normalized state behavior if individual states were not attempting 
to fi nd credible ways to signal to international or domestic audiences.
Motivated by the puzzle of how international norms are generated when 
compliance is costly, I explain why election monitoring became an inter-
national norm. I show that international norms are generated through a 
process that is endogenous to strategic interaction among international 
actors and that costly signaling leads to unintended and consequential 
international norms. Although this signaling theory of norm formation 
is generalizable to other areas of international relations, it was gener-
ated to better understand the consequences of international democracy 
promotion and explain international election observation as an overt and 
12. Hurd, “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.”
13. Bush, S., “International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legisla-
tures”; Goertz and Diehl, “Toward a Theory of International Norms.”
14. Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui, “Human Rights in a Globalizing World”; Hathaway, 
“Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”
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substantively important form of international involvement in the domes-
tic politics of sovereign states.
Defining the Norm of Election Observation
Throughout this book, I follow the majority literature in defi ning in-
ternational norms as shared “standards of appropriate behavior for ac-
tors with a given identity.”15 This book focuses on the norm, or shared 
standard of appropriate behavior, that for all national elections, leaders 
committed to democratization should invite international observers and 
receive their endorsement, particularly when there is uncertainty about 
the government’s commitment to democracy.16
Not all internationally observed elections are democratic. Rather, the 
norm is the shared belief that all potentially democratic elections are interna-
tionally observed and any nonobserved election is not democratic. Interna-
tional election observers are offi cial delegations of foreigners invited to 
observe and report on the credibility of the electoral process. Since at least 
the early 1990s, observers are typically credentialed by the host govern-
ment and permitted access to the entire electoral process, including regis-
tration of voters, campaigning, distribution of electoral materials, and most 
notably, observing activities in and around polling stations, vote counting, 
and vote aggregation centers during the election period. They are offi cially 
nonpartisan and are intended to be objective third-party observers.
Uncertainty about the commitment of some governments to democ-
racy was a necessary condition for the initiation and diffusion of the norm. 
For some states, there is little uncertainty about the incumbent govern-
ment’s commitment to democracy. On the autocratic end of the spectrum 
of regimes, governments holding uncontested elections are not expected 
to invite observers when the characteristics of the election eliminate the 
possibility of electoral competition. Countries with only one legal politi-
cal party, with severe restrictions on candidate entry, and with totalitarian 
political structures would be understood as holding authoritarian elections 
15. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 891.
16. Throught the book, I use the terms “election observers” and “election monitors” 
interchangeably. Some organizations and governments prefer to avoid the term “monitor” 
because they argue that it implies a more interventionist practice, or a practice that involves 
more direct cooperation with the government. However, interventionist monitoring exists 
very rarely in practice, the distinction between the terms is not particularly useful outside of 
diplomatic circles.
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even if they invited international observers; thus, they stand to gain little 
by inviting observers.
As the norm diffused in the 1990s, countries that were widely consid-
ered to be consolidated democracies, such as those in Western Europe and 
North America, held elections but were not expected to invite observers. 
Other states “graduated” by demonstrating their democratic credentials. 
For example, at the end of a seventeen-year period of dictatorship and 
as part of the country’s transition back to civilian rule, the Chilean gov-
ernment invited observers to the 1988 referenda on the continued rule 
of General Augusto Pinochet and to the 1989 general elections. Because 
the country is now widely perceived to have successfully transitioned to 
democracy, it is no longer expected to invite international monitors. Simi-
larly, new European Union (EU) members are widely perceived as de-
mocracies after meeting the EU accession criteria and frequently are not 
expected to invite international observers.
However, refl ecting the diffusion of the norm, this trend has changed 
slightly in more recent years, with observers from the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Offi ce for Democratic Insti-
tutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) observing elections in 
Belgium (2007), Canada (2006), Finland (2007), France (2002, 2007), Ice-
land (2009), Ireland (2007), Italy (2008), the Netherlands (2006), Portu-
gal (2009), Spain (2008), Switzerland (2007), the United Kingdom (2003, 
2005), and the United States (2002, 2004, 2006, 2008). It is not yet clear 
whether other, similar democratic states will follow their lead and invite 
observers even when their status as a democracy is unquestioned. It is 
also unclear whether organizations sponsoring international observation 
would be willing to allocate scarce resources to observing elections in 
countries that are already considered stable democracies.
The Puzzling Norm of International Election Observation
There is no global government to enforce the norm of election ob-
servation, and inviting observers remains the choice of election-holding 
governments. Additionally, international monitors observe elections only 
when they have been offi cially invited by the host government. The in-
cumbent may delegate this decision to another domestic actor, such as the 
foreign minister or the election commission, but the incumbent maintains 
the right to refuse entry to foreign observers. Without formal credentials 
from the host government, it is nearly impossible for observers to engage 
in credible election observation, a standard now enshrined in numerous 
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international documents, including the 2005 Declaration of Principles for 
International Election Observation.17
Leaders apparently face an easy choice: invite observers when they 
know their elections will be clean and prohibit them when election fraud 
is likely to be discovered. The creation of an internationally held norm of 
election observation, however, has made the choice for leaders much less 
simple. Pseudo-democrats, or governments willing to engage in election 
manipulation, face a dilemma. On one hand, the norm generates con-
sequences for not inviting observers. Although noncompliance with the 
norm is rarely tested (arguably a sign of its strength), those leaders who 
do not invite foreign observers are assumed to be holding undemocratic 
elections, as in the Iranian example discussed above.18 Similarly, Egypt’s 
refusal to invite international observers to its 2005 presidential elections 
led many external groups to conclude that the election would be a charade 
before it took place, even though opposition presidential candidates were 
permitted for the fi rst time. Commentators on Hosni Mubarak’s decision 
to refuse foreign observers argued that the absence of international moni-
tors was “proof that the . . . election will be no different than preceding 
ones” in which the president allowed no opposition candidates and voters 
were given the opportunity only to vote yes or no on Mubarak’s continued 
rule.19 Holding internationally monitored and endorsed elections has also 
become a necessary step before countries under economic sanctions can 
resume normal bilateral relations with many Western governments. For 
example, U.S. President George Bush challenged the Cuban government 
to hold free and fair elections in 2003, saying that “once the 2003 elec-
tions are certifi ed as free and fair by international monitors, once Cuba 
begins the process of meaningful economic reform, then and only then 
will I explore ways with the United States Congress to ease economic 
sanctions.”20
17. Carter Center, Building Consensus on Principles for International Election Observation; 
United Nations, Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Con-
duct for International Election Observers.
18. To illustrate, countries that are not already considered consolidated democracies but 
that refused to invite observers to all elections after 2000 include Bahrain, Cuba, Egypt, 
Guinea, Iran, Jordan, Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, North Korea, Oman, Syria, Turkmenistan, and 
Vietnam. Countries that refused observers to some but not all elections after 2000 include 
Benin, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Iraq, Madagascar, Mauritania, and Singapore.
19. “Arab Observers Warn of Egypt Election ‘Masquerade’,” September 6, 2005, Agence 
France Presse.
20. G. Bush, “Remarks on the 100th Anniversary of Cuban Independence in Miami, 
Florida,” May 20, 2002.
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On the other hand, choosing to invite observers and complying with the 
norm is also risky. For those leaders wishing to manipulate elections, both 
the chances of getting caught and the consequences of a negative report 
have increased with the spread of election observation. Negative reports 
from election monitors have been linked to domestic uprisings and elec-
toral revolutions, reductions in foreign aid, exclusion from international 
forums, and other forms of internationally imposed sanctions.21
Figure I.1 illustrates the rate of observed elections and internationally 
criticized elections over time and shows that negative reports from inter-
national observers have not reduced the rate of internationally observed 
elections, as we would expect if leaders invited observers to only those elec-
tions likely to be clean. To explain the norm of election monitoring, I focus 
on the decision by leaders to invite international observers. The norm of 
21. This topic has not yet been treated in the international relations literature with rigor-
ous cross-national quantitative methods, but a thorough reading of cases in which fraud is 
alleged by international observers highlights many well-publicized cases in which the gov-
ernment faced internationally imposed costs because of election manipulation. The issue is 






















1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2006
Year
Observed and criticized Observed and not criticized
Figure I.1. Internationally observed elections, 1960–2006
Source: Author
Note: Includes 1,759 election events in 157 independent states, excluding those with popula-
tion < 250,000.
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election observation is particularly useful as an empirical case because it is 
not well explained by existing theories of norm formation, and I use it to 
develop a distinct causal explanation for why individually costly behaviors 
diffuse and become new and self-enforcing international norms.
Signaling and International Norms
In part, my argument is based in economic theory. In the “market for 
lemons,” famously described by economist George Akerlof, when con-
sumers possess little information about the quality of a product, such as 
used cars, and the quality of the product is known to vary, the market 
fails.22 Consumers prefer to avoid cars that are “lemons,” but they cannot, 
by themselves, distinguish between high- and low-quality products. The 
price that they are willing to pay refl ects the uncertainty of a market con-
taining both (indistinguishable) types of products. Sellers of high-quality 
used cars cannot command a suffi ciently high price and so choose not 
to sell their vehicles, thus lowering the expected quality of used cars on 
the market and eventually causing only undesirable lemons to be for sale. 
Rather than risk a lemon, buyers in this market avoid used cars entirely.
Information between international actors is similarly asymmetric: states 
possess accurate information about their own type, but international ac-
tors can have diffi culty judging whether another state is an undesir-
able type, or a so-called lemon. In the absence of better information about 
the true characteristics of states, the international-level equivalent of con-
sumers may prefer to avoid risk and interact primarily with states that 
already have credible reputations as desirable types. In addition, states also 
benefi t from promoting certain types of characteristics among other states 
in the international system, and they do so by rewarding states that are be-
lieved to possess valued characteristics. For states possessing valued char-
acteristics but lacking a matching reputation, this type of international 
market gives them the incentive to fi nd credible ways to signal their type 
to external audiences.
To describe this dynamic in other terms, many states in the international 
system seek international benefi ts—such as increased investment, trade, 
foreign aid, military support, membership in international organizations, 
and legitimacy and prestige. These international benefi ts are frequently 
targeted toward states possessing valued characteristics and withdrawn 
22. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’.”
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from states that are revealed not to possess them. Benefi t- seeking leaders, 
like sellers of used cars, possess more information about their own char-
acteristics than other international actors. Even when infl uential interna-
tional actors prefer to interact with specifi c types of states, they cannot 
always distinguish good types from bad types and, all else equal, prefer 
to avoid rewarding states of uncertain type. Benefi t-seeking states, like 
owners of high-quality used cars, are motivated to fi nd a solution to this 
market failure. A credible signal of their type to other international actors 
represents such a solution.23
Within international politics, it is well known that states vary in their 
type. In fact, Akerlof’s 1970 paper was motivated by a desire to explain 
why business in “underdeveloped” countries is diffi cult and not, despite 
its title, to explain the used car market. Yet in part because of the dif-
fuse nature of the international system, it is rarely articulated exactly how 
states that possess desirable characteristics but lack a matching reputa-
tion might credibly signal their type. Credible signals are not necessarily 
mandated or articulated by benefi t-giving actors; they must instead be 
discovered by benefi t-seeking states. Before election monitoring became a 
norm, for example, it was clear that the value of democratic political insti-
tutions was increasing and that democratizing states wanted such support 
to increase, but international actors did not specify exactly how states that 
were not already considered consolidated democracies could demonstrate 
their commitment to democratization.
Similarly, increasing globalization and the preferences articulated by 
powerful states and international organizations for neoliberal economic 
policies gave many states the incentive to signal their valued characteris-
tics in order to attract increased international investment, help negotiate 
better trading arrangements, and enhance their stature relative to other 
countries. Across a variety of issue areas, if a given signal is successful 
in communicating that a state is a valued type, other states will have the 
incentive to adopt the signal. If all “good” types are believed to send a 
given signal, even states that do not actually possess the valued character-
istic should attempt to fake that signal.
Signaling behaviors have been linked to social norms by Robert Axelrod, 
who argues that individuals follow existing social norms in part because 
“violating [the norm] would provide a signal about the type of person you 
are.”24 Dressing sloppily at a formal dinner, he argues, not only draws dis-
23. Spence, “Job Market Signaling.”
24. Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms,” 1107.
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approving stares from other diners but may lead them to conclude more 
generally that you are a lazy, cheap, or rude person. Axelrod links this con-
cept to the creation of new social norms, which grow out of “behavior that 
signals things about individuals that will lead others to reward them” and 
that “as more and more people use the signal to gain information about 
others, more and more people will adopt the behavior that leads to being 
treated well.”25
States seeking international benefi ts, in my theory, are similar to indi-
viduals seeking social approval in Axelrod’s argument. A signal becomes 
a norm when the relevant audience assumes that all desirable types of 
states likely engage in a specifi ed behavior. The norm creates incentives 
for other, less-desirable types to try to mimic the signal. Thus, if it is 
possible to simulate a signal, even if it is costly for undesirable types to 
do so, signaling behaviors spread and become new international norms 
when they become linked to desirable characteristics. This diffusion can 
take place even in the absence of explicit advocacy, overt pressure from 
powerful states, or incentives for cooperation. Adoption of the behavior 
as an international norm reinforces the incentives for governments of un-
certain type to continue sending the signal and may create incentives for 
international actors to raise the stakes for undesirable types by increasing 
the costs of mimicry.
This process has strong parallels to solutions for the market failure iden-
tifi ed for Akerlof’s market for lemons. Similarly, in Michael Spence’s well-
known education game, workers are willing to pay the costs of obtaining 
an education because education represents a credible signal to employers 
that workers are worth a higher wage, even if more years in school do 
not add to their productivity.26 In relation to international credit markets, 
Sylvia Maxfi eld argues that “politicians use central bank independence to 
try to signal their nation’s creditworthiness to potential investors.”27 To 
gain international credit, states are willing to invite (and pay for) sover-
eign bond ratings from reputable fi rms, even when they are likely to get 
a less than perfect rating. Now that credit-rating agencies are widely ac-
cepted, countries have diffi culty issuing sovereign bonds if they have not 
been rated by one of the three major agencies.28 Higher ratings should 
attract better investors, yet because of the international expectation that 
25. Ibid.
26. Spence, “Job Market Signaling.”
27. Maxfi eld, Gatekeepers of Growth, 4.
28. Although credit rating agencies have been criticized and their reputations were dam-
aged by the 2008 fi nancial crisis, countries cannot forgo credit ratings entirely.
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all creditworthy states receive a credit rating, a poor credit rating is better 
than none at all.
For this theory to work, it is not necessary that signals communicate an 
actor’s type with certainty. Signals, even when they become accepted as 
norms, are not always perfectly informative. In the corporate job market, 
for example, it is logically possible that a very intelligent, educated, and 
productive job applicant could lack an MBA. It is also possible that a high-
quality used car could be for sale without a factory-certifi ed warranty. Or a 
creditworthy country likely to repay its debts could refuse to obtain a sov-
ereign bond rating. However, the widespread acceptance of these signals 
has made it unlikely that any good types will refuse to signal. When such 
signals become norms, the relevant audience believes that all good types 
send the signal, and the act of refusing to signal itself becomes a source 
of information about an actor’s type: all else equal, used cars with factory-
certifi ed warranties are perceived as more reliable than those without, in-
dividuals with MBAs or other advanced degrees are perceived as more 
qualifi ed job applicants than those without, and internationally observed 
and certifi ed elections are perceived as more democratic than those that 
are not observed.
In all these cases, the signal is useful and becomes accepted because 
there is some existing uncertainty about the characteristics of a subset of 
actors, the process of signaling reveals additional information about the 
signaling actor, and sending the signal is more costly to bad types. Some 
warranties are limited or cover a short period of time, some graduates 
receive poor grades, some countries earn low sovereign bond ratings, and 
some reports from international election observers criticize elections as 
fraudulent.
Not all international signals become international norms. At the in-
ternational level, a norm is generated only if a signal becomes widely ac-
cepted as a useful source of information about a state or leader’s type, 
and benefi t-seeking actors develop the belief that all good types of leaders 
send the signal. Domestic actors may also accept the signal as credible, a 
change that becomes more likely as a new behavior becomes an interna-
tionally held norm. Although domestic actors may pressure some govern-
ments to adopt a new norm after it has been initiated in another state, 
it is important to note that in the absence of a transnational advocacy 
network29 domestic pressure does not explain the international diffusion 
of a norm. Especially in the case of international election observation, 
29. Keck and Sikkink, Activists beyond Borders.
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domestic  audiences react to the signal by the incumbent government in 
crosscutting ways. More important, pressure from domestic audiences 
does not necessarily provide a common exogenous shock that can explain 
international diffusion of a behavior. Without such a common shock, such 
as a change in the allocation of international benefi ts, it is more diffi cult 
to explain the global diffusion of a new behavior.
In the case of election observation, the signal requires inviting interna-
tional observers and receiving their endorsement of the election. Govern-
ments that invite observers and receive negative reports fail to signal to 
both domestic and international audiences that they are holding plausibly 
democratic elections. Normalization of a signal reinforces the behavior by 
generating costs for noncompliance. When the belief is accepted that all 
valued regime types send the signal, then choosing not to signal indicates 
that a state is not a valued type, further increasing the incentives for other 
international actors to imitate the signal.30
My theory of norm development is therefore characterized by a change 
in benefi ts available to democratizing states, governments attempting to 
signal to external audiences, mimicry of successful signals by other gov-
ernments, acceptance of the signal by prominent international actors, and 
enforcement of the norm by those who benefi t from improved informa-
tion about governments’ types. International norms in a variety of issue 
areas could be explained by this theory, as I explore later. Distinctions 
among states regarding property rights protections, domestic political in-
stitutions, levels of corruption, civic and media freedoms, independence of 
central banks, or the presence or absence of specifi c military weapons are 
all sources of variation that have been rewarded by various international 
actors. The theory can help explain why most countries now have neo-
liberal economic institutions; why nearly all countries in the world hold 
national-level elections even where few believe that the process is demo-
cratic; why countries such as Iraq and North Korea are willing to allow 
weapons inspectors; and, returning to the question motivating this book, 
why most leaders now invite foreign monitors to evaluate their elections.
Democracy and the Norm of International Election Monitoring
This book presents an alternative causal path to the development of 
international norms and explains the rise and persistence of international 
election observation as a consequential form of international involvement 
30. This emphasis on the costs of norm-violating behavior is similar to Axelrod, “An 
Evolutionary Approach to Norms.”
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in the domestic affairs of sovereign states. The norm of inviting observ-
ers, I argue, was initiated by leaders of developing countries in an effort to 
attract increased international support for democratic and democratizing 
governments. When powerful states expressed a general preference for 
supporting democratic regime types, initially in the early 1960s and overtly 
in the 1980s, the premium for being identifi ed as a democratizing regime 
gave “true democrats” an incentive to signal their democratic credentials 
to international audiences.31 Although there were other possible signals 
of democratization, such as an opposition candidate victory or opposition 
party acceptance of the results, these leaders chose to invite observers as 
an action that distinguished their regime as one committed to democrati-
zation but that did not necessarily require them to give up power.
As the potential rewards for demonstrating a commitment to democ-
racy increased and as international actors developed the belief that all 
governments holding potentially democratic elections would invite inter-
national observers, other benefi t-seeking leaders imitated the signal even 
when they were not committed to democratization. This widespread and 
repeated behavior, coupled with the growing importance of democracy to 
international actors, changed international expectations such that invit-
ing observers became an international norm. The norm holds that pro-
democracy actors believe that all good types invite observers and receive 
their endorsement. Given uncertainty about the government’s commit-
ment to democracy, failing to hold internationally certifi ed elections nec-
essarily became a signal that a government was not holding democratic 
elections. Pro-democracy actors, primarily those at the international level 
but also domestic actors, began to rely on election monitoring to evaluate 
the democratic credentials of states and tied foreign aid and other tar-
geted benefi ts to internationally certifi ed elections. For example, follow-
ing coups or other interruptions of democratic rule, Western aid donors 
31. The international emphasis on democracy is a consequential and relatively unexplored 
variable within international relations. See McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World 
Value.” It is more thoroughly explored in the international law literature on the emerging 
right to democratic governance: Fox and Roth, “Democracy and International Law”; Rich, 
“Bringing Democracy into International Law”; Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance.” See also the literature on the international dimensions of democratization, 
including Burnell, Democracy Assistance; Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform; Drake, 
“The International Causes of Democratization”; Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the 
International Context of Democratization”; Levitsky and Way, “International Linkage and 
Democratization”; Mansfi eld and Pevehouse, “Democratization and International Organi-
zations”; Pevehouse, Democracy from Above; Pevehouse, “Democracy from the Outside-In?”; 
Starr, “Democratic Dominoes”; Vachudova, Europe Undivided; Whitehead, The International 
Dimensions of Democratization.
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frequently required internationally certifi ed elections before normal bilat-
eral relations could be restored. By the late 1990s, a government’s refusal 
to invite observers became a conspicuous signal that the election was not 
legitimate, further constraining election-holding leaders throughout the 
developing world.
Alternative Explanations
This book outlines a new theory of international norm formation. The 
majority of existing work on international norm creation focuses on two 
causal pathways: norms that result from the work of committed activists, 
commonly referred to as norm entrepreneurs, and norms that result from 
attempts to facilitate international cooperation.32 Although not focused 
on norm formation, the literature on the international diffusion of policies 
also provides a potential alternative explanation for the spread of election 
monitoring.33 I provide a brief summary of these general theories and 
contrast them with my argument.
Advocacy and Norm Entrepreneurs
The most prominent theory of norm development in international re-
lations offers one possible explanation for the creation of norms under 
which compliance is costly. According to this theory, initiated by con-
structivist scholars of international relations, new and more controversial 
international norms are generated because coalitions of activists or power-
ful states pressure other actors to change their behavior. Activist pressure 
changes the decision calculus for leaders, and as a result state leaders are 
motivated to comply with the new norm. This activist-centered theory is 
32. For representative works involving norms and international cooperation see Katzen-
stein, Keohane, and Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of World Politics”; 
Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences”; Keohane, “Reciprocity in Interna-
tional Relations”; Keohane, After Hegemony; Schelling, The Strategy of Confl ict. For a sample 
of widely recognized work on norm entrepreneurs, see Klotz, Norms in International Relations; 
Finnemore, “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms”; Risse-Kappen, Ropp, and 
Sikkink, The Power of Human Rights; Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights”; Thomas, The Hel-
sinki Effect; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; 
Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes.”
33. Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1960–2000”; Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the International 
Context of Democratization”; Simmons and Elkins, “The Globalization of Liberalization”; 
Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy.
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most clearly articulated by Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink: in the 
fi rst stage of norm initiation, “norm entrepreneurs attempt to convince a 
critical mass of states (norm leaders) to embrace new norms.” Norm lead-
ers then pressure other states to become norm followers, causing a “norm 
cascade” in which increasing numbers of states adopt the new norm. In 
the third stage of their theory, norms can become internalized and com-
pliance with the norm becomes automatic.34
Although instrumental logics play a part in this theory and many re-
lated arguments—the work of activists may be intended to, for example, 
generate costs for actors who fail to comply with the new norm—norm 
entrepreneurs are central in initiating and spreading the new behavior. 
Without this pressure, the activist-centered theory implies that states or 
other international actors that are better off not complying with the po-
tential norm would not be motivated to change their behavior. Therefore, 
unless advocates for a new norm are suffi ciently powerful, infl uential, or 
persuasive, attempts to change state behavior and generate new interna-
tional norms are unlikely to succeed.
Like Finnemore and Sikkink, Richard Price highlights the work of 
transnational activists in the global campaign to generate a norm against 
the use of antipersonnel landmines.35 Norm entrepreneurs and activists 
lobbied governments, generated international media attention against 
mine-producing states, mobilized domestic populations, and campaigned 
for the UN treaty banning the production and sale of landmines. Simi-
larly, Nina Tannenwald argues that in addition to nuclear deterrence, a 
post–World War II international norm against the use of nuclear weapons 
explains the absence of nuclear weapon use since 1945. This norm was 
created, she argues, in part because of the work of a global and morally 
motivated network of activists who campaigned against the use of nuclear 
weapons and raised moral objections against them.36 The work of activists, 
which may include networks of committed individuals, nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs), or states, is intended to “mobilize popular opinion 
and political support both within their host country and abroad” and ulti-
mately to motivate international actors to change their behavior.37
The pattern of election observation over time closely tracks the pattern 
of norm development described by Finnemore and Sikkink, including 
34. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 896.
35. Price, “Reversing the Gun Sights.”
36. Tannenwald, “The Nuclear Taboo.”
37. Nadelmann, “Global Prohibition Regimes,” 482.
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norm initiation, norm cascade, and norm internalization.38 It is tempt-
ing to conclude that the causal mechanism is the same and that norm 
entrepreneurs advocated the practice of election monitoring, causing it 
to spread, and lobbied powerful states to pressure noncomplying states 
to change their behavior. Finnemore’s and Sikkink’s theory is so widely 
accepted as the dominant explanation for norm development that when 
encountering a new international norm, some scholars assume that it must 
have been generated through activist pressure. This is clearly a tautology 
that Finnemore and Sikkink did not intend, but it highlights the dominant 
infl uence of their theory.
Advocacy-based theories of norm creation have been useful in explain-
ing a number of now-prominent international norms governing state be-
havior, including the targeting of civilians in war, the production and use 
of landmines, traffi cking in slaves, as well as those international norms 
proscribing individual behavior within states, such as international norms 
against child labor, killing endangered species, and discriminating against 
ethnic and religious minorities.39 They have also been useful in demon-
strating that international norms matter and that states may comply with 
international norms even when it is costly for them to do so.40 Yet the 
activist theory of norm development does not—nor was it intended to—
explain all international norms, nor all norms that are consequential.
Finnemore and Sikkink argue that “norms do not appear out of thin 
air; they are actively built by agents having strong notions about appro-
priate or desirable behavior in their community.”41 It is this feature of 
the Finnemore and Sikkink theory that most clearly distinguishes it from 
my argument in this book. By providing a theory of norm initiation and 
diffusion that does not require activism or imposition by powerful states, 
I focus explicitly on norms that are generated primarily through diffusely 
motivated strategic action and that can be created even in the absence of 
activist pressure.
Judith Kelley adopts the Finnemore and Sikkink model to explain the 
norm of election monitoring.42 In contrast to the more general theory 
and Kelley’s explanation of election monitoring,43 I argue that the  primary 
38. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change.”
39. Checkel, “International Norms and Domestic Politics”; Klotz, Norms in International 
Relations; Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction”; Nadelmann, “Global Pro-
hibition Regimes”; Thomas, The Helsinki Effect.
40. Katzenstein, The Culture of National Security.
41. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 896.
42. Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms.”
43. Ibid.
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motivation for the initiation, spread, and acceptance of international 
norms is not activist pressure but the incentive of individual states to sig-
nal their type and avoid being viewed as pseudo-democrats by infl uential 
international actors.
In the case of election monitoring, as I document in chapter 2, norm 
entrepreneurs and activists were conspicuously absent when election ob-
servation was initiated and began to spread, and regimes seeking inter-
national benefi ts, rather than activists, were the fi rst movers in initiating 
election monitoring. Some scholars infer the existence of norm entre-
preneurs because election observation is now an international norm, but 
evidence of norm entrepreneurship in election observation is nearly all 
present after the end of the Cold War, and well after election observation 
was initiated and diffused widely, undermining confi dence in its explana-
tory potential.44 Even prominent election observers such as former U.S. 
President Jimmy Carter were at fi rst reluctant to engage in election obser-
vation. Carter grew willing to participate as an international monitor only 
after being invited by sovereign leaders as part of a broader peace process 
in Haiti and Nicaragua. Even after these elections, the Carter Center con-
tinued to emphasize that they would observe elections only if invited by 
the host government and opposition parties. Providing an even clearer ex-
ample of international reluctance to engage in election monitoring, from 
the 1950s to 1990 the United Nations refused numerous invitations to 
monitor elections on the grounds that the practice violated sovereignty 
and constituted undue infl uence in the domestic affairs of member states. 
Even the Organization of American States, the fi rst international organi-
zation to adopt international monitoring as a common practice, initially 
refused to send election monitors after being invited on multiple occa-
sions by leaders of member states.
Norms and Incentives for Cooperation
Within international relations theory, one of the dominant approaches—
frequently referred to as “rationalist” or “neoliberal institutionalism”—
typically discusses norms as embedded within international institutions, 
and therefore generated along with them, frequently as a result of demand 
for interstate cooperation or through imposition by powerful states.45 This 
second alternative theory of norm development is similar to my argument 
44. Ibid.
45. Keohane, After Hegemony; Krasner, International Regimes; Young, “Regime Dynamics: 
The Rise and Fall of International Regimes.”
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in that both focus on strategic interaction between international actors; 
however, the institutionalist theory is not intended to explain the forma-
tion of costly norms or norms that are not intended to facilitate coop-
eration within international institutions. The types of norms discussed by 
institutionalists—such as those governing the fl ow of goods across borders—
are distinct in that they contribute to or result from mutually benefi cial in-
ternational cooperation. Any risks associated with the norm must therefore 
be outweighed by the benefi ts of cooperation. Cooperative norms (also 
called conventions) can result from simple coordination dilemmas, such 
as a community’s decision to drive on one side of the road or the adoption 
of international aviation control regulations. Defection is automatically 
punished, and the gains from following the norm are clear. Norms may be 
sticky or path dependent and may persist after the incentives that gener-
ated them change, but in general, the substantive focus is on norms that 
facilitate international cooperation by providing focal points and com-
mon knowledge or by constraining or ordering  preferences.46 Similarly, 
scholars in economics and international law have argued that norms and 
other social conventions can develop spontaneously as a result of repeated 
interactions and persist because they are Nash equilibria, with no actor 
having the incentive to deviate from the norm.47
My argument presents an alternative causal explanation for the cre-
ation of international norms and shows how consequential international 
norms can be generated unintentionally in a process that is endogenous 
to strategic interaction. Nevertheless, the interests of powerful states and 
pro-democracy advocates were important in raising the profi le of democ-
racy during the Cold War and generating the near-universal support for 
democratic governments within international organizations. International 
pressure for democracy or democratization, however, does not necessar-
ily include pressure for monitoring of elections, and my argument is that 
the norm of election monitoring was generated primarily because states 
seeking international benefi ts reacted to growing international support 
for democratic states. I fi nd little historical evidence to show that early 
advocates attempted to pressure other governments to invite observers. 
Across other issue areas, signaling-generated norms may coexist with ad-
vocacy, norm entrepreneurs, pressure from powerful states, and  incentives 
46. Schelling, The Strategy of Confl ict; Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, “International 
Organization and the Study of World Politics.”
47. Sugden, “Spontaneous Order”; Koh, “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?”; 
Axelrod, “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms.”
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for  cooperation, although I emphasize the distinction to make my theo-
retical contribution clear.
In relation to election monitoring, even in a counterfactual world in 
which the United States demanded that all democratizing countries invite 
observers, or if a transnational advocacy network developed with the ob-
jective of pressuring or shaming states into inviting international election 
observers, there are several reasons why it was unlikely they could have 
persuaded state leaders who were not already committed to democracy to 
begin allowing such an intrusion into their domestic political affairs. In-
vitations to international election monitors from sovereign governments 
motivated to improve their country’s democratic credentials were a neces-
sary fi rst step. Additionally, international organizations such as the United 
Nations and the Organization of American States initially objected quite 
strenuously to the practice of election monitoring as a violation of the or-
ganizations’ commitment to nonintervention. In the absence of repeated 
invitations from sovereign leaders, it is not clear that they would have 
been persuaded to not only send observers but also to initiate election 
observation, pressure countries to invite observers, and force observers 
upon unwilling states. Finally, pressuring governments to invite observers 
would have been unlikely to succeed for a very practical reason. With-
out government permission, it is extremely diffi cult for foreigners to en-
gage in effective election monitoring because they can be denied entry to 
the country and access to important parts of the electoral process. In the 
case of election monitoring, and in other similar cases, my contention is 
that election observation would not have spread so widely had it not been 
initiated by state leaders in an effort to (sometimes falsely) signal the demo-
cratic quality of their elections. International pressure for democracy, 
democratization, human rights, and self-determination played a role in 
motivating states to fi nd a signal of their commitment to democratization, 
but the norm of election monitoring would not have developed without 
the incentives generated by the dynamic signaling process.
Diffusion of Policies across Time and Space
An additional alternative explanation for the norm of election monitor-
ing is suggested by the literature on international diffusion of policies. 
Although the policy diffusion literature is not intended to explain inter-
national norm formation, it is similar to my argument in several ways. 
Like my argument, recent theories of policy diffusion also focus on instru-
mental motivations in explaining the spread of behaviors among states. 
For example, Beth Simmons and Zachary Elkins argue that the diffusion 
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of neoliberal economic policies, including capital account liberalization, 
exchange rate policy unifi cation, and current account liberalization, have 
taken place in part because of international factors that infl uence informa-
tion and the available set of policy choices. They argue that the incentives 
for a given state to adopt a particular policy are infl uenced by the foreign 
policy choices of other states and the information used by governments 
to make policy choices is also altered by policy choices in other states.48 
Similarly, Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett theorize that 
policies diffuse between states by four processes: coercion, competition, 
learning, and emulation.49 Competition, learning, and emulation are all 
elements of my signaling model of norm formation and diffusion, al-
though my theory can be considered a more specifi c version of a diffusion 
model and one that focuses on a particular causal mechanism. Kristian 
Gleditsch and Michael Ward highlight international factors in explaining 
the global diffusion of democratic political institutions.50 In addition to 
domestic causes of democratization, they demonstrate that a democratic 
transition is more likely in a given nondemocracy if neighboring coun-
tries also democratize and “fi rmly reject the idea that institutional change 
is driven entirely by domestic processes and unaffected by regional and 
international events.”51 However, like Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, 
they do not go into great detail about the casual mechanism underlying 
how international variables affect democratic transitions.
Across the literature on international policy diffusion, international 
norms are treated as a potential explanatory variable rather than a topic 
to be explained, and scholars in this literature tend to present norm-based 
explanations for the diffusion of policies as an alternative to those that 
focus on strategic behavior. For example, Gleditsch and Ward present the 
argument that “norms and values . . . favor the development and durability 
of democratic rule” as an alternative to their interpretation.52 Simmons 
and Elkins argue that one way that the policy choice payoffs can be al-
tered are “ideational” and “works through the more subjective pressures 
of prevailing global norms.”53 As I discuss in the next section, this con-
trast presents an incomplete picture of the role of international norms 
48. Simmons and Elkins, “The Globalization of Liberalization.”
49. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, “Introduction”; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, The 
Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy.
50. Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization.”
51. Ibid., 930.
52. Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the Spread of Democratic Institutions,” 263.
53. Simmons and Elkins, “The Globalization of Liberalization,” 172.
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when accounting for the widespread diffusion of a variety of policies and 
practices among states. Although these scholars do not attempt to explain 
international norms, I believe that many of the substantive topics they ex-
plore can be better understood if viewed through the lens of international 
norm formation, as I discuss in greater detail below.
Election Monitoring Is Costless?
A fi nal alternative explanation, and a challenge to my argument and the 
overall theme of this book, would be that election monitoring does not 
matter: if it is costless to invite observers, then it would be easy for all state 
leaders to mimic the trend even if they are engaging in widespread elec-
tion fraud, and election monitoring would be relatively uninteresting as a 
topic. Therefore, in order to evaluate my argument, it is also necessary to 
evaluate whether election monitoring matters in substantive ways.
Several consequences of election monitoring are implied directly by my 
theory. The signal of inviting observers must be more costly for pseudo-
democrats than for leaders committed to holding democratic elections. 
There are at least three ways that election monitoring matters for the do-
mestic politics of inviting states and that make election monitoring more 
costly for pseudo-democrats. First, the existence of the norm of election 
monitoring may reduce international benefi ts for those who invite moni-
tors and are caught cheating, as well as for those pseudo-democrats who do 
not invite them at all. Second, election monitors may reduce fraud directly 
and cost pseudo-democrats a percentage of their fraudulently obtained 
vote share. Third, the dynamics of signaling and norm creation triggered 
an evolving game of strategy between international monitors attempting 
to evaluate the quality of elections and incumbent leaders seeking inter-
national certifi cation of their elections. Taken together, the potential costs 
of election monitoring act as a set of diverse constraints on governments, 
making it more diffi cult for leaders to hold elections without risking their 
hold on power and also illustrating why international monitoring is an 
important—although imperfect—element of democracy promotion.
Caveats for International Norms
International norms are often mischaracterized or misunderstood by 
political scientists, and it is helpful to clarify several points. First, I focus 
on international norms that are generated unintentionally, in the absence 
of advocates, but that are also puzzling because compliance with them can 
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be costly. The current literature provides few examples of norms that are 
both consequential (i.e., noncooperative norms) and that are generated 
without norm entrepreneurs, incentives for cooperation, or imposition by 
powerful states.54
Second, my theory is not about moral or ethical motivation, which is 
typically used to explain the commitment of activists and is assumed by 
some to be a necessary component of international norms. Although in-
ternational norms or “shared standards of appropriate behavior” must be 
expected to possess a quality of “oughtness,” they need not be based in 
morality to be international norms.55 Nevertheless, the substantive focus 
of many studies, such as those on torture, the slave trade, landmines, child 
labor, female genital mutilation, treatment of medical personnel in war, 
the use of nuclear weapons, and other similar cases of international norm 
formation may lead one to conclude otherwise. My view of international 
norms, following a widely used defi nition in the literature, is more general 
and can be applied to shared expectations of appropriate behavior across 
issue areas, regardless of the moral dimension.
Third, although I present an overtly instrumental or “rational” theory 
of norm formation and diffusion that is distinct from existing theories, it 
is far from the only theory of norm creation to include some element of 
strategic interaction or rational behavior. The debate about international 
norm formation is sometimes misperceived as a debate between rationalists 
and constructivists over whether norms matter. This perceived debate is 
outdated, at best, and by some accounts it never took place. Highlighting 
constructivist attention to rational action, Finnemore and Sikkink label 
the process of norm formation “strategic social construction” and argue 
that “rationality cannot be separated from any politically signifi cant epi-
sode of normative infl uence or normative change, just as the normative 
context conditions any episode of rational choice.”56 Peter Katzenstein, 
Robert Keohane, and Stephen Krasner argue that although constructiv-
ists and rationalists disagree on ontology, “on issues of epistemology and 
methodology, however, no great differences divide constructivists from 
rationalists.”57 Similarly, James Fearon and Alexander Wendt complain 
54. Some coordination norms are generated without activists, but because they gener-
ate gains from cooperation, compliance with such norms is not controversial. See Sugden, 
“Spontaneous Order.”
55. Goertz and Diehl, “Toward a Theory of International Norms.”
56. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 888.
57. Katzenstein, Keohane, Stephen Krasner, “International Organization and the Study 
of World Politics,” 675.
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that rationalism and constructivism are often falsely pitted against one 
another, and some scholars mistakenly argue that “rationalists believe that 
people are always acting on material self-interest, and constructivists be-
lieve that people are always acting on the basis of norms and values.”58 
They go on to argue that this widely held misperception is due to mis-
understanding of rationalism, not to any fundamental theoretical confl ict 
between rationalism and constructivism.
Additionally, a number of prominent scholars focused on international 
norms have now highlighted that rational choice and constructivism 
complement each other more often than not and that rational or stra-
tegic action is closely tied to norm initiation and norm compliance.59 
For example, in relation to the norm of Arabism governing the inter-
national relations of Arab states, Michael Barnett argues that changes 
in this norm were generated through “social and strategic interactions” 
between rational and self-interested Arab states. In explaining state ac-
ceptance of the norm of territorial integrity, Mark Zacher argues that in-
strumental motivations played a large part in driving states to accept the 
norm, in addition to democratic ideals promoted through international 
organizations.60
A fi nal clarifi cation relates to which actors must hold an international 
norm in order for it to exist. It is not necessary for those actors who are 
expected to comply with the norm to share it. Rather, it is entirely possible 
for one group of states —such as the Western developed democracies—to 
share expectations about the appropriate behavior of a second group of 
states —such as developing countries. Continuing with Zacher’s territorial 
integrity norm, it is not necessary for all states to believe that the norm 
is legitimate in order for it to be enforced.61 It only must be true that 
some suffi ciently powerful states share the norm of respect for territorial 
integrity and are willing to enforce it against potential aggressors. The 
fact that many powerful states and most international organizations now 
share the norm of election observation is suffi cient to motivate change in 
state behavior; it is not necessary that every state leader choosing to invite 
58. Fearon and Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism,” 58.
59. Abbott and Snidal, “Values and Interests: International Legalization in the Fight 
against Corruption”; Barnett, Dialogues in Arab Politics; Finnemore and Sikkink, “Interna-
tional Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Fearon and Wendt, “Rationalism v. Con-
structivism”; Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International 
Election Monitoring”; Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm.”
60. Zacher, “The Territorial Integrity Norm.”
61. Ibid.
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observers does so out of a belief in the appropriateness or legitimacy of 
the norm.62
In my theory, only after the norm exists are costs imposed for non-
compliance. If the norm, and the associated costs of noncompliance, did 
not exist, improvements in the accuracy of the signal (the quality of elec-
tion monitoring) would mean that leaders could stop playing the game 
without fear of sanctions (losing only potential benefi ts from successful 
signaling). With the international norm and the expectation that all true 
democrats invite international observers to their elections, the costs of 
noncompliance reinforce the incentives for states to participate in the sig-
naling game, even when compliance with the norm becomes more costly. 
The norm makes it more likely that domestic and international democ-
racy promoters will react to a negative report or a country’s failure to 
invite observers.
States’ leaders may, of course, still choose to comply with the norm 
because they have internalized it or because they believe it is legitimate, 
and for most purposes it is not productive to debate whether states comply 
with international norms out of instrumental or norm-based reasons. As 
Fearon and Wendt argue, the answer could always be “both.”63 In the case 
of election monitoring, by distinguishing between norm-compliers and 
those who hold the norm, however, I am able to show how norms gener-
ate costs for noncompliance that would otherwise not exist and argue that 
the international norm causes states to continue inviting observers when 
it would not otherwise be in their interest to do so.64
Outline of the Book
In chapter 1, I present this argument in greater detail, working up to 
a set of empirical implications about the causes and consequences of the 
norm of election monitoring that are evaluated in chapters 2–5. In chap-
ter 2, I focus on changes over time in the reasons why leaders invite in-
ternational election observers. I provide a detailed narrative description 
62. This point is similar to the “logic of appropriateness” and “logic of consequences” 
arguments outlined by March and Olsen in “The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders.” Actors sharing the norm are motivated by a “logic of appropriateness,” but 
actors that comply with a norm may be doing so not because they believe it is right but rather 
based on a “logic of consequences.”
63. Fearon and Wendt, “Rationalism v. Constructivism.”
64. For a discussion of the differing motivations to comply with new norms, see Hurd, 
“Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.”
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of the governments that initiated election monitoring and present a new 
dataset documenting the trend of election monitoring over time. Using 
descriptive statistics and regression analysis, I use original data to eval-
uate whether my theory about the causes of internationally monitored 
elections is consistent with the cross-national empirical evidence. I also 
compare my argument to the alternative explanations outlined above, for 
which I fi nd only limited support.
Chapter 3 considers the supply side of election monitoring and docu-
ments changes in international democracy promotion as well as the change 
in democracy-contingent benefi ts associated with the norm of election ob-
servation, providing quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of my 
argument. I show that pro-democracy actors are responsive to the reports 
of observers and that the reports of observers are now used in many prom-
inent indices, such as Freedom House, that quantify a country’s political 
institutions. I also document changes in international benefi ts over time in 
several illustrative cases, providing clear evidence of the connection be-
tween international benefi ts and internationally certifi ed elections.
In chapter 4, I use experimental evidence to document that election 
monitoring is costly for pseudo-democrats in a way that it is not for true 
democrats. At a minimum, monitoring reduces election day manipulation, 
thus making it harder or more expensive to steal an election outright. For 
those holding clean elections, the same cost does not exist, an empirical 
fi nding that buttresses my theoretical argument.
In chapter 5, I explore the game of strategy between international ob-
servers and incumbent governments that are intent on manipulating the 
election and evading the consequences of a negative report. Using quali-
tative evidence, documented changes in observation methodology, and 
details from hundreds of election observation reports, I illustrate how the 
types of election manipulation have changed over time, in part responding 
to improved methods of election observation and increased willingness by 
other international actors to tie benefi ts to the reports of observers.
Even as it became more costly for many leaders to comply with the 
norm, the growing international emphasis on democracy meant that the 
norm was reinforced rather than weakened. So long as democracy remains 
a characteristic valued by other states in the international system, the norm 
will reinforce itself. However, should democracy become unimportant to 
powerful states and international organizations, the norm will weaken, 
and pseudo-democrats would be the fi rst to stop inviting international 
election monitors.
In the concluding chapter, I briefl y extend the argument to several 
other issue areas, including international weapons inspection, bilateral 
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investment treaties, and the diffusion of a variety of neoliberal economic 
policies. I then discuss the implications of this study for future research on 
international norm formation, election manipulation, and international 
constraints on pseudo-democratic leaders. In terms of policy, I outline the 
implications of this project for international election monitoring and for 
democracy promotion and international pressure more generally.
Indirect Pressure, Diffusion, and Norm Formation
This book presents a theory of norm development that explores how 
states in the developing world respond to the preferences of powerful 
states. Regardless of where these preferences originate, the overarching 
implication of this theory is that leaders respond to the changing prefer-
ences of more powerful actors within the international system. A corol-
lary to this theory is that it is not necessary for powerful states to impose 
their will on less-powerful actors for new international norms, rules, and 
institutions to be generated. Rather than requiring the work of advocates, 
imposition by powerful states, or mutually benefi cial coordination, these 
rules and norms can result from diffusely motivated reaction to anticipated 
international benefi ts. States respond to the availability of international 
benefi ts, and successful responses are mimicked. When signals diffuse in 
such a manner because of their relationship to characteristics that are val-
ued or rewarded, signals can quickly become international norms, even 
when no relevant actors pressure for a new norm.
This project covers the global development of international election 
observation from 1960 through 2006. The central argument is presented 
as a signaling game between incumbent leaders and democracy promot-
ers. The empirical implications derived from this model are evaluated 
using several types of evidence, including original cross-national data 
on elections and election observation throughout the developing world, 
natural and fi eld experiments involving the random assignment of inter-
national observers, and qualitative evidence about the dynamics between 
leaders, international observers, and pro-democracy international actors. 
By moving from a macro-level theory explaining the new norm of elec-
tion observation to cross-national, qualitative, and micro-level tests of the 
implications of this theory, I provide a comprehensive examination of why 
election monitoring has become an international norm as well as the con-
sequences of the norm for governments throughout the world.
Since the end of the Cold War, international election observation has at-
tracted signifi cant attention from policymakers and practitioners of for-
eign aid, democracy promotion, and postconfl ict political development as 
a useful and widely accepted tool to help facilitate democratic elections. 
For scholars of international relations and comparative politics, especially 
those interested in the consequences of international pressure on govern-
ment behavior, election observation also represents an ideal case of inter-
national norm formation. This chapter presents my argument in detail, 
providing a theory of international norm creation in which strategic inter-
action between state leaders and powerful international actors generates 
new and consequential international norms. I present a stylized model of 
the interaction between governments seeking international benefi ts, de-
mocracy promoters, and international election observers. Election moni-
toring became a norm in part because compliance is perceived to be costly 
for a well-defi ned subset of governments: those that engage in signifi cant 
election manipulation. By inviting independent third-party observers to 
judge their elections’ quality, governments holding rigged elections risk 
heightened international and domestic exposure of their corrupt prac-
tices. Because election monitors can deter fraud directly or make fraud 
more diffi cult, inviting observers is more costly for leaders who engage in 
election manipulation. These costs, in turn, are precisely what make elec-
tion monitoring a useful and informative signal.
The argument is presented in four parts. First, I introduce the relevant 
actors, including true democrats, pseudo-democrats, democracy promot-
ers, and international election observers. The creation of the norm of 
election observation hinged in part on the perceived existence of two 
types of leaders: those who are committed to genuine democratization 
and those who hold elections but are not necessarily willing to abide by 
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democratic rules.1 Second, I argue that changes in the international en-
vironment generated a common shock, exogenous to domestic political 
developments, that increased benefi ts for some state leaders who signaled 
their commitment to democracy. Although election monitoring was just 
one of many potential signals that governments could have used, it spread 
in part because democracy promoters began to recognize and reward pos-
itive reports from foreign election observers as an informative signal of a 
government’s intention to democratize.
Third, focusing on the decision to invite election observers, I argue 
that efforts by state leaders to gain democracy-contingent benefi ts led to a 
change in the expectations among democracy-promoting actors and ulti-
mately generated an international norm of election observation.
The norm is unintended in the sense that no constituency or group lob-
bied for the norm, nor do I fi nd evidence that it was imposed by a global 
or regional hegemon. The signal of inviting international election obser-
vation was initiated by leaders wishing to demonstrate their commitment 
to democratization, not by leaders seeking a new norm, and was imitated 
by pseudo-democratic leaders when the “democracy premium” grew suf-
fi ciently large. Repeated invitations from many state leaders led to the 
normalization of election observation and its explicit use as a method to 
evaluate the democratic credentials of other states.
Finally, I outline the empirical implications of this theory and sum-
marize the approach used to evaluate them in the subsequent chapters of 
the book. The analysis includes a global dataset of elections and election 
observation, detailed information on changes in democracy promotion 
and international benefi ts, evidence from election observer reports, and 
natural and fi eld experimental tests of the effects of election monitoring 
on domestic political behavior.
International Incentives and the Decision to Invite Observers
Although states are sovereign within the international system, they do 
not act in isolation. The decisions of leaders and the behavior of domestic 
political actors are subject to a variety of external infl uences. I focus in 
1. Note that these are ideal types, and even leaders who are committed to democratiza-
tion may be willing to bias the election in their favor. The important distinction between 
types of leaders is whether the recipients of the signal—in this case democracy-promoting 
actors—perceive that the distinction between types exists and if they think that they are bet-
ter off supporting governments that are true democrats.
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particular on one form of international infl uence: powerful international 
actors hold preferences about the characteristics of other states and en-
courage these characteristics indirectly through the allocation of inter-
national benefi ts. This hierarchical relationship between more and less 
infl uential international actors provides the foundation for my theory.2 
Economic and political stability, strategic location, transparency, and 
democratic political institutions are examples of valued and rewarded 
state-level characteristics. Countries such as Egypt and Israel receive high 
levels of foreign support from the United States primarily because they are 
strategically important, and the United States seeks to encourage such al-
lies through military and fi nancial support. Countries such as Singapore 
and Costa Rica attract high levels of foreign direct investment in part 
because they are perceived as stable. Economic and political stability is 
a state-level characteristic that is rewarded by many international actors. 
Across a variety of issues areas, however, infl uential international actors 
frequently do not defi ne exactly how states should prove that they are 
transparent, stable, or possess other desirable characteristics. Instead, for 
powerful states, it is frequently a safer strategy to interact with and reward 
those states whose “type” is clear from their behavior. Leaders of benefi t-
seeking states without established reputations must fi nd a way to demon-
strate their country’s qualifi cations in the absence of clear directives, an 
environment that gives them the incentive to identify credible signals of 
their type.
Given a change in the preferences of powerful international actors 
about the characteristics of other states—such as an increase in the em-
phasis on democracy—states that are not already perceived to possess 
the characteristic have an increased incentive to modify their behavior 
in order to gain more international benefi ts and to signal their commit-
ment (or type) to skeptical or indifferent audiences. International benefi ts 
are diverse and fungible and include international investment, foreign 
aid, preferential trade agreements, membership in international organi-
zations, military support, increased economic exchange, and legitimacy 
and prestige. New behaviors that become recognized as credible signals 
of a government’s type produce dynamic effects. Because such signals in-
crease the incentives for other states to imitate the new behavior, the new 
behavior spreads. In addition to generating imitators, success of a given 
benefi t-seeking signal indicates that some international actors have ac-
cepted the signal and therefore increases the demand for the signal among 
2. Lake, Hierarchy in International Relations.
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its intended recipients. If the signaling game becomes institutionalized 
such that international actors believe that all good types of states send a 
given signal, the new behavior becomes a norm. Only bad types refuse to 
signal. Therefore, if there is some probability that bad types can mimic 
the signal, this dynamic generates pressure on all benefi t-seeking states to 
comply with the norm.
This process is most likely when benefi t-giving actors want to encour-
age or reward a characteristic that is not readily observable. Because some 
governments may attempt to mimic democratic political institutions, it is 
diffi cult for external actors to judge a regime’s commitment to democracy. 
In the context of democracy promotion, pro-democracy actors prefer to 
support states committed to democratization and, all else equal, attempt 
to avoid supporting states that are not committed democrats.
True and Pseudo-Democrats
A common assumption in political science research is that the primary 
goal of incumbent politicians is to maintain power. This is often a useful 
assumption, but it can be misleading when applied to countries without 
established political institutions that help “enforce” democracy.3 For some 
leaders in transitional countries, the goal of democratization trumps the 
goal of staying in power at all costs. Throughout democratic history, dur-
ing periods of institutional instability some leaders have put their desire 
to lead their country toward democracy ahead of their desire to stay in 
offi ce. U.S. President George Washington was one of the fi rst prominent 
politicians to do so, and he transferred power to an elected successor de-
spite popular opinion that he should serve indefi nitely. Since that time, a 
number of incumbent politicians have risked their own political future in 
order to help their country progress toward democracy, including one of 
the fi rst leaders on record to invite international observers to elections in 
a sovereign state: José Figueres of Costa Rica, a man referred to upon his 
death as his country’s “father of democracy.”4
State leaders condition their behavior on anticipated international ben-
efi ts. Benefi t-seeking behavior is common in the developing world, where 
foreign aid and other forms of external support are frequently used for 
political purposes. Not all benefi t-seeking leaders are equally committed 
3. Przeworski, Democracy and the Market; Weingast, “The Political Foundations of Democ-
racy and the Rule of Law.”
4. “José Figueres, Father of Costa Rican Democracy, Dies.” United Press International, 
June 8, 1990.
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to democratization, even when they hold elections, as electoral autocrats 
such as Alberto Fujimori, Vladimir Putin, and Robert Mugabe illustrate. 
This distinction between types of leaders means that, given some level 
of international benefi ts tied to democracy and uncertainty about some 
governments’ commitment to it, those leaders who are actually commit-
ted to democratization are motivated to signal their type to domestic and 
international audiences.
Throughout this book, national leaders of transitional countries are re-
ferred to as “incumbents” or “governments.” This assumed actor can be 
one individual or a group of leaders, depending on the regime type. Once 
elections are announced, all incumbents choose the degree to which they 
(and usually their party and supporters) will abide by the rules of a demo-
cratic election. In institutionalized democracies, a free and independent 
media, an independent judiciary, rule of law, and an informed and active 
citizenry mean that—at least in theory—leaders are bound to democratic 
rules by predictably severe consequences.5 In countries in which democ-
racy is not institutionalized, some of the mechanisms of self-enforcing 
democracy may be weak or limited, and leaders are not so constrained. 
Incumbents may choose to delegate authority to an independent electoral 
commission, but one may assume that they always maintain ultimate au-
thority over the degree to which elections are manipulated.
Within this environment, there are two general types of incumbents: 
true democrats and pseudo-democrats. True democrats are those incum-
bents who obey the letter and the spirit of electoral laws: they follow rules 
regulating electoral competition (they do not commit electoral fraud) and 
comply with expected behavior following an election (if they lose, they 
peacefully transfer power). Put simply, they act like leaders in established 
democracies, working to maintain power within the confi nes of demo-
cratic institutions.
For other leaders of countries in transition, power-hungry politicians 
will attempt to stay in offi ce at all costs, including through undemocratic 
means. Although pseudo-democrats agree to hold elections, and will even 
hold free and fair elections if they believe that they are popular enough to 
win outright, they manipulate the election or the electoral process when 
they are not otherwise sure of their victory. The crucial differences between 
true democrats and pseudo-democrats are that, fi rst, pseudo-democrats 
will cheat in order to win and, second, if they are defeated, they do not 
willingly transfer power to another party.
5. Weingast, “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.”
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I do not attempt to classify each and every leader as a true or pseudo-
democrat because it is frequently impossible to do so before elections take 
place.6 Some leaders may change during their tenure, such as dictators 
who rule unelected for decades but peacefully leave power after allowing—
and losing—democratic elections. Kenneth Kaunda, the president of 
Zambia from 1964 to 1991, is such an example. Other leaders persist 
in holding elections long after they are widely perceived as dictators or 
“electoral autocrats.” Still others appear to oscillate between gross viola-
tions of democratic procedures and respecting democratic processes even 
when they lose, such as Hugo Chavez of Venezuela or Daniel Ortega of 
Nicaragua.
Variation in the degree to which leaders are willing to abide by the rules 
of democratic elections is essential in explaining why election monitoring 
became an international norm. Even China claims to be democratizing, 
and even North Korea and Turkmenistan hold elections. There are also 
a number of countries such as Chile, Ghana, and Indonesia that transi-
tioned to democracy under great uncertainty about the commitment of 
their leaders to democratization. Judging which governments are actually 
democratizing is diffi cult because verbal commitments by leaders claim-
ing to democratize and even the decision to hold elections are cheap talk. 
Many autocrats pay lip service to democratic values and hold rigged elec-
tions without serious risk to their power. As I argue in this chapter, inter-
national election monitoring spread widely because an endorsement from 
reputable international observers became internationally recognized as a 
signal that a leader was committed to holding democratic elections, be-
cause it is costly but not impossible for pseudo-democrats to imitate this 
signal, and because observation itself generated valuable information for 
democracy-promoting states.
Democracy Promoters
The other major actor in the development of election observation is 
the democracy-promoting community, represented primarily by powerful 
Western states. In some cases, the coalition of democracy promoters also 
includes domestic forces within a potentially democratizing country, al-
though domestic pro-democracy forces are not necessary for governments 
to have the incentive to respond to foreign democracy promoters. In 
6. Przeworski et al. code a binary democracy variable based on whether democratic elec-
tions are possible, although the coding rules make it diffi cult to apply to these rules to elec-
tion monitoring (Democracy and Development.)
34 The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma
reality, democracy promoters are an amalgamation of states, international 
organizations, and other actors, all of whom act independently from one 
another. I refer to these actors in the aggregate in order to examine how a 
leader’s decision to invite election monitors is infl uenced by the expected 
response among democracy promoters. This type of assumption is not 
without precedent. For example, as Michael Tomz has shown in relation 
to state reputation in international capital markets, coordination is not 
necessary for diverse international actors—such as investors or democracy 
promoters—to develop common beliefs and responses to the behavior of 
governments.7 Simply put, the behavior of leaders can be infl uenced by 
the anticipated reaction of the pro-democracy international community, 
even when the international community is a diffuse set of actors without a 
formal mechanism to coordinate their response.8
International Election Observers
International election observers are offi cial delegations of foreigners 
who are invited by the host government to observe and report on the elec-
toral process. Election observation missions are deployed or sponsored by 
international organizations, such as the Organization of American States 
(OAS), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Offi ce 
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR), and the 
European Union (EU), and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), such 
as the Carter Center and the Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL). 
Some NGOs such as the National Democratic Institute and the Interna-
tional Republican Institute are nominally independent but are primarily 
funded by individual governments. International election observers are 
central in my theory, yet their role is straightforward. Although there are 
several notable exceptions, the primary role of international observers at 
an election is to evaluate its quality and to provide recommendations for 
improvements to the electoral process. In this stylized model of election 
observation, their report on election quality is not determined by the ex-
pected response of other actors but rather is determined only by the qual-
ity of the election.9
In this sense, the reports of observers on election quality are not stra-
tegically motivated, although I will show later that as the norm became 
7. Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation.
8. This point is also made clearly by Goertz and Diehl in relation to diffuse sanctioning 
of norm violators in “Toward a Theory of International Norms.”
9. But also see Kelley, “D-Minus Elections.”
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more widely accepted, organizations supporting international observers 
invested in improving observation technology.10 For now, it is important 
to note that in my theory, international observers do not by themselves 
confer international costs or benefi ts.11 They primarily serve an informa-
tional role, and their reports matter to the extent that other actors rely on 
them to evaluate the quality of elections.
The quality of observers varies considerably over time and between 
organizations. Since observers began criticizing elections in the 1980s, 
a subset of observer organizations have developed reputations as being 
more professionalized and more willing to call out problematic elections. 
As I discuss in chapter 5, this fact has been exploited by pseudo-democrats 
in the game of strategic manipulation played with observers.12 Other or-
ganizations are unlikely to be explicitly critical and do not invest resources 
in improving monitoring techniques.
The International Environment and the Democracy Premium
Countries seeking international benefi ts respond to the preferences of 
other international actors, such as a preference among powerful states for 
democratic political institutions to be present in states receiving their sup-
port. The skeptic may doubt that such a “democracy premium” exists in 
practice because there are many examples in which nondemocratic re-
gimes continue to receive external support from pro-democracy actors. It 
would be naive to assert that infl uential actors promote democracy at all 
costs or that democracy promotion trumps all other interests of powerful 
states. At best, promoting democracy is just one of many foreign policy 
goals, and its importance relative to other objectives changes over time 
within individual countries and international organizations. Nevertheless, 
there is much evidence to suggest that international pressure for democ-
racy exists and that benefi t-seeking states respond to this pressure.13 For 
10. There are several counter examples in which international observers are pressured 
to reach a predetermined conclusion about the election or to base their conclusion on 
which party won rather than the quality of the process, but these examples are, at this point, 
exceptions.
11. It is possible that there is a direct psychological effect on leaders as a result of praise 
or criticism, although this is not included in my theory.
12. Beaulieu and Hyde, “In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion”; Simpser, “Unin-
tended Consequences of Election Monitoring.”
13. States promote democracy for many reasons ranging from the ideological to the stra-
tegic. I set aside the question of why states promote democracy, and I discuss the empirical 
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such international pressure to infl uence the behavior of leaders, it is only 
necessary that not-yet-democratic states have reason to believe that they 
may be rewarded for appearing to democratize.
Leaders vary in the types of international benefi ts they seek, and they 
may desire benefi ts such as international legitimacy, foreign aid, mem-
bership in international organizations, and increased foreign direct in-
vestment. International benefi ts can also be withheld or withdrawn as a 
penalty for various reasons, including actions related to democratic rever-
sals. Individual states or leaders may prefer different types of benefi ts and 
may seek material or less tangible benefi ts, such as international legitimacy 
or prestige. As I discuss in chapter 2, the fact that international benefi ts 
are fungible makes measurement more challenging, but it is unnecessary 
to assume that leaders seek only material benefi ts or nonmaterial benefi ts 
such as legitimacy.14
During the Cold War, democracy promotion was closely tied to U.S.- 
and Western-aligned states. Although anti-communism was clearly the 
most important characteristic to the United States, and frequently trumped 
democracy, allies were periodically encouraged to liberalize politically 
and were promised increased support if they did so.15 The end of the Cold 
War brought democracy promotion closer to the top of the foreign pol-
icy agendas of many powerful states, and the issue of democracy gained 
prominence in a number of international organizations.16 Even after the 
end of the Cold War, however, the widespread movement toward overt 
and multifaceted democracy promotion by powerful international actors 
did not displace other foreign policy objectives, but rather it grew in im-
portance relative to anti-communism. Pressure for democracy continues to 
vary across states and regions depending on other geopolitical concerns.
In presenting this theory, I make the basic assumption that international 
actors prefer to support countries that they judge to have high value and 
that the characteristics valued by international actors change over time. 
More than one characteristic of a given state can be rewarded or pun-
ished, even if they sometimes confl ict, and the relative weight of individual 
evidence of democracy promotion efforts and the international benefi ts tied to democracy 
in chapter 3.
14. Kelley argues that leaders are primarily seeking legitimacy when they invite observ-
ers, although she highlights both instrumental and normative reasons in “Assessing the Com-
plex Evolution of Norms.”
15. Smith, America’s Mission.
16. Donno, “Defending Democratic Norms: Regional Intergovernmental Organizations, 
Domestic Opposition and Democratic Change”; Pevehouse, Democracy from Above; Mans-
fi eld and Pevehouse, “Democratization and International Organizations.”
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characteristics changes. For example, during the Cold War, a communist-
aligned government could not gain support from democracy promoters 
because its position on communism would have outweighed its other char-
acteristics, even if the country’s government was genuinely committed to 
democratization. An anti-communist government, however, could lobby 
to increase its share of international benefi ts by signaling its commitment 
to democracy. Also according to this model, a strategically important auto-
crat may continue receiving support from democracy-promoting states so 
long as the value of its geopolitical position outweighs its lack of political 
liberalization.
State-level characteristics may change in value relative to each other. 
When anti-communism was the most important factor in allocating in-
ternational benefi ts during the Cold War, increasing a state’s commitment 
to democracy would lead to only a small boost in international benefi ts, 
and becoming more democratic could not outweigh the negative value at-
tached to a communist-sympathizing government. Compared to the value 
associated with anti-communism, the weight of democracy was small. 
After the Cold War, the weight given to democracy increased relative to 
other characteristics, giving more leaders the ability and incentive to seek 
democracy-linked benefi ts.
Two simple but important implications follow from this basic model. 
First, it is not necessary that democracy is the state’s most important char-
acteristic for it to factor into the decision-making behavior of benefi t-
seeking incumbents. Second, for each government seeking international 
benefi ts, any change in the relative weight given to democracy in the allo-
cation of international benefi ts changes the corresponding expected ben-
efi ts of being internationally recognized as democratic.
Although this emphasis is redundant, scholars and public commenta-
tors often make the point that democracy promotion cannot be effective 
if it is inconsistently applied across states or if other characteristics are 
also valued.17 In contrast, I argue that inconsistent democracy promotion, 
or democracy promotion conditioned by geopolitical interests, can still 
have important effects in motivating changes in the behavior of benefi t-
maximizing leaders. Counterintuitively, this argument also suggests that 
some ambiguity in the motivations of powerful democracy-promoting 
states increases the number of leaders willing to risk political liberaliza-
tion and invite international exposure. If all leaders expected that foreign 
commitments to enforce democracy were absolute, the governments most 
17. Roth, “Despots Masquerading as Democrats.”
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likely to violate democratic institutions would be the least willing to risk 
political liberalization to gain democracy-contingent international bene-
fi ts. In a world of sovereign states, the promotion of democracy at all costs 
would decrease the incentives for pseudo-democrats to invite observers 
and therefore decrease international scrutiny where it is most interesting: 
governments that are most likely to be manipulating their elections and 
constraining political liberalization.
Signaling Commitment to Democracy
Assuming that a democracy premium exists and that democratic gov-
ernments receive some increase in their expected level of foreign support, 
how might a government of an uncertain type send a credible signal of 
its commitment to democratization? Historically, scholars and policymak-
ers have applied various standards to democratizing countries in order to 
judge when they can be considered democratic. One such standard is the 
“two-turnover test,” in which a country is considered democratic after two 
peaceful transitions in power through elections, a standard that leaders 
or parties who wish to remain in power would clearly not prefer.18 Another 
popular standard defi nes an election as democratic if all political parties ac-
cept the results. Opposition acceptance of the results is an unreliable indi-
cator because opposition political parties may act as sore losers, protesting 
even democratic elections. Similarly, governments may credibly threaten 
to crack down on protest following rigged elections and successfully in-
timidate losing parties. Such a credible threat of retribution would falsely 
give the appearance that opposition parties had accepted the results.
These standards are not ideal from the perspective of true democrats 
seeking recognition as such: a country could theoretically be democratic 
before experiencing two turnovers, as Arend Lijphart has argued in the 
cases of Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland,19 or 
countries could experience democratic backsliding even after two or more 
turnovers in power, as in Nicaragua or Peru. Before democracy is institu-
tionalized, suspicion between political actors and an absence of credible 
information make it diffi cult for leaders to signal whether an election is 
democratic. This idea was neatly summed up by a Chilean general be-
fore the internationally observed 1988 plebiscite on the continued rule of 
18. Huntington, The Third Wave of Democratization.
19. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
39Signaling Democracy
Augusto Pinochet: “If the government’s candidate wins everyone will say 
it was fraud. If he loses everyone will say it was a fair election. So it is more 
in our interests than anyone else’s to be able to show it was an absolutely 
fair election.”20
Following an increase in democracy-contingent benefi ts, benefi t-seeking 
states have the incentive to signal their type rather than rely on the judg-
ment of powerful states. Other potentially credible signals, such as op-
position victory, require leaders to give up power. By proactively signaling 
their commitment to democratic elections, state leaders who initiated 
election observation could make it more likely that their country was ac-
curately recognized as a democratizing state, potentially decrease suspi-
cion among domestic opposition parties, and increase their likely share of 
international support from the West. International election monitoring is 
a credible signal because it is more costly for pseudo-democrats than for 
true democrats, yet both types of leaders can signal their commitment to 
democracy by holding internationally monitored and endorsed elections.
Simply extending an invitation to international observers is not a suf-
fi cient signal: elections must also receive a positive report from observ-
ers. As election monitoring spread, pro-democracy actors, including true 
democrats, increased the cost of the signal to pseudo-democrats by ex-
panding the mandate of election monitoring and improving the quality 
of observation: governments increasingly had to allow more observers; 
give them unfettered access to the entire electoral process throughout the 
country before, during, and after the election; and avoid manipulating the 
election in a manner that observers would criticize.
The dynamics of this interaction, including the diffusely motivated be-
havior of states acting in their own best interest, caused the new behavior—
inviting international election monitors—to spread widely. Because these 
state leaders were successful in advocating a connection between election 
monitoring and democracy, initially reluctant international actors began 
to accept the signal of inviting observers in some regions. Over time, these 
pro-democracy actors began to expect that all leaders holding potentially 
democratic elections would invite international election monitors unless 
they were not committed to democracy.21 This change in international 
20. General Fernando Mattei on Pinochet’s “insoluble dilemma,” quoted in Huntington, 
The Third Wave, 84.
21. On the norm of election observation see Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair; Kelley, “As-
sessing the Complex Evolution of Norms”; Rich, “Bringing Democracy into International 
Law”; Santa-Cruz, “Constitutional Structures, Sovereignty, and the Emergence of Norms.”
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expectations about the behavior of governments has been noted by other 
scholars. As Roland Rich argues,
International observation of national elections and referendums in coun-
tries claiming to be democratic has become the norm. The rejection of 
foreign electoral observers has come to be taken as a signal that the coun-
try concerned is not prepared to open itself to international scrutiny and is 
not interested in the international legitimacy that a positive report would 
bestow.22
And, as Eric Bjornlund writes, “in democratizing and semiauthoritarian 
countries, election monitoring has become the norm and is now effectively 
a prerequisite in such countries for elections to be viewed as legitimate.”23 
Judith Kelley similarly highlights the change in internationally held expecta-
tions, arguing that because “honest governments always had the incentive to 
invite monitors . . . [t]he international community could therefore infer 
that incumbents who refused monitors must have intended to cheat.”24
In recent years, the norm has spread even among developed democra-
cies. Until 2000, few countries invited observers if they had established 
their type and their commitment to democracy. But as election observation 
became normalized, some pseudo-democratic governments complained 
of hypocrisy and paternalism in the application of election observation, 
and partly in response, European and North American democracies began 
to invite foreign observers.
The Dynamics of Norm Initiation and Diffusion
Why did state leaders choose to invite international scrutiny of what 
used to be an entirely domestic political process? Why did leaders who 
planned to commit election fraud begin inviting observers? Why did 
inviting observers become an international norm rather than a fl eeting 
phenomenon, and why do states continue to comply with the norm even 
when it is clear that they will be caught manipulating the election?
Explaining the global diffusion of election monitoring requires explain-
ing the decision by individual leaders to invite observers or not. My theory 
is based on a signaling game.25 Scholars of international norms and game 
22. Rich, “Bringing Democracy into International Law,” 26.
23. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 31.
24. Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms,” 231.
25. For discussion of signaling games in international relations, see Morrow, “The Strate-
gic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and Negotiation in International Politics.” 
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theorists rarely engage one another, although some concepts have strong 
parallels in both literatures.26 Because the setup and implications of the 
game are relatively straightforward, the formalization of the game is con-
fi ned to the appendix and the model is described entirely in words. When 
it is useful, I link the argument to game-theoretic concepts, and familiarity 
with game theory is helpful but not necessary to understand this part of 
my argument.
Incumbent governments choose whether to invite observers and attempt 
to gain their endorsement. This decision is modeled as a signaling game 
played by incumbents of uncertain type: unambiguous autocratic regimes 
such as Saudi Arabia or North Korea are not expected to play the game, 
and unambiguously democratic regimes such as Australia, Belgium, or 
Canada were not expected to invite observers until the norm had diffused 
widely.27 For such governments, it is unlikely that the signal of inviting ob-
servers and receiving their report would change other actors’ beliefs about 
regime type, making it unlikely that they will attempt to play the game.
Given that elections are being held in a country that is not unam-
biguously autocratic, I assume that the incumbent leader can be a true 
democrat or a pseudo-democrat. Both types of leaders decide whether to 
invite international observers. Before making this decision, leaders evalu-
ate their likely share of international benefi ts and the available ( potential) 
benefi ts tied to democracy. Other country-level characteristics known to 
the incumbent and democracy promoters, such as strategic location, al-
liances, or any number of other characteristics, also factor into the an-
ticipated benefi ts that incumbents perceive before deciding whether to 
invite observers. In choosing whether to invite observers, governments 
also consider whether and how they will attempt to manipulate the elec-
tion in their favor. More manipulation is more expensive and more likely 
to be caught when observers are invited. Methods of manipulation that 
are less likely to be caught by observers are assumed to be more expensive, 
because additional effort must be devoted to concealing manipulation or 
manipulating the election using legal or indirect tactics.
See also Schelling, The Strategy of Confl ict; Schultz, Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy; Schultz, 
“Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises”; Milner, Interests, Institutions, 
and Information; Fearon, “Rationalist Explanations for War.”
26. Katzenstein, Keohane, and Krasner, “International Organization and the Study of 
World Politics”; Morrow, “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?”; Fearon and Wendt, 
“Rationalism v. Constructivism”; Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics 
and Political Change.”
27. I discuss the decision by developed democracies to invite international observers 
below.
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Because by defi nition the ideal type of true democrat never cheats, they 
do not have to pay the costs of manipulating the election and are never 
caught cheating. I assume that election monitoring is not entirely cost-
less for true democrats, who must pay a small sovereignty cost if they 
invite observers. The sovereignty cost is in part determined by the reac-
tion of domestic audiences to the government’s decision to invite observ-
ers. Domestic audiences do not necessarily support the decision to invite 
observers. The sovereignty cost can vary by country because of variation 
in domestic support for the decision to invite international observers. For 
example, some domestic actors view international election observers as 
an unnecessary form of foreign meddling, and in such cases the sover-
eignty costs associated with inviting observers would be greater. However, 
as election observation becomes more widely accepted among domestic 
audiences, the sovereignty cost decreases.28
Leaders committing large-scale fraud or who are less willing to risk a 
negative report must exert more effort to conceal election manipulation, 
such as by moving election manipulation to the pre-election period, by 
engaging in indirect rather than direct forms of manipulation (e.g., media 
bias rather than vote theft), and by training polling offi cials to disguise 
election fraud as administrative incompetence. They may also have to in-
crease the rate of cheating in front of observers in order to overcome any 
fraud deterrence caused by the observation.
In this model, elections represent a gamble with a probabilistic out-
come.29 Across all leaders, the base probability of victory without fraud 
is assumed to be the same. Incumbents who do not win the election 
gain nothing, even if they invite observers. Those who win through 
election manipulation in the presence of observers must also pay the as-
sociated cost of election manipulation, although election manipulation 
makes victory more likely. Figure 1.1 illustrates the basic relationship 
between the probability of victory and the level of manipulation with 
and without international observers. The probability of victory for true 
democrats is labeled in the fi gure as p. Note that election fraud increases 
the probability of victory for pseudo-democrats (denoted as q), but this 
increased probability of victory comes at a price and is marginally more 
costly when observers are present. Benefi ts of winning the election 
28. In the empirically unusual case that the domestic audience increases support for 
the incumbent because the incumbent invited observers, the sovereignty cost can be mod-
eled as a benefi t in the formal model and would increase the likelihood that observers are 
invited.
29. Cox, “Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975–2000.”
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come from both domestic and international sources. Domestic benefi ts 
associated with winning the election include salary and domestic pres-
tige, which are available to both types of leaders. Following an election 
victory, the incumbent expects to receive some amount of international 
benefi ts based on the total value of their country’s characteristics and 
the updated postelection beliefs among democracy promoters about 
their type.
When signifi cant fraud is detected, observers issue a negative report, 
but if cheating is not detected, observers issue a positive report. Given that 
an incumbent is cheating, the probability that observers issue a negative 
report is infl uenced by the level and form of cheating committed. If the 
incumbent is a true democrat, cheating is never revealed to international 
observers and negative reports are never issued. For pseudo-democrats 
who engage in election manipulation, a negative report is possible but not 
certain and is determined by their success at manipulating the election in 
a manner that observers are unlikely to criticize. At the conclusion of the 





















MJ = 1*MJ = 0*
Figure 1.1. International observation, election manipulation, and probability of victory
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incumbent leader is a true democrat or a pseudo-democrat and condition 
their support accordingly.
Although opposition parties are sometimes found to be guilty of elec-
tion fraud, they do not determine whether observers are invited in the 
fi rst place; therefore, this possibility is not modeled in my explanation of 
the decision to invite observers. Additionally, in investigating all nega-
tive reports from observers, I have found no cases in which international 
observers criticized an election when only opposition parties committed 
election fraud.
Signaling and the Dynamics of Norm Diffusion
Logically, if democracy-promoting actors believe that all true demo-
crats invite international observers, any incumbent government that does 
not invite observers is assumed to be a pseudo-democrat. In the lan-
guage of game theory, the norm of election monitoring is defi ned as the 
shared expectation among democracy promoters that all true democrats 
invite observers and receive their endorsement. The international norm 
of election observation therefore means that if democracy promoters ob-
serve that a government (of uncertain type) has refused to invite observers, 
or they observe that a government has received a negative report from ob-
servers, they update their postelection beliefs and assume that the leader is 
a pseudo-democrat. Using this conceptualization, explaining the creation 
of the norm is equivalent to explaining how this shared expectation that 
true democrats invite observers was generated.
Signaling behaviors are common in international relations. Generally, 
they are most useful when they allow other actors to distinguish between 
types of governments. If there are two types of governments, and only 
one type of actor is willing or able to send a specifi ed signal, it is called a 
“separating equilibrium.” In a separating equilibrium, a government can 
credibly signal its type to the intended recipient of the signal. A “pool-
ing equilibrium” occurs when both types of governments are motivated 
to send the signal, but in this case the signal does not serve as a credible 
signal of a government’s type. Also possible in many signaling games 
are semiseparating or semipooling equilibria in which one or more 
types send the signal some of the time. Under such scenarios, the recipi-
ents of the signal can infer some information about the incumbent’s type 
based on whether or not the incumbent attempts to signal, but the sig-
nal does not allow other actors to clearly distinguish between types of 
governments.
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I use this general model and the basic concepts underlying signaling 
games to explain the initiation and diffusion of election observation over 
time and to outline the motivations for changing behavior among lead-
ers and democracy promoters. As with many signaling games, there are 
a number of possible equilibrium strategies, which are discussed in ap-
pendix A. In order to describe the causal dynamics of norm formation 
and diffusion over time and the relationship of my theory to signaling 
behaviors, I discuss various equilibria of the signaling game as they apply 
to specifi c periods in the overtime development of the norm of election 
observation.
In the period preceding the introduction of international election mon-
itoring, states “pooled” on the decision not to invite observers. Neither 
true democrats nor pseudo-democrats invited observers, and neither type 
was expected to do so. Given the assumptions in the model, if there are no 
democracy promoters, or if the incumbent believes that democracy pro-
moters will not recognize and reward the signal of inviting election moni-
tors, whether a government invites observers is not a factor in postelection 
beliefs about the government’s type, and there is therefore no incentive 
for governments to invite observers.
The equilibrium in which no incumbents choose to invite observers 
represents the world before election monitoring was initiated. This equi-
librium changes if the true democrat believes that inviting election observ-
ers may be recognized as a signal of his or her type and there are potential 
rewards associated with such signaling. Rewards are possible when the 
democracy-contingent benefi ts outweigh the sovereignty costs associ-
ated with inviting observers and when inviting observers is assumed to be 
more costly for pseudo-democrats than for true democrats. Because gain-
ing a positive report from observers is relatively easy for true democrats, 
who never commit election fraud, there is little risk to true democrats 
associated with inviting observers. As mentioned above, as more actors 
adopt the view that election observation is consistent with sovereignty and 
self-determination, sovereignty costs diminish. The growing number 
of well-respected democracies that have invited international observers 
since 2002 in part refl ects the reduction in sovereignty costs associated 
with the normalization of election observation. This reduction is a conse-
quence rather than a cause of the international norm.
For pseudo-democrats, the decision to invite observers is more com-
plicated. Like true democrats, they consider the size of the potential 
democracy premium and sovereignty costs of inviting observers. In weigh-
ing the decision to invite observers, they also consider their ideal level of 
election manipulation, the probability that they will win given this level 
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of election manipulation, the probability that they will receive a positive 
report from observers, the direct costs of cheating in front of election 
observers (such as fraud deterrence), and the effort devoted to cheating 
in front of observers. All else equal, if the democracy premium is large 
enough to outweigh the risks associated with inviting observers, pseudo-
democrats have the incentive to do so. Under these conditions, however, if 
the democracy premium is large enough to outweigh these risks for pseudo-
democrats, they should also outweigh the costs for true democrats. If any 
pseudo-democrats invite observers, then democracy promoters can rea-
sonably believe that all true democrats invite observers. If true democrats 
have the incentive to invite election monitors, it should lead to the belief 
among democracy promoters that all true democrats invite observers, and 
that all noninviting states are necessarily pseudo-democrats. If such a belief 
develops, and if there is some possibility that pseudo-democrats can fool 
observers and receive a positive report, pseudo-democrats have the incen-
tive to invite observers as well. Under such conditions, pseudo-democrats 
risk receiving a negative report when they invite observers, but failing to 
invite observers signals their type with certainty. If pro-democracy actors 
believe that all true democrats invite observers, the only condition under 
which the pseudo-democrat prefers not to invite observers is when there 
is no chance of fooling observers and gaining a positive report given their 
anticipated level and type of election fraud.
If democracy promoters exist, they seek to support true democrats 
and withhold benefi ts from pseudo-democrats, and the potential value of 
the democracy premium changes substantially over time. For both true 
democrats and pseudo-democrats to invite observers, the anticipated de-
mocracy premium must be large enough to outweigh the costs and risks 
associated with cheating in front of observers. Inviting observers can be 
the expected strategy for both types of incumbents when the democracy 
premium is suffi ciently high and when pseudo-democrats can potentially 
gain a positive report from observers. Pseudo-democrats who invite ob-
servers must successfully hide or minimize election manipulation: if they 
do not, democracy promoters update their beliefs accordingly, and the 
incumbent faces the costs of having signaled that their government is an 
electoral autocracy.
The pool of countries expected to play the game is not necessarily uni-
form over time. It is possible that true democrats can graduate from the 
norm of election observation when there is no longer any uncertainty 
about their type. It is also possible that unambiguously autocratic govern-
ments can work to change their reputation by engaging in credible politi-
cal liberalization. They can, for example, introduce elections, multiparty 
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competition, and other democratic reforms, such as liberalization of 
the media.
Because refusing observers became a de facto admission of guilt by 
pseudo-democrats, however, the incentives faced by governments made it 
more likely that both types invited observers. The only governments re-
fusing to invite observers became those holding the most blatantly rigged 
elections, such as Laos, North Korea, and Vietnam; those receiving for-
eign support for strategic reasons, such as Egypt; and those willing to 
go without Western support (perhaps because of high sovereignty costs 
imposed by anti-Western domestic audiences), such as Iran and Malay-
sia. Reduced sovereignty costs are also evidenced by the fact that even 
powerful democracy-promoting states began to invite international elec-
tion observers, in part to avoid charges of hypocrisy from governments 
such as Belarus and Russia.
Thus, the norm in which all true democrats are expected to invite in-
ternational observation of their elections leads to an equilibrium in which 
all true democrats invite observers and many pseudo-democrats attempt 
to invite observers. All noninviting countries are perceived to be pseudo-
democracies or autocracies. Not all pseudo-democrats who invite observ-
ers are able to successfully imitate the signal, and some are documented 
as pseudo-democrats by international observers. Attempting to fake the 
signal imposes additional costs upon pseudo-democrats.
Explaining the norm of election monitoring requires that this model of 
individual decision making—in which each government makes a choice 
about whether observers should be invited—be extended to explain the 
global diffusion of election monitoring. The model described above and 
formalized in the appendices focuses on individual decision making but 
generates empirical predictions about how groups of leaders with specifi c 
characteristics should behave. In the early period of election monitoring, 
inviting observers was initiated by leaders who sought to increase their 
share of international benefi ts. The only internationally imposed cost was 
for leaders caught manipulating elections. In the second period, an exog-
enous increase in democracy-contingent benefi ts associated with the end 
of the Cold War gave nearly all true democrats the incentive to invite 
observers. As a result of this change in behavior, democracy-promoting 
actors developed the belief that all true democrats invite observers, which 
triggered the third stage of election monitoring, its rapid diffusion, and 
the establishment of international election observation as an international 
norm. Because the practice was initiated by state leaders seeking observers, 
and these leaders continued to invite observers, concerns among interna-
tional actors about violating sovereignty were sidestepped. Predictably, 
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leaders who refused observers after the norm developed justifi ed their 
decision by arguing that observers violate state sovereignty. Additionally, 
the link between election observation and democracy, which was created 
and strengthened by leaders who invited observers in order to boost their 
democratic credentials, made it possible for international actors to accept 
election observation as a method of democracy promotion. This link was 
not obvious when election observation was initiated, but it has become 
so widely accepted that it now seems self-evident. Election observation 
is now a central component of democracy promotion, and the reports of 
observers are overtly linked to a variety of international benefi ts.
Costly Signals and Domestic Consequences
Because international observers may improve the quality of elections in 
countries with a history of election manipulation, election monitoring is 
an important tool of democracy promotion. The domestic consequences 
of election monitoring are also essential to evaluating my theory. For the 
signal of inviting international observers to be meaningful, it must be 
more costly for pseudo-democrats than for true democrats. True demo-
crats should have nothing to hide, so inviting observers carries little risk, 
except for the sovereignty costs outlined above. When pseudo-democrats 
invite observers, they face a dilemma. They can hold a clean election and 
hope that they will win outright but plan to falsify or nullify the results 
if they lose. Or, they can manipulate the election, betting that efforts to 
conceal manipulation are successful and the level of observable manipula-
tion is not suffi cient to generate a negative report.
Pseudo-democrats may hold clean elections when they believe they are 
popular enough to win outright, but this does not eliminate potential costs 
associated with inviting observers. For these leaders, the uncertainty lies in 
their evaluation of their own popularity. Particularly in the fi rst elections 
held after a period of nondemocratic rule, leaders are sometimes surprised 
to lose elections. Huntington calls these “stunning” elections, in which “au-
thoritarian rulers sponsored elections and lost or did much worse than they 
and others anticipated.”30 Following an unexpected loss, the quintessential 
pseudo-democrat refuses to accept the result, such as in the 2008 elections 
in Zimbabwe. In these cases, the presence of observers can make it more 
diffi cult for leaders to cancel the election on trumped-up grounds, as Man-
30. Huntington, The Third Wave, 174–78.
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uel Noriega learned in Panama in 1989. Observers draw disproportion-
ate media attention and, as an impartial third-party, their judgment of the 
rightful victor has more credibility. Additionally, methods such as the paral-
lel vote tabulation (also called the quick count) have made it relatively easy 
to prove that manipulation has taken place in the vote tabulation process.31
It is also possible that leaders may be so skilled at manipulation that 
observers fail to catch government-orchestrated election fraud. A direct 
test of this proposition is impossible, but improvements in election ob-
servation should mean that undetectable manipulation is increasingly ex-
pensive and rare. Observers have expanded the scope of their mission to 
include virtually all portions of the electoral process and to coordinate 
with domestic election observers and other domestic actors. Therefore, 
for perfectly concealed electoral manipulation to succeed it would have to 
be hidden not just from international observers but from all other actors, 
many of whom would have a vested interest in exposing efforts to ma-
nipulate the election. In theory, the forms of election manipulation that 
are less detectable should be more diffi cult, more costly, or more risky 
to carry out. Changing vote totals takes only the stroke of a pen. Covert 
election manipulation requires the capacity to manipulate effectively and 
unobtrusively and the use of only effective and concealed tools of election 
manipulation. For example, the now notorious pre-election poisoning of 
presidential candidate Viktor Yushchenko in the Ukraine was never traced 
and could be an example of well-concealed and indirect election manipu-
lation.32 Even in this case, however, because of other problems with the 
election, Ukraine received a strongly negative report from the OSCE/
ODIHR. Manipulation of the electoral rules or gerrymandering are in-
direct and often legal, but even these forms of manipulation can provoke 
criticism from observers.33
When pseudo-democrats choose the second option and invite observ-
ers while manipulating the election, observers can have a variety of effects, 
including directly reducing election fraud, motivating pseudo-democrats 
to choose less effective or more expensive forms of manipulation, or con-
demning an election as fraudulent and therefore making international 
31. Garber and Cowan, “The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations”; Estok, Nevitte, and 
Cowan, The Quick Count and Election Observation; Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair.
32. Interestingly, both sides claim the Yushchenko poisoning was an effort to manipulate 
the election covertly: Yushchenko’s opponents claim he did it to himself in a bid for sympa-
thy and to discredit his opponent, and Yushchenko’s party claims it was a deliberate effort to 
prevent him from winning.
33. Calingaert, “Election Rigging and How to Fight It”; Schedler, “The Nested Game of 
Democratization by Elections”; Birch, “Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct.”
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or domestic consequences more likely. Concealed forms of election ma-
nipulation may be more or less effective than ballot box stuffi ng or steal-
ing vote totals, but the expanding scope of election monitoring should 
constrain the “menu of manipulation” available to pseudo-democrats.34
Empirical Implications
State Leaders and the Decision to Invite Observers
There is no single conclusive test of my argument. Rather, the dynam-
ics outlined above generate a number of empirical implications about the 
diffusion of international election monitoring and the domestic conse-
quences of observed elections. If my theory is true, the empirical evi-
dence should be consistent with the implications outlined below. To be 
most convincing, I must also demonstrate a lack of support for alterna-
tive explanations, and this is considered separately in the relevant empiri-
cal chapters. The following twelve empirical implications follow directly 
from my theory and are presented in the order that they are evaluated in 
the remainder of the book.
First, because of the manner in which international benefi ts are allo-
cated, Cold War alliances should dictate patterns of observation before 
1989. The only governments likely to benefi t from signaling a commit-
ment to democracy during the Cold War should have been those that 
were already anti-communist. After the Cold War, the value of anti-
communism decreased relative to democracy, and formerly communist or 
nonaligned states became eligible for democracy-contingent benefi ts.
1. Before 1989, only U.S. and Western allies should be eligible for democracy-
contingent benefi ts. After 1989, all benefi t-seeking governments should com-
pete for democracy-contingent benefi ts. Therefore, only U.S. allies should invite 
observers during the Cold War, and U.S. and non-U.S. allies should invite ob-
servers after the Cold War.
The diffusion of election monitoring should also exhibit observable 
empirical patterns over time and space. My theory predicts that early in-
viters of international monitors should be different from those who in-
vited them in the latter period of election monitoring. On average, they 
should be more democratic and hold cleaner elections in the early period 
34. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation.”
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of election observation. As cheating pseudo-democrats began to mimic 
the signal of true democrats, the average level of democracy among invit-
ing countries should decrease. Eventually, as election monitoring became 
an international norm and nearly all benefi t-seeking governments had the 
incentive to invite observers, inviting countries should converge toward 
the average level of democracy throughout the developing world.
2. Initially, leaders who invite observers are likely to be more democratic than 
the average. Over time, there should be convergence between the average level 
of democracy in developing countries and the average level of democracy among 
governments that invite observers.
The third empirical implication stems in part from the observation that 
leaders with highly uncertain government types should have the most to 
gain by signaling their commitment to democracy. This tendency was rec-
ognized in the early 1990s by Samuel Huntington and Thomas Franck, 
two prominent scholars of democracy in political science and international 
law, respectively, who separately noted that international observers were 
expected at virtually all transitional elections.35 Governments without ex-
perience with democracy should be the most likely to invite observers, 
such as those holding the fi rst multiparty elections, governments holding 
elections after a nondemocratic alteration in power such as a coup, or 
those holding the fi rst elections following independence.
3. Governments with highly uncertain regime types should be more likely to 
invite observers, including those holding the country’s fi rst multiparty elections, 
transitional governments holding elections following a period of nondemocratic 
rule, and elections held after previous elections had been suspended.
Conversely, governments with certain regime types, including unam-
biguously democratic and unambiguously autocratic governments, should 
be less likely to invite observers. Governments that successfully establish a 
reputation as fully democratic can graduate from the expectation that they 
should invite international observers. Two implications follow.
4. Countries that hold elections but that do not allow electoral competition 
should be unlikely to invite election observers.
35. Huntington, The Third Wave; Franck, “The Emerging Right to Democratic 
Governance.”
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5. Countries that are widely considered consolidated democracies or that become 
widely perceived as such after having invited observers should be unlikely to 
invite observers.
Similarly, increases in the probability that elections are observed should 
follow increases in the available democracy-contingent benefi ts, the exis-
tence of which may also vary by region.
6. The rate of election monitoring should increase with increases in available 
democracy-contingent benefi ts.
States receiving high levels of foreign support for other reasons should be 
less likely to invite observers, especially those states that are strategically 
important to the United States.
7. States that are strategically important to the United States for reasons un-
related to their regime type should be less likely to invite observers.
Democracy-Contingent Benefits and International Pressure
From the supply side of election monitoring, my theory suggests several 
patterns of behavior among democracy promoters. Changes in the provi-
sion of democracy-contingent benefi ts are modeled as an exogenous shock 
in my argument. Democracy promoters must have changed their behavior 
in order to generate such a shock and must have provided democracy-
contingent benefi ts. Therefore, during the period in which election moni-
toring was initiated, some democracy-contingent benefi ts must exist and 
incumbents must be aware that they exist. Democracy promoters should 
link democracy-contingent benefi ts to election monitoring only after they 
believe that all true democrats invite observation. This generates an over-
time prediction representing a corollary to (6) above.
8. Before election monitoring is initiated, there should be evidence of an in-
creased link between democracy and international benefi ts. As election mon-
itoring spreads, democracy promoters should marginally increase benefi ts to 
democratizing states but should link democracy-contingent benefi ts overtly to 
election monitoring only after the norm is generated or after they believe that 
all true democrats invite observers.
After election observation is accepted among democracy promoters as a 
valid signal, if pseudo-democrats are caught manipulating the election and 
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observers issue a strongly negative report, pseudo-democrats should face 
various consequences. Leaders should forgo international benefi ts but 
may also face domestic protest and other costs for being internationally 
criticized for election fraud. International election observers are rarely 
the only voice criticizing a fraudulent election: domestic election observ-
ers, opposition political parties, and other governments also comment on 
election quality. It appears to be easier, however, for motivated regimes 
to discredit domestic actors as biased or as sore losers. Unlike domes-
tic observers and opposition parties, international observers are relatively 
risk-free in their criticism, so when reputable observers do issue an overtly 
negative report, it is more likely to be viewed as credible. Additionally, 
their reputations are formed internationally, and when leaders attempt to 
discredit the reports of internationally reputable observers as biased, they 
are usually unsuccessful. Nevertheless, an important implication of the 
theory is that if a negative report is issued, the sanctioned government 
should face reduced or forgone international benefi ts.
9. Governments that invite observers and receive a negative report should 
receive reduced international benefi ts.
Similarly, as the norm took hold and democracy promoters developed 
the belief that all true democrats invite observers, those governments that 
refuse observers should be treated as pseudo-democracies by democracy-
promoting actors.
10. After the norm developed, few governments should refuse observers, and 
there should be consequences for not inviting observers. Countries that do not 
invite observers should be perceived as pseudo-democrats.
Domestic Consequences of Election Observation
In addition to international reaction to negative reports, observers can 
potentially infl uence election fraud in a variety of ways. If observers reduce 
election fraud directly, they make it more diffi cult for leaders to steal votes 
on election day and effectively lower the vote share for cheating parties. 
Direct deterrence of manipulation may also take place in other periods of 
the electoral process. Leaders may be less likely to abuse state control of 
the media or shut down certain TV stations if international observers are 
monitoring the media and issuing regular reports on the amount of air 
time devoted to each candidate. Nevertheless, I focus primarily on the 
possibility that observers have a direct effect on election day behavior.
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11. Election monitoring should be more costly to pseudo-democrats than true 
democrats. If observers reduce election fraud, pseudo-democrats should perform 
worse in the presence of observers.
My theory also predicts an evolving game of strategy between pseudo-
democrats and international observers. Because observers prefer to be ac-
curate, as more pseudo-democrats invite observers, election observers and 
democracy promoters have the incentive to develop better fraud-detection 
technology. As observers get better at catching fraud, pseudo-democrats 
should work to reduce the chances they will be criticized. The scope of 
monitoring and the ability of incumbents to conceal their cheating should 
therefore escalate jointly. It is not only international observers who benefi t 
from higher-quality monitoring. As international actors accepted election 
observation as an international norm, it was used to distinguish between 
true democrats and pseudo-democrats. True democrats, international ob-
servers, and democracy promoters wish to increase the accuracy of the 
signal by making it more costly for pseudo-democrats to invite observers 
and get away with election manipulation.
12. Forms of manipulation and observation should change over time, with 
observers expanding their focus and manipulation becoming less direct as the 
quality of election monitoring improves.
Toward a Theory of Signaling Norms
Within the fi eld of democratization, international pressure for democ-
racy has made a number of other characteristics of democratic elections 
widespread, such as independent election commissions, nationally central-
ized voter registers, the publication of election results at polling stations, 
and the use of transparent ballot boxes, uniform ballots, and indelible ink. 
Although there are advocates for some of these practices, I would argue 
that the reason they have diffused is not because norm entrepreneurs cam-
paigned for indelible ink to safeguard against multiple voting, for example, 
but rather because using indelible ink (and the iconic election day photos 
of smiling voters proudly displaying their purple fi ngers) has become a 
widely shared behavioral expectation and internationally recognized sig-
nal for governments holding elections in developing countries.
In much of the existing work on international norm formation, some 
actors have the incentive to promote the global diffusion of the new in-
ternational norm. In the case of election observation, if I assume that 
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democracy-contingent benefi ts are fi nite, it would not necessarily be in 
any actor’s interest for the norm to develop, particularly when the practice 
was initiated and began to spread rapidly. Notably, the norm of election 
observation was actually generated in part by the actors who are most 
hurt by the normalization of the practice. In this case, true democrats face 
little cost if election observation becomes a widely accepted international 
norm, although they may face increased competition over scarce interna-
tional benefi ts. Increasingly constrained pseudo-democrats, in contrast, 
would be better off if the norm did not exist.
This theory has the potential to explain a subset of international norms 
that have not attracted the support of committed activists, are not imposed 
by powerful states, and do not necessarily help facilitate international co-
operation. Because of this, signaling norms may seem more benign or less 
interesting at fi rst glance, but I argue that they are just as consequential 
as those that arise through other causal mechanisms, if not more so. They 
are the unintended result of strategic interaction, but they become an 
important part of the rules and norms governing international politics.
The Costa Rican elections of February 1962 are widely cited as the fi rst 
internationally observed election in a sovereign state, but they were not 
the fi rst elections for which a government had sought international ob-
servers.1 Four years earlier, the democratizing government of Costa Rica 
and the threatened Cuban dictatorship each attempted to invite inter-
national observers, foreshadowing the trajectory of international obser-
vation in which both true and pseudo-democrats invite foreign election 
monitors. These invitations were issued amid heated debates within the 
Americas about the relationship between democracy, anti-communism, 
and U.S. support for dictators in the Western Hemisphere. Costa Rica 
invited observers from the UN and the Organization of American States 
(OAS) to the 1958 elections for the purpose of making the election, in the 
words of President José Figueres, “an example to the Americas.”2 The 
New York Times coverage describes the extensive efforts undertaken by 
the Costa Rican government to identify a credible signal of the quality of 
their democratic institutions:
Dr. Alberto F. Canas, representative of Costa Rica at the United Nations, 
said today that the presidential election in his country next February 
would be the fi rst to be conducted in Latin America with neutral observers 
1. See Slater, The OAS and United States Foreign Policy; Beigbeder, International Moni-
toring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections; Santa-Cruz, “Constitutional Structures, 
Sovereignty, and the Emergence of Norms”; McCoy, “Monitoring and Mediating Elections 
during Latin American Democratization”; Middlebrook, Electoral Observation and Democratic 
Transitions in Latin America; Legler, Lean, and Boniface, Promoting Democracy in the Americas; 
Organization of American States, “Supporting the Electoral Process.”
2. Special to the New York Times, “Costa Rica Inviting Election Observers,” New York 
Times, January 16, 1958.
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present under the auspices of an international organization. The initiative 
came from the Costa Rican Government and was a voluntary move, he 
added. . . . President José Figueres asked Secretary General Dag Hammar-
skjöld to submit a list of individuals from democratic countries around the 
world, as potential observers of the balloting. On Sunday Dr. Canas will 
fl y to San José with the confi dential list delivered to him today.3
President Figueres’ reputation as the country’s “father of democracy”4 and 
his vehement opposition to other dictatorships in the region made him 
one of the hemisphere’s leaders in lobbying the U.S. and other govern-
ments to adopt more explicitly pro-democracy foreign policies. Despite 
his efforts to attract foreign observers, the UN and the OAS denied the 
government’s request to provide offi cial observers for the 1958 Costa 
Rican elections, and no record of a formal observation mission has been 
uncovered.5
Several months later, the Cuban government also attempted to invite 
international election observers. Facing threat from Fidel Castro, an arms 
embargo, and pressure from the United States “to curtail repression and 
hold honest elections without his own participation,”6 Batista scheduled 
multiparty elections, allowed opposition candidates to run, and released a 
number of political prisoners.7 In November of 1958, following demands 
from the opposition parties, Batista invited international observers from 
the OAS and the UN to monitor the elections.8 Both organizations refused 
to send observers, but the invitation stands out as an early example of a 
government with few democratic credentials attempting to demonstrate 
its new— and likely false— commitment to democratic elections following 
heavy international and domestic pressure for political liberalization.
Although the central question of this book is ultimately why inviting 
foreign observers became an international norm, the fi rst question to ask 
is why leaders invite observers at all. This chapter evaluates why leaders 
began inviting election monitoring and why election observation spread 
throughout the world by using a variety of empirical evidence, including 
3. Special to the New York Times, “Vote Will Be Observed: U.N. Hands Costa Rica List 
of Individuals She Requested,” New York Times, December 14, 1957.
4. United Press International, “José Figueres, Father of Costa Rican Democracy, Dies,” 
UPI, June 8, 1990.
5. It is possible that the three observers suggested by the United Nations were present for 
the 1958 Costa Rican elections.
6. Aguila, Cuba, 36.
7. Braddock, “1958 Elections.”
8. Special to the New York Times, “Cuba Will Accept Voting Observers,” New York Times, 
October 18, 1958.
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government rhetoric about the decision to invite observers and cross-
national data from 1960 to 2006 documenting when and where election 
monitoring diffused. The evidence in this chapter evaluates and lends sup-
port to the fi rst seven empirical implications outlined in chapter 1, all of 
which focus on explaining the decision by governments to invite election 
monitors. I conclude the chapter by discussing the normalization of elec-
tion monitoring, including its nearly universal spread, even among the 
long-term developed democracies.
Early Inviters and the Diffusion of Election Observation
The early history of election observation shows a majority of cases in 
which leaders were attempting to demonstrate that they were leading 
genuine transitions to democracy, and a few cases, such as in the Domini-
can Republic in 1966, Bolivia in 1978, and Nicaragua in 1963, in which 
electoral autocrats attempted to bring some undeserved democratic legiti-
macy to their continued rule by holding elections and allowing a man-
aged transition to a puppet president. International election monitoring 
had previously taken place only in nonsovereign or trust territories, most 
commonly for plebiscites on territorial issues.9
Although these fi rst cases are notable for initiating the practice of in-
ternational election monitoring in sovereign states, such as those in Costa 
Rica and the Dominican Republic in the 1960s, they are distinct. The 
rate of observed elections continued at less than fi ve per year until the 
early 1970s. With several exceptions, these early missions sent only one or 
two observers to the capital city on election day and rarely criticized elec-
tions.10 No elections were observed between 1973 and 1976, with the 
practice picking up again in the late 1970s.11
As election observation spread, observers were particularly likely to be 
invited to high-profi le elections following transitions from authoritarian 
rule in which the government’s commitment to democracy was uncertain. 
For example, the 1984 Guatemalan elections were observed by the OAS 
following a 1983 coup. The Efraín Ríos Montt government, remembered 
 9. Wambaugh, Plebiscites since the World War; Wambaugh, A Monograph on Plebiscites; 
Joseph Coy Green Papers, Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections.
10. Reports from the 1962 and 1966 Dominican elections suggest that foreign observers 
were willing to criticize elections, but they simply chose not to do so based on their observa-
tions of the quality of the election.
11. Legler, Lean, and Boniface, Promoting Democracy in the Americas.
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for the worst human rights abuses in Guatemala’s history, was deposed in 
a coup led by Oscar Mejías.12 Although Mejías came to power through 
blatantly undemocratic means, he attempted to manage a return to de-
mocracy in Guatemala. He lifted the state of siege, put forth electoral 
laws, allowed political activity that had been banned under Ríos Montt, 
and did not permit his government to support any parties or candidates. 
Concluding his role in the transition, he did not run for offi ce and allowed 
another individual to be elected president.13
In El Salvador, the OAS observed the 1982 elections to the constituent 
assembly that were conducted in an attempted return to democracy. In 
1984 presidential elections were held amid widespread violence.14 The 
OAS also sent observers to these elections, and pro-United States and 
anti-communist candidate José Duarte was elected. Other notable elec-
tions include Grenada in 1984 following the 1983 U.S. invasion; the 1978 
general elections in the Dominican Republic, in which Joaquín Balaguer 
(Trujillo’s former puppet president) was voted out of offi ce; and the 1978 
national assembly elections in Panama in which there was a peaceful trans-
fer of power.
Leaders of sovereign states outside Latin America also began to invite 
observers in the 1980s. After having observed elections for independence 
in several nonsovereign states such as Rhodesia in 1979, the Common-
wealth began observing elections in newly sovereign states in Africa with 
observation missions in Zimbabwe and Uganda in 1980.15
By the mid-1980s, increasingly blatant pseudo-democrats began to seek 
international observers. The growing strength of the link between de-
mocracy and internationally observed elections meant that pro-democracy 
advocates—both domestically and internationally—began to pressure for 
observers. Government rhetoric displays the reluctance of these pseudo-
democrats to invite observers as well as their attempts to manipulate them. 
Before the 1986 “snap” elections in the Philippines, the foreign minister 
was quoted as saying that “[t]he Republic of the Philippines is a sovereign 
and independent state, with the supreme authority to conduct its electoral 
processes any way it sees fi t” and that Marcos was under “no obligation” 
12. Sanford, Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala.
13. McCleary, “Guatemala’s Postwar Prospects.”
14. Montgomery, Revolution in El Salvador.
15. The Commonwealth is an international organization based in London, with fi fty four 
member states as of 2010. It was formalized as an organization when the British Empire 
dissolved, and many member states are former British colonies. The Commonwealth also 
observed elections in the nonsovereign countries of British Guiana (1964), Mauritius (1967), 
and Gibraltar (1967).
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to invite observers but did so as “a gesture of the good faith” and to prove 
that “we are a government of laws.”16 President Ferdinand Marcos an-
nounced his decision to invite international observers on a television pro-
gram that was broadcast in the United States and the Philippines:
You’re all invited to come and we will invite the members of the American 
Congress to please come and see what is happening here. All this talk 
about fraud—that’s sour grapes [from] all these poor losers.17
After twenty-six years of single-party rule, President Kenneth Kaunda 
of Zambia agreed in July of 1990 to allow a national referendum on one-
party rule. He proposed the referendum following an attempted coup and 
during widespread unrest over increases in the price of food. Kaunda was 
also facing serious international pressure, having defaulted on a $23 mil-
lion payment to the World Bank. In response to the proposed referendum, 
opposition groups and trade unions demanded the end to a nearly three-
decade-long state of emergency, the legalization of opposition parties, 
and the presence of international observers. By September 1990, Kaunda 
scrapped plans for the referendum in favor of multiparty elections, and 
by February 1991, he had agreed to invite foreign observers, including 
the Commonwealth, the Carter Center, and the National Democratic In-
stitute, which helped organize and fund a broad-based domestic election 
monitoring network.
Displaying tactics that have become common among pseudo-democrats, 
in the year before the elections Kaunda’s government “arrested political 
opponents, banned opposition gatherings, fi red critics from within the 
ruling party and unleashed riot police on protesters . . . fi red the chief edi-
tors of the country’s two daily newspapers” and prohibited the govern-
ment printing press from producing an independent weekly paper.18 The 
government also attempted to manipulate and discredit international 
observers after they had issued somewhat critical statements about the 
government’s preparations for elections and its misuse of state resources. 
Kaunda’s campaign ran a full-page newspaper advertisement alleging that 
the international observers were biased and that they were in conspiracy 
16. Quote and paraphrase from R. Gregory Nokes, “Administration Studying Aid Use in 
Philippines,” The Associated Press, January 22, 1986.
17. Fernando del Mundo. Newswire report. United Press International, November 3, 
1985.
18. Melinda Ham, “Kaunda Manipulates Media in Struggle for Political Survival,” Asso-
ciated Press, January 2, 1991.
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to overthrow him.19 Yet despite these efforts Kaunda lost to Frederick 
Chiluba and, surprising many witnesses to the event, peacefully stepped 
down and respected the results of the country’s fi rst multiparty elections.
Pro-democracy domestic actors also began pressuring for observers in 
some countries. Some pseudo-democrats also came under pressure from 
domestic constituencies with an interest in signaling the country’s com-
mitment to democracy and potentially exposing the country’s leadership 
as less than democratic. In inviting observers from the Commonwealth 
Secretariat to the 1990 elections, Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir 
Mohamed explained his decision, saying that “we suspect certain groups 
are already plotting to smear the image of the country in the next elec-
tion” and that “it is vital that we get outside people with no interest to 
witness and observe our election.”20
Although individual leaders invite international observers for diverse 
reasons, early election monitoring is notable for its signaling character. 
The rhetorical justifi cations used by leaders to explain their decision to 
invite observers suggest that they were primarily interested in fi nding a 
way to signal the quality of their elections to international and domestic 
audiences. Arguing for international observers for the 1997 elections in 
Jamaica, the president of the Jamaica Manufacturers’ Association said that 
inviting observers “would send a signal to the international community 
that our democratic process is open.” Jamaican Prime Minister Percival 
Patterson initially refused international observers, complaining that “it 
would be a travesty to the legacy of our democratic reputation were we 
now to suggest that we are incapable, as a country, to administer our elec-
toral or other affairs.”21 Patterson later relented, inviting an offi cial del-
egation from the Carter Center.
That inviting international election observers became a widely accepted 
signal of democratic elections is perhaps an historical accident I document 
in greater detail in chapter 3. However, election monitoring became a 
credible signal of a government’s commitment to democratic elections be-
cause observers made it more diffi cult for pseudo-democrats to cheat and 
get away with it and because attempts by pseudo-democrats to discredit 
election monitoring as unwanted foreign intervention were undermined 
19. Obinna Anyadike, “Zambia: Commonwealth Observers Demand an Apology from 
Kaunda,” IPS-Inter Press Service, October 28, 1991.
20. “Malaysia to Invite Observers for General Elections,” Xinhua Genera News Service, 
June 21, 1990.
21. Lloyd Williams, “Jamaican Leader: International Elections Observers Not Neces-
sary,” Associated Press Worldstream, April 7, 1997.
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by the increasing numbers of countries seeking international monitors. 
As the reputation of observers began to spread and it became clear that 
they were willing to criticize fraudulent elections, as more countries began 
holding elections in which the intentions of the government were un-
certain, and as election monitors criticized several high-profi le elections, 
pro-democracy domestic groups began to voice their support for invit-
ing observers. Domestic support for observers was far from universal, 
however, with some arguing that they “sprinkled holy water on a rigged 
process.”22 Nevertheless, the incentive for leaders to fi nd a signal of their 
commitment to democratization led them to invite observers, even when 
(or perhaps because) doing so would increase the risk that election fraud 
would be caught and condemned. I now turn to a cross-national quanti-
tative evaluation of the spread of election monitoring and more explicit 
evaluation of the fi rst seven empirical implications outlined in chapter 1.
Global Data on Elections and Election Observation
Much of the quantitative evidence in this chapter is drawn from an orig-
inal dataset on national election events in the developing world. When 
beginning research for this project, existing data on elections were in-
adequate or incomplete, particularly for elections held in nondemocratic 
regimes. Because part of the puzzle is why leaders invite international 
monitors to undemocratic elections, including even the worst elections 
in the analysis is particularly important. My dataset includes all national 
elections from 1960 to 2006 in countries with a population greater than 
500,000. Appendix B provides a more detailed codebook, lists the primary 
sources, and lists all countries included and excluded from the analysis.
Coding National Elections
Each observation in the dataset is a separate election in an independent 
state. If multiple offi ces are elected on the same day (or during one con-
secutive multiday election period), the election is treated as one observa-
tion. Elections on separate days, even when held in the same country in the 
same year, are treated as separate observations (for example, a legislative 
election in June and a presidential election in December are counted as 
separate observations). Although data were collected on multiround elec-
tions, the statistical analysis examines only fi rst-round elections because 
22. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections, 297.
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the decision to invite observers in the second round is completely deter-
mined by fi rst-round invitations. National referenda on constitutional or 
other substantive issues were excluded because they represent different 
strategic decisions made by the incumbent leader. In some isolated cases, 
incumbents held referenda on their own continued rule. Referenda on the 
continued rule of the executive are equivalent to elections with only one 
candidate, and both are included.
Defining Internationally Observed Elections
For every election event, I also code whether the election was inter-
nationally observed. International election observers are offi cial delega-
tions of foreigners who observe and report on the electoral process. In 
nearly all cases, international observers were formally invited by the host 
government. There are some minor exceptions to this rule, discussed 
below. Sometimes the incumbent government delegates the decision to 
invite observers to an agent, such as the central election commission. 
However, because international observers must be allowed access to the 
electoral process in order to do their job (which includes entering poll-
ing stations on election day and observing the vote tabulation process), 
it is diffi cult for them to observe without offi cial credentials from the 
host government. Even in cases in which observers are issued a formal 
invitation by a government agent, the central government retains the 
residual ability to prevent them from entering the country to observe on 
election day. In 2005, the rule that observers must be invited was insti-
tutionalized in the Declaration of Principles for International Election Ob-
servation. The document, signed by more than twenty of the largest and 
most respected organizations that sponsor observation missions, states 
that an international observation mission should not be recognized as 
such unless the election-holding country, “issues an invitation or other-
wise indicates its willingness to accept international election observation 
missions.”23
Data were collected from election observation missions whose quality 
varied, including observers whose reputation suggests that they always 
approve elections regardless of their quality. No organizations sending 
offi cial delegations of foreign observers were excluded from the data, al-
though I explore varying quality of observers in chapter 5. Election moni-
toring data were collected in two ways. First, information was collected 
23. UN, Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of Conduct 
for International Election Observers.
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directly from organizations that sponsor election observation missions. 
Because some reports have been lost or were never made public, and 
because some organizations do not keep comprehensive documentation 
of all observer missions, for each election after 1978 newswire reports 
for dates surrounding elections were also searched for mention of inter-
national observers.24 In this manner, the record of whether an election 
was monitored was checked by organization and by election. Additional 
information from case studies and scholarly articles supplemented these 
sources.25
There are four types of borderline cases in coding observed elections. 
In a handful of elections, observers were invited and deployed, but be-
cause the conditions were judged to be so poor that a democratic elec-
tion was impossible, the missions withdrew before election day. In these 
cases, when the observer mission issues a report on the quality of the elec-
tion but suspends the mission before election day, I coded the election as 
observed.
As election observation began to spread throughout Latin America in 
the late 1970s, there was some debate about which domestic actors had 
the authority to invite international observers. In some cases, the agreed 
upon standard was that if all political parties requested observers, they 
considered themselves invited. Additionally, in several isolated cases be-
tween 1978 and 1984, domestic human rights organizations, such as the 
Guyana Human Rights Association, extended invitations to international 
election observers directly, and observers from international human rights 
organizations such as the International Human Rights Law Group or the 
British Parliamentary Human Rights Group accepted. These elections 
are coded as internationally observed.
There are also several cases in which autocratic regimes “invited” ob-
servers via press release on the newswire, but the invitation was not per-
ceived as credible and no observers were willing or able to accept the 
invitation. For example, Saddam Hussein’s regime offi cially announced 
that they had invited 10,000 foreign observers to the 1995 Iraqi elections 
in which he was the only candidate. No specifi c organizations were in-
vited, no offi cial delegations were deployed to the country, and no reports 
were issued. This election and several others like it were not coded as 
internationally observed even though an invitation to observers was tech-
nically issued.
24. The terms “international,” “foreign,” “monitor,” and “observer” were used in Lexis-
Nexis searches.
25. Legler, Lean, and Boniface, Promoting Democracy in the Americas.
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Finally, there are some reports of “international observers” that are, in 
fact, direct representatives of individual governments and that observe 
the election only for internal purposes. These delegations are usually not 
invited, and they typically do not issue public reports on the quality of 
the election. They are also more likely to be viewed as biased toward one 
candidate or party. In general, I do not code these delegations as inter-
national observers because they do not issue public reports on election 
quality and are frequently indistinguishable from foreign embassy staff, 
which have long paid close attention to election day proceedings in the 
countries in which they are stationed. There are, however, cases in which 
these country-sponsored delegations joined with offi cial observer missions 
from intergovernmental organizations ( IGOs) or international nongovern-
mental organizations ( INGOs), or combined with representatives of other 
countries under “coordination and support” by the UN. These missions 
are coded as offi cial international observers despite the involvement of em-
bassy staff.
Therefore, for each election (each observation in the dataset), there is 
an indication of whether it was observed and by whom. Many elections are 
observed by multiple groups, and both international NGOs and IGOs are 
recorded as sponsors of observation missions.26
26. The majority of election-monitoring missions were carried out by the follow-
ing organizations: NGOs include the Asian Network for Free Elections, Carter Center, 
Electoral Institute of Southern Africa, International Foundation for Electoral Systems, 
International Human Rights Law Group, International Republican Institute for Inter-
national Affairs, National Democratic Institute, and the Washington Offi ce on Latin 
America. IGOs include the African Union (formerly Organization of African Unity), 
Caribbean Community and Common Market, Commonwealth Secretariat, Common-
wealth of Independent States, Council of Europe, Economic Community of East African 
States, European Union, Organization of American States, Organisation Internationale 
de La Francophonie, Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Offi ce of 
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe, 
Southern African Development Community, and the United Nations. Other organi-
zations recorded in the dataset as having deployed one or more international observer 
missions include the Andean Parliament, Andean Community, Arab Centre for the In-
dependence of the Judiciary and Legal Professions, Arab League, Arab Maghreb Union, 
Association of Asian Election Authorities, Association of Central and East European 
Election Offi cials, Association of European Parliamentarians for Africa, British Helsinki 
Human Rights Group, Canadian Association of Former Parliamentarians, Center for Ex-
change and Solidarity, Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa, Community 
of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP), Community of Sahel-Saharan States, East 
African Community, Economic Community of Central African States, European Elec-
tions Observatory, European Federation of Liberian Associations, European Network of 
Election Monitoring Organizations, Freedom House, Global Exchange, Helsinki Com-
mittee of Norway, Indian Ocean Commission, International Mission for Iraqi Elections, 
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Trends in International Election Monitoring
Earlier I presented the puzzle of election observation in part by show-
ing the rate of internationally observed elections over time, as well as the 
percentage of those elections that received negative reports (see intro-
duction, fi gure I.1). As illustrated in greater detail in fi gure 2.1, the total 
number of elections, as well as the rate of observed elections, increased 
substantially between the 1980s and 1990s, when the number of states in 
the international system also grew.27
International Mission for Monitoring Haitian Elections, Islamic Conference Organiza-
tion, Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Latin American Studies Association, 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Pacifi c Islands Forum Secretariat, Parliamentary Con-
federation of the Americas (COPA), Research Group on the Democratic, Economic and 
Social Development of Africa (GERDDES-Africa), Shanghai Cooperation Organization, 
South American Common Market (MERCOSUR), South African Association for Re-
gional Cooperation, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, United Kingdom 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group, West Africa Civil Society Forum, and the West 
African Economic and Monetary Union ( UEMOA).
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Figure 2.1. Total number of elections per year, 1960–2006
Source: Author
Note: Includes 1,759 elections in 157 independent states.
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These trends also exhibit strong regional dynamics, as shown in fi gure 2.2. 
Election observation was initiated and spread fi rst in Latin America.28 
Europe and Africa display similar patterns, with a dramatic increase in 
both elections and election monitoring in 1990. In Asia, election ob-
servation began in the mid-1980s but increased only gradually in the 
1990s. Finally, in North Africa and the Middle East, elections are not 
as frequent, and it remains the region with the lowest rate of election 
monitoring.
Cold War Politics and Patterns of Diffusion
The end of the Cold War brought with it a dramatic change in the types 
of countries that could seek democracy-contingent benefi ts. During the 
Cold War, U.S. and allied preferences for supporting anti-communist 
countries meant that this variable outweighed any preference for democracy 
28. Lean, “External Validation and Democratic Accountability”; Santa-Cruz, “Constitu-
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Figure 2.2. Diffusion of elections and election observation by region
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in countries that were not recognized as anti-communist. The diminished 
importance of anti-communism as a state-level characteristic was most 
visible in Africa, where many governments during the Cold War sought 
international benefi ts by engaging the United States or the USSR in a 
bidding war for their allegiance. After the few cases of Commonwealth 
observation in Africa in the early 1980s, no elections were observed in 
sovereign African states until the 1991 elections in Zambia.
The fi rst empirical implication outlined in chapter 1 specifi ed that 
democracy-contingent benefi ts should be available only to a subset of 
states during the Cold War, and that before 1989, only anti-communist 
Western allies should have invited international observers. As shown in 
table 2.1, the pattern of observed elections in the early period of elec-
tion observation closely correlates with Cold War alliance patterns: the 
only Soviet ally to invite international observers before 1989 was Nica-
ragua (whose alliance switched during the Cold War), and only three 
nonaligned countries invited observers, all of which are former British 
colonies.
Alliance patterns also roughly illustrate which countries were posi-
tioned to benefi t the most from inviting observers at the end of the Cold 
War. Table 2.2 shows the breakdown of observed elections during this 
transition by Cold War alliance patterns from 1989 to 1994, with the ad-
dition of a category for states that became independent in 1989 or later. 
Election observation was no longer confi ned to U.S. allies, and the rates 
of election observation among former Soviet allies and nonaligned states 
increased substantially.
Table 2.1. Observed elections and Cold War alliances, 1962–1988
Alliance Country
Allied with USSR Nicaragua (1963, 1972, 1984)
Nonaligned (residual category) Guyana (1980); Uganda (1980); Zimbabwe (1979, 1980)
Allied with United States Argentina (1983); Bolivia (1966, 1978, 1979); Chile 
(1988); Costa Rica (1962, 1966, 1970, 1978, 1982); 
Dominican Republic (1962, 1966, 1970, 1978); 
Ecuador (1968); El Salvador (1982, 1984, 1985, 1988); 
Guatemala (1970, 1984, 1985); Haiti (1987, 1988); 
Honduras (1981, 1985); Pakistan (1988); Paraguay 
(1988); Panama (1978); Philippines (1986, 1987); 
South Korea (1987); Trinidad and Tobago (1986); 
Uruguay (1984) 
Notes: Cold War alliance patterns coded from Walt (1987). State membership and dates of 
independence from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
69Sovereign Leaders
Pre- and post-Cold War trends should also be visible in the exist-
ing level of democracy in countries that invite foreign observers. The 
second empirical implication outlined in chapter 1 described the types 
of governments likely to initiate election monitoring. Early inviters 
should be more democratic than average until the norm is established. 
As pseudo-democrats mimic the signal of true democrats and all true 
democrats continue inviting, the average level of democracy in inviting 
countries should converge with the global average. Figure 2.3 presents a 
visual representation of the types of countries likely to invite observers by 
plotting the average POLITY scores among countries that invited observ-
ers (using a locally weighted regression line) against the average POLITY 
Table 2.2. Observed elections and Cold War alliance patterns, 1989–1994
Alliance Country
Allied with USSR Albania (1992); Angola (1992); Bulgaria (1990, 
1991, 1994); Burundi (1993); Congo (1992, 1993); 
Czechoslovakia (1990, 1992); East Germany (1990); 
Estonia (1992); Ethiopia (1994); Guinea (1993); 
Hungary (1990, 1994); Madagascar (1992, 1993); Mali 
(1992); Mongolia (1990, 1992, 1993); Mozambique 
(1994); Nicaragua (1990); Poland (1991); Romania 
(1990, 1992); Russia (1989, 1990, 1993); Yugoslavia 
(1992); Zambia (1991)
Nonaligned (residual category) Bangladesh (1991); Cambodia (1993); Cameroon (1992); 
Central African Republic (1992, 1993); Djibouti 
(1992, 1993); Gabon (1993); Ghana (1992); Guinea-
Bissau (1994); Guyana (1992); Lesotho (1993); Malawi 
(1994); Nepal (1991, 1994); Niger (1993); Peru (1992); 
South Africa (1994); Sri Lanka (1989); Togo (1993, 
1994); Uganda (1994)
Allied with United States Bolivia (1989, 1993); Chile (1989); Colombia (1994); 
Costa Rica (1990); Dominican Republic (1990, 1994); 
El Salvador (1989, 1991, 1994); Guatemala (1990); 
Haiti (1990); Honduras (1989, 1993); Kenya (1992); 
Malaysia (1990); Mexico (1994); Morocco (1993); 
Pakistan (1990, 1993); Panama (1989, 1991, 1994); 
Paraguay (1989, 1991, 1993); Senegal (1993); Tunisia 
(1989); Uruguay (1989); Venezuela (1993)
Newly independent states 
(post-1988)
Azerbaijan (1992, 1993); Belarus (1994); Croatia (1992, 
1993); Georgia (1992); Kazakhstan (1994); Latvia 
(1993); Lithuania (1992); Macedonia (1994); Moldova 
(1994); Namibia (1994); Slovenia (1992); Ukraine 
(1994); Uzbekistan (1994)
Notes: Cold War alliance patterns coded from Walt (1987). State membership and dates of 
independence from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
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score across all countries in the world. All scores for observed elections 
lag by one year to exclude changes caused by the observed elections. Note 
that the average POLITY scores in the fi rst observed elections in the 1960s 
were close to the global mean. From 1970 to 1990, observers were more 
likely to be invited to elections in countries with more democratic politi-
cal institutions than the global average, which is consistent with the idea 
that relatively more democratic countries initiated the trend of election 
observation. From 1990 to the present, the means converge as elections 
and election observation spread widely.
To look at this trend of decreasing quality of observed elections from 
another angle, I also examine the over-time changes in election moni-
toring based on whether there were domestic pre-election concerns 
about election fraud (see appendix B). This indicator provides an al-
ternative measure of the average characteristics of elections to which 
observers were invited. As shown in fi gure 2.4, although the rate of 
elections with pre-election concerns about fraud is relatively constant 
over time, averaging about 40% of elections in the developing world, 
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Figure 2.3. Regime type in observed elections vs. global average
71Sovereign Leaders
The third implication of the model outlined in chapter 1 relates to ex 
ante uncertainty among other international actors about a government’s 
“type.” Governments of widely known type should not invite observers, 
whereas governments of more uncertain types should converge quickly to-
ward inviting observers during periods in which it is clear that democracy-
contingent benefi ts exist. I examine three likely election-specifi c indicators 
of uncertainty about a government’s commitment to democracy: elections 
held by transitional governments following a period of nondemocratic rule, 
elections held after previous elections had been suspended, and govern-
ments holding the country’s fi rst multiparty elections. All of these trends 
fl uctuate signifi cantly over the period under study. Nevertheless, as fi g-
ures 2.5–2.7 show, “uncertain” types of governments became highly likely 
to invite international observers by the early 1990s. For example, before 
1988, 23% of elections were observed if they were run by a transitional gov-
ernment tasked with holding elections. After 1988, 85% of these elections 
were internationally monitored, and after 1995, 100% were internationally 
observed. Similar trends are shown for a country’s fi rst multiparty elections 
and elections held after elections were suspended, with invitations to ob-
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Figure 2.4. Elections with pre-election concerns about fraud
Sources: Author and NELDA
Note: Includes 1,759 elections in 157 independent states.
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Run by transitional government
Run by transitional government and observed
Figure 2.5. Elections held by transitional government
Sources: Author and NELDA
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Following suspended elections
Following suspended elections and observed
Figure 2.6. Elections held following suspended elections
Sources: Author and NELDA
Note: Includes 1,759 elections in 157 independent states.
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Cross-National Analysis
Building on these descriptive statistics, I now turn to a more com-
prehensive evaluation of the correlates of observed elections. I argue 
that leaders began inviting international scrutiny of their elections in 
part because they believed that they would be better off by signaling 
their commitment to democratization. For leaders committed to hold-
ing democratic elections, the decision to invite observers is determined 
by their likely share of international benefi ts and the uncertainty among 
democracy promoters about their commitment to democracy. For 
pseudo-democrats, their decision to invite observers is based on the po-
tential benefi ts from democracy promoters relative to the possibility that 
they will be caught committing election fraud. In addition to providing 
graphical documentation of the relevant trends over time, I use regres-
sion analysis to show that the cross-national evidence is consistent with 
my argument. Because of the clear break in the rate of election moni-
toring at the end of the Cold War and the complexity of modeling such 
time trends in data that are not traditional time-series cross-sectional, 
I focus the analysis only on the 1991–2005 period. Additionally, election 
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Figure 2.7. First multiparty elections
Sources: Author and NELDA
Note: Includes 1,759 elections in 157 independent states.
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important variables of interest, such as democracy-contingent benefi ts, 
are not available.
In my theory, focusing on the 1991–2005 period in which election mon-
itoring is known to exist and be available in all regions of the world, two 
general sets of variables are important in explaining a given state’s decision 
to invite observers. The fi rst set of variables pertains to whether there is 
existing pre-election uncertainty about a given government’s type. There 
are several ways to think about uncertainty in this context. First, there are 
some types of governments for which little ambiguity exists about their sta-
tus as a democracy. Governments that never hold national elections, such 
as China and Saudi Arabia, are clearly perceived as nondemocracies. In 
order to be part of the relevant universe of cases included in this study, a 
government must hold elections. However, if the government holds elec-
tions in which opposition electoral competition is banned, there is little 
chance that they will be able to mimic the signal of true democrats, even 
if they invite election observers. I therefore include a measure of whether 
opposition parties are allowed to participate in elections, a variable called 
Opposition Competition. This is a dichotomous indicator that is equal to one 
if all of the following three conditions hold: opposition parties are legal, 
opposition parties are allowed (even minimally), and there is a choice of 
candidates on the ballot. If any of these conditions do not hold, or if there 
is any uncertainty or ambiguity about whether these conditions hold, the 
variable is coded as zero. Opposition Competition should be positively asso-
ciated with the probability that observers are present at an election.
Similarly, if a country is already a consolidated democracy, or becomes 
widely viewed as a consolidated democracy, it should be less likely to 
invite observers during the 1991–2005 time period. Note that this has 
begun to change, especially since 2006, as all OSCE members, includ-
ing countries such as Belgium, France, the UK, and the United States, 
have recently invited observers. The spread of election observation to 
developed democracies is further evidence of the normalization of elec-
tion observation and is discussed in greater detail at the end of this chap-
ter. Nevertheless, between 1990 and 2006 there is little evidence that the 
democratic credentials in the long-term developed democracies of West-
ern Europe and North America were questioned, nor were Japan, Aus-
tralia, or New Zealand.29 After 1989, countries that were successful in 
29. The long-term developed democracies are those countries that have been continu-
ously democratic for forty years or more, as coded by Lijphart (“Patterns of Democracy”) 
and that were also OECD members in 1960. These twenty-three countries are Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, 
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joining the European Union are also coded as consolidated democracies 
beginning in the year that they formally became members of the organi-
zation. I code Israel and India as consolidated democracies, although the 
results are not sensitive to the classifi cation of these two states. Addition-
ally, several countries initially invited international observers but became 
widely perceived as democracies and were told as much by international 
monitoring organizations. These countries included Chile after 1992 and 
the Czech Republic after 2003. Therefore, I code Consolidated Democracy 
as one if the country is one of the long-term developed democracies, is a 
member of the European Union, or was told explicitly and publically by a 
well-respected international monitoring group that it no longer needed to 
invite international observers because their elections were now considered 
democratic.
Uncertainty about the quality of the process should also infl uence 
whether leaders invite observers. Elections held following an interruption 
of democratic rule are highly uncertain and can lead to democratization 
or further entrenchment of autocracy. Given my argument, elections with 
high levels of uncertainty should be more likely to be observed. I therefore 
include measures of whether the election is the fi rst multiparty election 
(First Multiparty), whether previous elections had been suspended (Sus-
pended Elections), and whether the election was run by transitional leader-
ship tasked with holding elections (Transitional Leadership). As I argued 
above, all three variables imply uncertainty about the government’s com-
mitment to democratization and represent situations in which existing 
information about the government’s commitment to democracy is fre-
quently low. I include them as individual variables in a model and then 
create an aggregate variable called Uncertain Type that is equal to one if the 
elections are the fi rst multiparty elections, if previous elections had been 
suspended, or if the elections were held by transitional leadership.
In my theory, leaders are aware of their potential share of international 
benefi ts before they choose to invite observers. Leaders vary, however, in 
their preferred types of such benefi ts and may seek a reward such as in-
ternational legitimacy, which is not easily quantifi able. Recall that leaders 
should be responding to a change in the weight given to democracy rela-
tive to other characteristics valued by powerful international actors. The 
ideal cross-national measure of international benefi ts would be an evalu-
ation of what each state leader expected to receive as a result of inviting 
Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. International system membership data are 
from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
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observers and gaining a positive report. Unfortunately, this is impractical 
for many reasons, and such data are not systematically available.
I instead use a variable intended to serve as a proxy for year-to-year fl uc-
tuations in the relative level of international support for democracy in each 
country. Offi cial development assistance is one observable indicator that can 
be disaggregated by sector, including foreign aid targeted toward democracy 
and governance, and such assistance is a reasonable measure of relative in-
ternational interest in promoting democracy. Note that this variable is not 
intended to measure the “democracy premium” directly but should be highly 
correlated with the availability of democracy-contingent benefi ts. Data on 
democracy assistance were compiled by a team of researchers who, in co-
operation with USAID, study the impact of U.S. democracy assistance on 
governance. They made data available for the U.S. and non-U.S. OECD 
donors from 1990 to 2005.30 I use the percentage of all offi cial development 
assistance (ODA) devoted to democracy and governance in the previous year, 
called Democracy and Governance/ODA. This measure is based on the assump-
tion that the rate of aid spent on democracy and governance in a country 
should be an observable pre-election indicator of the degree to which infl u-
ential international actors support democratization in that country. To ensure 
that the amount of democracy and governance assistance is in fact observable 
before the election, it is lagged by one year. Finally, I argued in chapter 1 that 
countries that are otherwise strategically important, such as Israel, Egypt, and 
more recently, Iraq and Afghanistan, are likely to gain high levels of foreign as-
sistance for other reasons. Therefore, to account for this strategic importance 
I also include a variable indicating the percentage of U.S. military assistance 
received by the country in the previous year. Countries receiving a higher 
percentage of U.S. military aid should be less likely to invite observers.
To account for the possibility that a country’s decision to invite ob-
servers is related to the size of the economy or the country’s economic 
development, I include measures of GDP (logged) and GDP per capita 
( logged). GDP data are from the World Development Indicators.31
Time trends are clearly important, although I sidestep some of the big-
gest problems by limiting the analysis in this section to 1991–2005. In part 
to account for remaining unexplained temporal variation, a year variable 
is included in all models. Elections are not annual events and therefore do 
not follow traditional cross-sectional time-series structure. The average 
number of elections held by a given country in the 1991–2006 time period 
30. Finkel et al., “Effects of U.S. Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building.”
31. World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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is nine, but numbers range from one election to eleven elections (and 
twenty-seven in the full 1960–2006 sample). Although they are pooled 
by country, the variation in the number of temporal observations for each 
country means that many statistical tools for binary time-series cross-
sectional analyses are not appropriate.32 Because the decision to invite 
32. Statement made based on information in Beck, Katz, and Tucker, “Taking Time Seri-
ously.” Because the number of time points ( T  ) is not “reasonably large” for all units, their 
Table 2.3. Binary logit, observed elections
(Model 1) (Model 2) (Model 3) (Model 4)
Variables 1991–2005 1991–2005 1991–2005 1991–2005
Previously Observed 2.819** 3.157** 3.180** 3.061**
(0.341) (0.317) (0.315) (0.313)
Opposition Competition 1.550** 1.379** 1.375** 1.438**
(0.417) (0.445) (0.400) (0.415)
Consolidated Democracy –1.624* –1.821** –1.817* –1.650*
(0.675) (0.726) (0.756) (0.812)






Uncertain Type 1.933** 1.908**
(0.326) (0.321)
Democracy and Governance / ODA t−1 2.852*
(1.424)
U.S. Military Assistance (Current USD) t−1 –0.188*
(0.086)
GDP (logged) –0.085 –0.046 –0.054 0.009
(0.093) (0.100) (0.103) (0.101)
GDP per capita (logged) –0.477** –0.326* –0.324* –0.406**
(0.130) (0.148) (0.145) (0.144)
Year 0.042 0.093** 0.099** 0.087*
(0.035) (0.036) (0.038) (0.038)
Constant –79.894 –185.630** –197.187** –174.607*
(69.255) (71.424) (75.520) (75.612)
Wald Χ2 178.50 249.94 230.29 217.11
Prob > Χ2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.4919 0.5283 0.5284 0.5397
Observations 710 710 710 710
Number of countries 146 146 146 146
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. *Signifi cant at 5%; 
**Signifi cant at 1%.
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observers in the current time period is not likely to be independent from 
the decision to invite observers in previous time periods, I include an indi-
cator of whether any previous election in the country was internationally 
monitored. All models use robust standard errors clustered by country.
Including all independent states holding national elections with a popu-
lation greater than 500,000, the full dataset consists of 1,759 individual 
fi rst-round elections held between 1960 and 2006. In the models pre-
sented below, which are limited to the 1991–2005 period, there are 714 
observations of elections in 146 countries.
Discussion of Results
Models 1–4 include two sets of variables: those associated with un-
certainty over a state’s commitment to democracy and those associated 
with a state’s need for and potential access to international benefi ts tied 
to democracy. Governments should be mostly likely to invite observers 
when they need to signal their type or when they believe they can gain 
democracy-contingent benefi ts.
The specifi cation of the baseline logit model (Model 1) is:
Pr (observed election| xi ) = 1 / (1+e-xi β ),
Where xiβ = β0 + β1 Previously Observed + β2 Opposition Competition + β3 
Consolidated Democracy + β4 Uncertain Type + β5 GDP ( logged) + β5 GDP per 
Capita (logged) + β6 Year.
As shown in table 2.3, Model 1, consistent with expectations, a country’s 
previous invitation to observers is a strong predictor of whether a given 
election will be observed. Also consistent with the empirical implications 
derived from my theory, elections in which competition is allowed are sig-
nifi cantly more likely to be observed than elections in which competition 
is not allowed. However, until 2006, if a country was considered a consoli-
dated democracy, either because it was long considered fully democratic 
or it had recently become regarded as such, it should be less likely to invite 
election monitors.
In Model 2, several characteristics of election-holding countries that 
should correspond to external uncertainty about their type are intro-
duced: Suspended Elections, First Multiparty, and Transitional Government. 
recommended method for binary TSCS data is not appropriate. Some countries in the data-
set have as few as one election.
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As expected, all three are associated with a positive probability that a given 
election will be observed, although Transitional Government and First Mul-
tiparty is just short of traditional levels of statistical signifi cance. Because 
each of these events is relatively rare, and because I expect them to be as-
sociated with uncertainty about a government’s type in the same manner, 
I combine them into one measure in Model 3. Uncertain Type is equal to 
one if the election is characterized by any of the three events, and the ag-
gregated variable is associated with signifi cantly greater probability that 
an election will be observed.
On the international benefi t side of the decision to invite observers, the 
percentage of aid devoted to democracy and governance in the country in 
the previous year is a signifi cant predictor of invitations to international 
monitors, as shown in Model 4. Model 4 also includes a measure of U.S. 
military aid, which helps account for the fact that countries that are strate-
gically very important to the United States are unlikely to seek democracy-
contingent benefi ts. As expected, countries receiving more U.S. military 
assistance are less likely to invite observers, although this result is sensitive 
to the inclusion of Egypt and Israel.
When all variables in Model 3 are set at median values, the probabil-
ity that an election will be observed is 27%. Because the substantive in-
terpretation of the size of logit coeffi cients presented in table 2.3 is not 
clear, table 2.4 provides simulated fi rst differences for six substantively 
interesting independent variables included in Models 3 and 4. When all 
other variables are held at their median values, a previous invitation to 
observers increases the probability that a given election will be observed 
by about 62%, from 27% to 89%. This large substantive effect illustrates 
that once countries begin inviting observers, they are highly likely to 
continue doing so. Similarly, countries that have never invited observers 
during this time period are not likely to start, a result that accounts for 
temporal dependence in a country’s decision to invite observers. Support-
ing my argument, holding elections when the country’s regime type is un-
certain increases the probability that an election will be observed by 43%. 
Being a consolidated democracy decreases the likelihood that an election 
will be observed by about 20%. All else being equal at median values, 
holding competitive elections increased the probability that observers will 
be invited by 18%.
The magnitude of the effect of democracy-contingent benefi ts is rela-
tively small, but it is positive and statistically signifi cant despite the im-
perfect nature of the proxy measure. It is also instructive to examine how 
the predicted probabilities of Observed change with respect to democracy-
contingent benefi ts in a few illustrative cases, rather than only when other 
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variables are held at median values. Assume a country is holding elections 
in which competition is allowed, but it is not a consolidated democracy 
and has never invited observers. This hypothetical government is assumed 
not to be an “uncertain” type per the defi nition above, and it receives 
no U.S. military aid. In this case, increasing the amount of democracy 
and governance aid from the 25th percentile (.3%) to the 90th percen-
tile (23%), which is a huge assumed increase in democracy-contingent 
benefi ts, increases the probability that an election will be observed from 
23% to 38%.33 If this country is assumed to be an uncertain type and all 
other variables are the same, the same increase in democracy-contingent 
benefi ts changes the probability that an election will be observed by 14%, 
from 69% to 82%.
For regions with other characteristics that make them unlikely to invite 
election monitors, increasing democracy-contingent benefi ts results in a 
smaller increase in the probability that the election will be observed. For 
example, consider a hypothetical country that has never invited observ-
ers, does not hold competitive elections, is not democratic, does not have 
an “uncertain” type, receives about 1% of total U.S. military assistance, 
33. The 95% confi dence interval of the 14% simulated fi rst difference ranges from 2.7% 
to 28%.
Table 2.4. Effects of country characteristics on the probability of inviting observers
When this variable . . . Shifts from . . . to . . .
Change in probability of 
observed election
(%)
(95% confi dence interval)
Previously Observed zero to one 62
(52 to 70)
Competitive zero to one 18
(8 to 27)
Democratic zero to one –20
(–33 to –5)
Uncertain Type zero to one 43
(29 to 54)
Percentage ODA to 
Democracy and Governance 
25th to 75th percentile 4
(0.3 to 9)
U.S. Military Assistance 25th to 75th percentile –0.1
(–0.2 to –0.01)
Notes: Estimations are based on a logit model estimated in Stata 10.0, with fi rst differences 
drawn from 1,000 simulations performed by CLARIFY (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003). The 
fi rst four estimates are based on Model 3. The fi nal two estimates are based on Model 4.
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and receives only a small percentage of development assistance targeted 
to democracy and governance. The probability that a country with these 
characteristics will invite observers is about 8%. All else being equal, 
changing the percentage of development assistance devoted to democracy 
and governance increases the probability that an election will be observed 
by about 6%, from 8% to 14%.34
Robustness and Alternative Explanations
Thus far the empirical results in this chapter have focused primarily 
on variables derived from my theory to explain internationally monitored 
elections. As discussed in the introduction, there are alternative expla-
nations suggested by the existing literature on election monitoring and 
the international diffusion of policies between states. Judith Kelley argues 
that a country’s level of democracy is an important variable in determining 
who invites observers. This is similar to my argument about whether there 
is uncertainty regarding a government’s commitment to democracy, but 
her explanation is more general and does not detail a testable causal mech-
anism. Following Kelley’s treatment of election observation, I include a 
measure of a government’s regime type with the POLITY2 measure from 
the POLITY IV data,35 as well as the same measure squared. The twenty-
one-point POLITY2 scale ranges from –10 to 10, or from most autocratic 
to most democratic. The squared term is included in order to account for 
Kelley’s fi nding that countries in the middle of the POLITY scale are most 
likely to invite observers.36
The literature on policy diffusion suggests a second alternative explana-
tion for the spread of election monitoring. Although my theory explicitly 
involves mimicry of election monitoring by states, I account for this em-
pirically by specifying the characteristics of individual regimes that are 
most likely to invite observers. The diffusion literature does not explain 
election monitoring, but related arguments would suggest that a country 
would be more likely to invite international observers if that country’s 
neighboring states also invited observers. Therefore, to evaluate the ex-
planatory power of a more general diffusion argument, I include a vari-
able that measures the percentage of all elections that were internationally 
monitored in a given region in the previous year. Regional Percent Observed 
34. The 95% confi dence interval of the 7% simulated fi rst difference ranges from 1% 
to 15%.
35. Marshall and Jaggers, Polity IV Project.
36. Kelley, “Supply and Demand of Election Monitoring.”
82 The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma
excludes elections that took place in a country in the previous year, so it is 
not necessarily equal across all region-years.37
Because using the POLITY data introduces new sources of missing data 
and reduces the number of observations from 714 to 650, I fi rst repli-
cate Model 4 without the observations for which POLITY scores are not 
available, shown in table 2.5, Model 5. The loss of observations due to 
missing POLITY data does not substantially change the results presented 
in table 2.3, Model 4. Model 6 adds the three variables outlined above, 
POLITY, POLITY Squared, and Regional Percent Observed. For 1991–2005, 
none of these variables are statistically signifi cant, although the signs are 
in the predicted direction.
These results suggest that the election and regime-specifi c variables de-
rived from my theory are better predictors of internationally monitored 
elections than the more general measures of regime type and regional dif-
fusion of election monitoring suggested by the existing literature. These 
fi ndings support the empirical implications outlined in chapter 1 and lend 
general support to my theory relative to the two central alternative expla-
nations that can be evaluated in this framework. Note that the alterna-
tive explanations presented in table 2.5 are suffi ciently general that they 
are also broadly consistent with my argument. Nevertheless, the cross-
national empirical evidence presented in this chapter provides strong 
support for the fi rst seven empirical implications presented in chapter 1 
and shows that variables associated with my argument are more strongly 
correlated with observed elections than two of the leading alternative 
explanations.
Note that two other alternative explanations were introduced in the 
introduction but are not tested in table 2.3. The argument that the norm 
of election monitoring was generated through advocacy or pressure from 
powerful states is addressed more thoroughly in the next chapter with de-
tailed evidence about the behavior of democracy promoters. I demonstrate 
that their role was primarily to make benefi ts available to states that were 
recognized as democratizing and that overt advocacy of election monitor-
ing by external actors did not occur until well after the norm was initi-
ated and spread widely. The fourth alternative explanation outlined in the 
introduction is that election monitoring is costless for pseudo-democrats 
and they invite observers because election monitoring is inconsequential. 
37. Note that in related work on this subject, I had also included POLITY and Regional 
Percent Observed as central independent variables explaining internationally monitored elec-
tions (Beaulieu and Hyde, “In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion.”).
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This alternative, addressed in chapters 3–5, demonstrates three ways that 
election monitoring is consequential to pseudo-democrats.
The Normalization of International Election Observation
Thus far, the empirical analysis has focused on the question of why lead-
ers invite observers, including why election observation diffused widely, 
and has sidestepped the question of when election monitoring became an 
Table 2.5. Alternative explanations
Model 5 Model 6
Variables 1991–2005 1991–2005
Previously Observed 3.121** 3.083**
(0.329) (0.328)
Opposition Competition 1.485** 1.417*
(0.438) (0.523)
Consolidated Democracy –1.624* –1.561
(0.794) (0.847)
Uncertain Type 1.993** 1.995**
(0.339) (0.335)
 Democracy and Governance / ODA 3.605* 3.638*
(computed from 2-year mean) (1.487) (1.455)
U.S. Military Assistance (Current USD) t−1 –0.094 –0.088
(0.063) (0.062)
GDP (logged) 0.021 0.026
(0.105) (0.103)












Wald Χ2 193.15 198.27
Prob > Χ2 0.000 0.000
Pseudo-R2 0.536 0.537
Observations 653 653
Number of countries 143 143
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses are clustered by country. * Signifi cant at 5%; 
** Signifi cant at 1%. For both alternative explanations the null hypothesis that the coeffi cient is 
equal to zero cannot be rejected (not reported).
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international norm. When did international expectations change? When 
did it become a widely shared expectation among infl uential international 
actors that leaders of democratizing countries would invite international 
election monitors? Pinpointing the exact moment when election observa-
tion changed from an entirely voluntary, state-initiated behavior to a be-
havior expected and enforced by international actors is diffi cult. However, 
it is still possible to provide evidence related to how and when the change 
took place.
As recognized by a number of prominent scholars, one observable 
characteristic of norm development is a change in rhetoric surrounding 
the new behavior and new norm.38 When election observation was initi-
ated, both the leaders who invited observers and the organizations that 
sponsored them routinely explained and justifi ed their behavior in public 
forums. As the connection between election observation and democracy 
grew stronger in the 1990s, leaders began to cite invitations to election 
monitors as evidence that the elections would be democratic. For exam-
ple, in the pre-norm period, Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze 
discussed preparations for the 1992 elections:
[ Reform] can only be done by a democratically elected government and 
only such a government can get the support and solidarity of the rest of 
the world. . . . We realise this and, at any price, will hold elections. . . . They 
will be free elections and we will invite observers from other countries and 
international organisations.39
For the most part, in the mid 1990s leaders ceased explaining the deci-
sion to invite observers. Instead, leaders of noninviting countries began to 
publicly justify their behavior, explaining why they chose not to invite ob-
servers. Rather than emphasizing the novelty of international observers, 
international media reports on elections began to note when observers 
were not invited, and governments under such indirect pressure began to 
pre-emptively defend their decisions, often relying on nationalist senti-
ment or arguing that observers violate sovereignty. For example, in the 
1999 Algerian presidential elections, all but the military-backed candidate 
dropped out of the race ahead of the election due to alleged fraud. A rep-
resentative of the incumbent party who was also the lone candidate and 
38. Payne, “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction”; Finnemore and Sikkink, 
“International Norm Dynamics and Political Change”; Checkel, “International Norms and 
Domestic Politics.”
39. Seamus Martin, “Shevardnadze one hundred days into toughest mission,” Herald 
(Glasgow), June 15, 1992.
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eventual winner of the contest, Abdelaziz Boutefl ika was asked in a press 
conference about the absence of international observers and responded 
as follows. “I don’t think elections are more transparent because there 
are a few UN, OAU (Organization of African Unity) or Arab League 
observers. . . . I won’t accept, now or in the future, any foreign interfer-
ence in my country.”40 The United States had previously put pressure on 
the Algerian government to invite international observers, but none were 
invited to the one-candidate election.41
In 2000 Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi made an offi cial state-
ment that Ethiopia would not invite international observers to the May 14 
parliamentary election.
We are people capable of managing ourselves and our affairs. We have 
to be able to conduct our elections on our own, as part of our right to 
exercise self-determination. If there is the assumption that the election is 
not democratic unless foreign observers monitored the process, this is a 
distorted outlook.42
The 2000 elections were not observed, but fi ve years later the same prime 
minister agreed to opposition party demands and invited international 
observers. The Carter Center and the European Union observed the 
election.
Egypt has held elections for decades but has yet to invite international 
observers. Prior to the 2005 presidential election, domestic groups and 
the U.S. government joined in attempting to pressure the government 
of President Hosni Mubarak to invite international observers. Although 
President Mubarak initially appeared to consider the idea, even going so 
far as to send a foreign minister on a television speaking tour in the United 
States in which the minister suggested the government’s interest in im-
partial observers, Mubarak ultimately banned their presence. In a press 
conference just a few weeks before the election, he was quoted as saying, 
“We are not a trust country to allow our elections to be subjected to inter-
national supervision. We can alone organize our elections and ensure their 
40. “Algeria in Crisis as Six Presidential Contenders Withdraw on Poll Eve,” Agence 
Free Press, April 14, 1999.
41. “We urge both the government of Algeria and the parties to invite international ob-
servers to the elections,” said Martin Indyk, Assistant Secretary of State for Middle East 
Affairs, Agence Free Press, February 24, 1999.
42. Quoted in Yemisrach Benalfew, “Politics—Ethiopia: No Foreign Election Observers 
Needed,” IPS-Inter Press Service, September 17, 1999.
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success.”43 This statement was in contrast to earlier demands by Egyptian 
human rights groups who called for the opening of the process to inter-
national observers. “It is not true that [election observation] constitutes 
an infringement on sovereignty or interference in internal affairs,” said 
Hafez Abu Seda, head of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights.44 
The support for election observation from pro-democracy actors at the 
domestic and international level is an implication of the normalization of 
election monitoring.
Also refl ecting the global norm of election observation was a trend for 
leaders in less-democratic countries to call for international election ob-
servers at the 2004 U.S. general elections. In an overt public attempt to 
highlight the paternalistic nature of election observation and U.S. democ-
racy promotion, a leader of the Iranian militia asked UN Secretary General 
Kofi  Annan to appoint observers, saying that “the presence of observers 
from the Islamic republic of Iran, one of the most democratic regimes 
in the world, is necessary to guarantee fairness in the U.S. presidential 
election.”45 Similar claims demanding international observers for the U.S. 
elections were made in Malaysian and Cuban newspapers. Ultimately, in 
part to enhance the credibility of international election monitoring, the 
United States invited, and the OSCE sent, a delegation of observers to the 
2004 U.S. presidential elections.
After 2004, and perhaps in response to growing criticism of democracy 
promotion as Western imperialism, many developed democracies also 
began to change their behavior and began to invite international election 
observers. Invitations from countries such as Austria, Belgium, France, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom are not signals of governments’ 
commitment to holding democratic elections. In these cases, invitations to 
observers—and their subsequent reports—reveal little information about 
the country’s commitment to democracy. International actors view these 
countries as democratic before they invite observers, and the invitation and 
the observers’ report do little to update this belief. Rather, invitations from 
stable democracies to international election observers represent a confi r-
mation of their compliance with the norm of international election moni-
toring and is a further sign that only non-democratic governments refuse to 
invite observers. For example, in announcing the United States’ invitation 
43. “Egypt Insists Refusal of International Election Monitors,” Financial Times Informa-
tion, August 31, 2005.
44. “Rights Group Calls for International Monitoring of Egypt Polls,” Agence Free 
Press, June 13, 2005.
45. “USA: Iranian Militia Wants Observers at Presidential Election,” ANSA English 
Media Service, October 18, 2004.
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to OSCE observers for the 2006 congressional elections, the U.S. ambas-
sador to the OSCE explained why the United States invited observers by 
saying that “the United States supports fully the OSCE’s important work, 
in particular its election observation efforts in promoting free and fair elec-
tions throughout the OSCE community.”46 Underscoring the widespread 
acceptance of the norm of election monitoring, in response to a ques-
tion about why Austria’s 2010 elections were going to be observed by the 
OSCE, the head of the government’s election commission responded that 
“observing elections in western Europe has become a routine act.”47 This 
change occurred relatively quickly. In 2000, it was still rare for long-term 
consolidated democracies to invite international observers and even more 
unusual for an organization to agree to send them. By 2010, many of the 
widely accepted democratic countries began inviting and receiving observ-
ers, including Canada, France, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The trend continues to expand through-
out Europe, and it remains to be seen whether other democracies, such as 
Chile and India, will follow the trend and seek international observers.
The normalization of election observation is also refl ected in domes-
tic public opinion. A 2009 survey conducted in seventeen nations by the 
University of Maryland’s Program on International Policy Attitudes con-
fi rmed widespread support for observers in both developed and develop-
ing countries:
Asked whether “when there are concerns about fairness of elections,” 
nations should be willing to have international observers monitor their 
elections, on average, across all nations polled, 64 percent say that they 
should. In no nation do most people oppose the idea, though views are di-
vided in Turkey and India. Most of the nations favoring election monitors 
do so by solid majorities, often two-to-one. The highest levels of support 
are found in Azerbaijan (83%), Kenya (82%) and Britain (81%). . . . Per-
haps most striking, most publics also say that their nation would “benefi t 
from having international observers monitor elections here.” The most 
enthusiastic are Kenya (85%) and Nigeria (74%). In no country do more 
than 51 percent oppose the idea.48
The diffusion of the norm led even developed democracies to accept 
election observation. Returning to the model outlined in chapter 1, the 
46. Marissa Eubanks, “U.S. Invites OSCE to Observe Congressional Elections in No-
vember; Election Observation Promotes Free and Fair Elections, Says U.S. Offi cial.” State 
Department Documents and Publications, June 30, 2006.
47. “OSCE election observation ‘a routine act’.” Austrian Independent, March 31, 2010.
48. Program on International Policy Attitudes, “World Publics Strongly Favor Interna-
tional Observers for Elections, Including Their Own,” news release, September 8, 2009.
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norm reduces any sovereignty costs associated with inviting observers, 
and domestic support for observers may even make these costs positive 
for some leaders.
To be clear, it was governments that lacked clear reputations as democ-
racies that initiated the practice of election monitoring, eventually causing 
it to become an international norm. The norm of election monitoring, in 
turn, has now led many stable democracies to invite international observ-
ers. The spread of election observation to even the consolidated democ-
racies further increases the number of elections that are internationally 
observed and creates an even shorter list of governments that refuse to 
invite observers.
Explaining the Diffusion of Election Observation
In this chapter I evaluated why leaders invite international election 
monitors, focusing on qualitative evidence about early inviters, rhetoric 
from powerful states about democracy and democracy promotion, and a 
cross-national examination of whether trends in elections and the types of 
states that invited election monitors are consistent with my theory. The 
decision to invite observers was made independently by many state lead-
ers but ultimately contributed to the creation of a norm of international 
election observation. Although the determinants of the decision to invite 
observers have changed over time, most notably due to the creation of 
the norm, there is qualitative and quantitative evidence that leaders were 
motivated to invite observers, in part because it provided a credible signal 
of their intent to hold democratic elections and because they could gain 
more benefi ts from democracy promoters as a result. Election monitor-
ing became an effective signal because it provides valuable information 
to international actors and it was more costly for pseudo-democrats to 
imitate. In subsequent chapters, I examine election monitoring from the 
perspective of democracy promoters, explaining why they were initially 
reluctant to send election monitors and how their views changed over 
time. I also explore the consequences of international election observation 
within countries to which they are invited. I show that international ob-
servers can reduce election fraud directly, therefore making it more diffi -
cult for leaders to cheat; that they have changed the form of manipulation, 
leading pseudo-democrats to engage in more strategic forms of election 
manipulation; and that if leaders are caught and criticized by international 
observers, they can face serious consequences.
As of January 2005, Ethiopia received nearly a third of its total budget 
from the United States and European Union member states. It was one of 
the leading aid recipients in Africa, and prior to parliamentary elections in 
2005, the country was considered a darling of the donor community on the 
African continent, setting an example of relative stability, economic growth, 
and political liberalization. Although he had refused to invite international 
observers in 2000, Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi’s government 
invited and accredited more than three hundred monitors for the May 2005 
general elections, including delegations from the African Union, the Arab 
League, the Carter Center, and the European Union. As the Economist re-
ported, the election was supposed to “mark the safe passage of Ethiopia 
from blood-soaked Marxist rule to multiparty democracy.”1 Prior to the 
election, Meles was praised for allowing open debate, the relative lack of 
violence in campaigning, and overall movement toward democracy.
Instead of fulfi lling expectations and holding democratic elections, 
however, the Meles government engaged in carefully orchestrated ma-
nipulation. Initially, international observers found the process to be rela-
tively clean, without signifi cant evidence of fraud on election day or in 
the pre-election period, and the election gained widespread international 
approval. The EU called it “the most genuinely competitive elections the 
country has experienced,” and the Carter Center reported that “Ethiopia 
has made tremendous strides toward democracy.”2
Almost immediately following the close of polls, however, concerns 
began to surface. The government announced election results before offi cial 
1. “Hoping That a Star Won’t Fizzle,” August 11, 2005, Economist.
2. “Ethiopia’s Governing Party Claims a Victory,” May 18, 2005, New York Times.
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results were compiled, asserting a landslide victory for the government. 
Several hours after the election, Meles decreed a ban on all public protest 
and demonstrations. International observers began to issue warnings to 
the Meles government, citizens protested despite the ban, and thirty-six 
protesters were killed in the week after the election. Almost before the ink 
was dry on their statements praising the election, the European Union 
warned that the postelection behavior by the government was “seriously 
undermining the transparency and fairness of the elections” and that their 
actions “increase[d] the scope for manipulation . . . and put in doubt public 
confi dence in the process.”3 Dozens of additional deaths, thousands of ar-
rests, and the intimidation of journalists continued in subsequent months, 
provoking further international condemnation. Continuing to play the 
part of a democratic leader, Meles attempted to distance himself from the 
government violence against protesters, expressing shock at the deaths 
and ordering an independent investigation. The Carter Center was more 
circumspect than the EU in their criticism of the election, a fact exploited 
by Meles’s government in an attempt to discredit EU criticism.4 Addi-
tionally, because Ethiopia was a U.S. ally in the “war on terror,” the U.S. 
reaction was mixed.
Even in these ambiguous circumstances, international actors responded 
to the reports of fraud, criticism from international observers, and politi-
cally targeted postelection violence, seeking to punish the Meles govern-
ment: the UK immediately froze more than $30 million in aid, and other 
donors followed suit, particularly after opposition and journalist-targeted 
violence continued in November. By January 2006, donors had halted 
more than $375 million in budgetary support initially intended for direct 
disbursement to the Ethiopian government. Pre-election recommenda-
tions by donors to double aid to Ethiopia vanished from discussion. The 
New York Times headline on the election was “Mr. Good Governance Goes 
Bad,” the paper’s editorial writers complained that “Mr. Meles is in favor 
of democracy only when people are voting for him” and recommended a 
series of actions aimed at punishing his government.5 Concern about hu-
manitarian conditions led those donors who did not suspend aid entirely 
to channel it through private organizations in an effort to sanction the 
government without causing further humanitarian suffering.
3. “Post-election Developments Undermining Confi dence in Ethiopian Vote: EU,” May 25, 
2005, Agence France Presse.
4. “Minister Points out Glaring Differences in EU-EOM, Carter Centre Reports. Sep-
tember 23, 2005, The Ethiopian Herald.
5. “Mr. Good Governance Goes Bad,” November 27, 2005, New York Times.
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In short, Meles’s attempts to hold internationally certifi ed elections ul-
timately failed, provoking serious international consequences. His sterling 
reputation as a democratic leader was tarnished, democracy-promoting 
states reduced and rechanneled foreign aid, and the pre-election discussions 
by donors of debt relief for the country dissipated. Meles ultimately stayed 
in power, although one can imagine that he would have fared better if 
he had not been under international pressure to comply with the norm 
of election observation and if international observers had not criticized 
the election. Had he managed to invite international observers and evade 
their criticism, it is likely he and his government would have received the 
promised aid increases and other benefi ts that would have accompanied 
recognition as one of Africa’s leading democracies.
By 2005, the norm of election monitoring was well established, and 
the leaders of Ethiopia and other similar countries were well aware of the 
links between democracy promotion, internationally certifi ed elections, 
and international benefi ts. In the early period of election observation, 
democracy-promoting organizations played a crucial role in motivating 
governments to invite observers, but their role was not to advocate the 
practice of election observation. Rather, democracy promoters succeeded 
in making a greater share of international benefi ts conditioned on a gov-
ernment’s regime type. Thus, the existence of democracy-contingent 
benefi ts gave some leaders the incentive to signal their commitment 
to democratization. When democracy promoters recognized election 
monitoring as a signal of a government’s commitment to democracy, 
other leaders also had the incentive to invite election monitors, even in 
the absence of overt advocacy for election monitoring. Again, the norm 
of election monitoring was generated by the new belief among democ-
racy promoters that all true democrats invite international observers 
to judge their elections, particularly if their “type” is not already well-
established.
This change in the expectations of democracy promoters and their rec-
ognition that election monitoring signaled valuable information about a 
government’s commitment to democracy was not inevitable. As discussed 
in previous chapters, the fi rst invitations from governments in sovereign 
states to foreign observers were refused. Although the OAS began to 
provide observers in 1962, the UN continued to refuse such invitations 
from sovereign states until 1990, with debate playing out for years within 
the General Assembly.6 Election monitoring was also a contentious issue 
6. Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms.”
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within other international organizations. Over time, however, as govern-
ments continued to invite election monitors, the practice became more 
widely accepted, and democracy-promoting actors developed the shared 
belief that all true democrats invite election monitors.
This chapter documents the indirect role that pro-democracy actors 
played in generating the norm of election monitoring. The dramatic in-
crease in support for democracy across a diverse set of international actors 
underscores the idea that international benefi ts tied to democracy exist; 
that the relative importance of democracy promotion has fl uctuated over 
time, growing considerably with the end of the Cold War; and that leaders 
of benefi t-seeking states were aware of the existence of such benefi ts and 
their relative importance.
I fi rst summarize changes in democracy promotion during the Cold 
War, including increases in democracy-contingent benefi ts available to a 
subset of states for which election monitoring was initiated. I also docu-
ment the initial reluctance of international actors to provide election 
monitors and the reactions within international organizations to the fi rst 
governments that attempted to invite observers. I show that observers 
do, in fact, issue negative reports and demonstrate that such reports in-
fl uence perceptions of a country’s commitment to democracy, including 
the most widely referenced indicators of a country’s regime type. I then 
present evidence of increased post–Cold War democracy promotion by 
a growing number of international actors and document that democracy 
promoters used the reports of observers when allocating international 
benefi ts.
According to my argument, the strengthening of the link between in-
ternational benefi ts and the reports of international observers generates 
several empirical implications (outlined in chapter 1), including the con-
ditioning of international benefi ts on internationally certifi ed elections 
and increases in internationally imposed costs for those governments 
exposed as pseudo-democrats. As more international actors grew willing 
to send election monitors, and as an invitation to international election 
monitors and their endorsement began to be recognized as a signal of a 
government’s commitment to democracy, there should be evidence that 
democracy-promoting actors used the reports of election monitors to up-
date their beliefs about governments’ types. To the extent that their beliefs 
change regarding a government’s commitment to democracy, the alloca-
tion of international benefi ts should also change.
The types of international benefi ts sought by states are diverse and 
fungible, creating a variety of challenges in measuring international ben-
efi ts and evaluating my argument cross-nationally. Although my theory 
93Democracy-Contingent Benefits
suggests a strengthening link between election-monitoring reports and 
international benefi ts, I do not necessarily expect a positive cross-national 
relationship between international benefi ts and positive reports from in-
ternational observers. If pseudo-democrats believe that democracy pro-
moters will react to the reports of observers, they should adjust their 
behavior accordingly. The counterfactual—or what would have happened 
if each election-monitoring report were different—is unobservable, and 
the evidence provided so far should make clear that there is an obvious 
selection bias in the countries that are most likely to invite observers. 
Governments that are caught holding fraudulent elections or that refuse 
to invite observers at all may already be pariah states from the perspective 
of Western democracies and therefore have few international benefi ts that 
can be withdrawn if their reputation worsens. Similarly, many govern-
ments are already perceived as democratizing and continue to invite ob-
servers and receive positive reports. If a government with a reputation as 
an electoral autocrat held surprisingly good elections, the country would 
increase its share of international benefi ts. Likewise, if a government that 
was believed to be committed to democratization held surprisingly bad 
elections, such as the Meles government in Ethiopia, international ben-
efi ts would decrease. However, most countries behave in a manner that is 
consistent with their existing reputation. In addition, governments that 
democratize typically also require less foreign aid, creating a complicated 
situation in which positive reports can be correlated with the perception 
that a government is a fully developed democracy no longer in need of 
democracy-contingent benefi ts. In cases of successful democratization, a 
country may decrease its share of easily measurable international benefi ts, 
such as foreign aid, while increasing intangible benefi ts, such as repu-
tational benefi ts associated with joining the exclusive club of long-term 
stable democracies.
Nevertheless, democracy-contingent benefi ts should respond to the re-
ports of election monitors, particularly when their reports are contrary 
to the pre-election perception of a given government’s commitment to 
democracy. Reactions should include reduced benefi ts for states receiving 
(unanticipated) negative reports and increased benefi ts for those receiv-
ing (unanticipated) positive reports, as well as updated evaluations of a 
country’s level of democracy. As the norm becomes widely shared, my 
theory also suggests that democracy promoters should begin to view gov-
ernments that do not invite international observers as governments that 
are necessarily holding fraudulent elections. For clarity, these predicted 
changes in the behavior and beliefs of democracy-promoting actors are 
mapped on a timeline in fi gure 3.1.
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In the remainder of this chapter, I document changes in democracy pro-
motion and the supply of election monitoring over time. I also show that 
the initiation of election observation coincided with increases in democ-
racy promotion before 1989 and that the rapid increase in election moni-
toring beginning in the late 1980s coincided with a dramatic increase in 
democracy-contingent benefi ts brought about by the end of the Cold War. 
I then present evidence from several detailed cases of elections in which re-
ports from international observers were linked to international benefi ts. Fi-
nally, I document and explain cases in which governments refused observers 
after 2000, showing that democracy promoters perceive these governments 
as nondemocracies, despite the fact that they hold national elections.
Democracy Promotion during the Cold War
Democracy promotion began long before the Cold War and includes 
efforts by the United States and the United Kingdom, support for Ger-
man political party foundations ( beginning in 1925), and, notably, ef-
forts by Woodrow Wilson and the League of Nations. Following World 
War II, the 1948 charter of the Organization of American States (OAS) 
proclaimed that the “solidarity of the American States and the high aims 
which are sought through it require the political organization of those 
1950 2006
 Noninviting countries 
assumed to be pseudo-democracies;
benefits tied directly 
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Figure 3.1. Changes in democracy-contingent benefi ts over time
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States on the basis of the effective exercise of representative democracy.”7 
The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains provisions for 
democracy, including Article 21, calling for “periodic and genuine elec-
tions . . . by universal and equal suffrage and . . . secret vote or . . . equivalent 
free voting procedures.”8 The Yalta Declaration on Liberated Europe spe-
cifi cally called for Britain, Russia, and the United States to help liberated 
nations “form interim governmental authorities broadly representative of 
all democratic elements in the population and pledged to the earliest pos-
sible establishment through free elections of governments responsive to 
the will of the people; and to facilitate where necessary the holding of such 
elections.”9 The post–World War II Marshall Plan included provisions for 
fostering democracy in Europe and Japan.
By the late 1940s, support of these commitments through foreign pol-
icy was, in most cases, soon outweighed by Cold War politics. As historian 
Tony Smith writes, “with the tensions of the Cold War intensifying in 
1947, American interest in gambling on democratic forces abroad steadily 
diminished.”10 By the mid-1950s, foreign support for democracy was lim-
ited. Some partisan U.S. allies continued to receive covert aid channeled 
through the Central Intelligence Agency. Germany restarted a tradition 
of supporting political party foundations or Stiftungen, which gave aid di-
rectly to political parties during the Cold War, notably in Portugal, Spain, 
and several other countries that later started the “third wave” of democra-
tization.11 U.S. rhetoric about democracy continued, but anti-communism 
dominated U.S. foreign policy and the policies of its allies until the late 
1950s, when democracy reemerged as an important variable in foreign 
policy debates, in part due to questions raised by Latin American leaders 
about whether repressive dictatorships created favorable conditions for 
communist revolution.
International monitoring of elections in sovereign states is rooted in this 
debate about how to best promote security and economic growth in the 
Americas while continuing to limit the spread of communism. The fall of 
the reliably anti-communist Cuban president Fulgencio Batista and the be-
ginning of Fidel Castro’s presidency in 1959 raised the profi le of this debate 
within the OAS and the United States regarding whether supporting anti-
communist dictatorships was the best Cold War strategy. Throughout much 
 7. Charter of the Organization of American States, Chapter II, Article 3.
 8. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 21, 3.
 9. Stalin, Roosevelt, and Churchill, Yalta (Crimea) Conference, Section II.
10. Smith, America’s Mission, 182.
11. Huntington, The Third Wave.
96 The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma
of the Cold War, the United States had relied on support from dictators 
such as Cuba’s Batista, Haiti’s François Duvalier, and the Dominican Re-
public’s Rafael Trujillo. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, Batista’s defeat and 
the Cuban revolution increased the infl uence of pro-democracy forces who 
argued that repressive dictators created conditions favorable to communist 
revolution. A coalition of pro-democracy states within the OAS began to 
argue for more explicit support of democratic governments, and the orga-
nization reaffi rmed its commitment to supporting democracy and human 
rights in the Declaration of Santiago at the August 1959 OAS Meeting of 
Foreign Ministers. Among other commitments, the declaration stated that
harmony among the American republics can be effective only insofar as 
human rights and fundamental freedoms and the exercise of representa-
tive democracy are a reality within each one of them, since experience has 
demonstrated that the lack of respect for such principles is a source of 
widespread disturbance and gives rise to emigrations that cause frequent 
and grave political tensions between the state that they leave and the states 
that receive them.12
Several democratic governments were under more direct threats from 
other dictatorships in the region. Two of the most vocal pro-democracy 
leaders—President Figueres of Costa Rica and President Rómulo Betan-
court of Venezuela—had survived plotted or attempted assassinations and 
coups sponsored by their dictatorial neighbors. These leaders argued that 
the United States had “foolishly fostered extremism by supporting right-
wing dictators” and advocated for a policy emphasizing support for demo-
cratically elected governments.13
Within the United States, although the Eisenhower administration had 
allied with many anti-communist regimes regardless of their commitment 
to democracy, policies toward the most repressive dictators were being 
questioned. In the fi rst months of 1960, the United States suspended diplo-
matic relations and imposed economic sanctions on Cuba and the Domini-
can Republic. By the beginning of the Kennedy administration, providing 
support to democratic governments and pressuring anti-communist dic-
tatorships had become an explicit part of U.S. foreign policy. Kennedy 
continued the policies of Eisenhower toward the Dominican Republic and 
increased pressure on François Duvalier, the Haitian dictator.14 Although 
12. Organization of American States, “Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs,” 538.
13. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World, 28.
14. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World.
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it now stands as a brief experiment, at the time Kennedy’s Alliance for 
Progress represented the most ambitious effort to promote democracy in 
Latin America, involving the distribution of $22.3 billion between 1961 
and 1965.15
The promises of aid for democratic states gave some Latin American 
leaders the impression that they could count on U.S. support as long 
as they were democratically elected. However, renewed support for de-
mocracy by the United States during the Cold War did not trump other 
foreign policy interests; preventing the spread of communism contin-
ued to be the central priority of the Kennedy administration, even if it 
meant denying support to democratically elected leaders who failed to be 
suffi ciently anti-communist, such President Arturo Frondizi of Argen-
tina.16 As Kennedy summarized this sentiment in describing his admin-
istration’s policy on the possibility of continuing support for the Trujillo 
dictatorship,
there are three possibilities in descending order of preference: a decent 
democratic regime, a continuation of the Trujillo regime, or a Castro re-
gime. We ought to aim for the fi rst, but we really can’t renounce the sec-
ond until we are sure that we can avoid the third.17
Democracy reemerged on the U.S. foreign policy agenda of the early 
1960s, and a coalition of states within the Americas continued to argue 
that the United States and the OAS should condition their foreign policy 
on democratic governance. At the January 1962 meeting of the Council of 
Foreign Ministers, the United States successfully pushed for Cuba’s sus-
pension from the OAS. At the same meeting, the council reaffi rmed the 
OAS’s commitment to democracy, proclaiming that member governments 
should “organize themselves on the basis of free elections that express, 
without restriction, the will of the people.”18 Detailing this policy, they 
“recommended that nondemocratic governments hold free elections ‘as 
the most effective means of consulting the sovereign will of their peoples, 
to guarantee the restoration of a legal order based on the authority of the 
law and respect for the rights of the individual.’ ”19
Creating an opening for the provision of international election moni-
tors when invited by member states, the council also came to agreement 
15. Smith, America’s Mission, 214.
16. Rabe, The Most Dangerous Area in the World.
17. Ibid., 41.
18. Ball, The OAS in Transition, 495.
19. Ibid.
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on a crucial question: how to reconcile respect for nonintervention with 
requests from member states to act on OAS commitments to support de-
mocracy within member states. In a resolution passed at the January 1962 
meeting, after the organization had denied several requests to provide in-
ternational election monitors, the member states agreed that “formation 
by free elections” is
the surest guarantee for the peace of the hemisphere and the security and 
political independence of each and every one of the nations that comprise 
it; and [f ]reedom to contract obligations is an inseparable part of the prin-
ciple of the self-determination of nations, and consequently a request by 
one or more countries that such obligations be complied with does not 
signify intervention.20
This statement endorsed the position that a government-requested “in-
tervention” was acceptable if it supported the existing obligations of mem-
ber states, including the commitments made by OAS members to support 
democracy.21
Before the 1962 meeting and the suspension of Cuba from the OAS, 
previous proposals within the organization that international monitor-
ing be provided were rejected. Following the 1962 meeting, “[ g]overn-
ments began to take up the idea of technical assistance in electoral matters 
and observers at elections almost at once.”22 Costa Rica again requested 
that the OAS send monitors to their 1962 elections, and the OAS sec-
retary general decided to send a small delegation to observe the Costa 
Rican elections without asking for approval from the governing body. It 
was billed as a technical assistance mission, with the mission’s report on 
the elections fi rst delivered directly to the Costa Rican government. The 
three-member delegation reported favorably on the election and on the 
practice of election monitoring more generally:
The Mission suggests that, to provide the nations of the hemisphere with 
adequate information, and to ensure honest, proper elections everywhere, 
other countries that so request should be given the opportunity to receive 
technical assistance by OAS observers as provided on this occasion.23
20. Organization of American States, “Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of 
Foreign Affairs,” 608.
21. Ball, The OAS in Transition, 494.
22. Ibid., 495.
23. Pan American Union, Report of the Technical Assistance Mission of the Organization of 
American States on the Presidential Elections in the Republic of Costa Rica, 14.
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This trend continued, and by 1980 the OAS had provided international 
observer missions to elections in Bolivia (1966), Costa Rica (1966, 1970), 
Dominican Republic (1962, 1966, 1970), Ecuador (1968), Guatemala 
(1970), and Nicaragua (1963, 1972).
As Jennifer McCoy writes, the OAS’s purpose at these early missions was 
“less to monitor the electoral process per se than to show moral support 
for democratic elections.”24 Early OAS acceptance of election observation 
did not spread outside the hemisphere, and concerns about violations of 
sovereignty and unnecessary intervention in the domestic affairs of sover-
eign states continued to be an issue. Several international nongovernmen-
tal organizations (INGOs), including the International Human Rights 
Law Group (established in 1978) and the Washington Offi ce on Latin 
America (established in 1974), sent early election observation missions 
but initially did so in order to “take advantage of the openness provided 
by an election period to investigate specifi c cases involving allegations of 
human rights violations” rather than out of enthusiasm for the practice of 
election observation per se.25 In the late 1970s, several governments that 
were reluctant to allow human rights monitors were actively seeking in-
ternational election observers. Human rights INGOs realized they could 
exploit government interest in international election monitors in order 
to gather information about human rights abuses in countries or regions 
where they would not otherwise be allowed access.26 The 1980 elections 
in Guyana, for example, were observed by the OAS and by the British 
Parliamentary Human Rights Group. Guyanese President Forbes Burn-
ham announced on the radio that foreign observers would be welcome 
to observe the election, and the Guyana Human Rights Association then 
invited the British group directly. Notably, they condemned the elections, 
with the mission’s leader arguing that it was “fraudulent in every possible 
respect.”27 It quickly became clear, however, that international observers 
were able to successfully observe elections only when they were invited 
and credentialed by the host government. Without some formal arrange-
ment between the host government and international observers, govern-
ments could deny access, restrict which observers were allowed entry into 
the country, and otherwise undermine the work of foreign observers. Even 
24. McCoy, “Monitoring and Mediating Elections during Latin American Democratiza-
tion,” 57.
25. Garber, Guidelines for International Election Observing, 6–7.
26. Garber, Guidelines for International Election Observing.
27. “Guyana Vote a Fraud, Foreign Observers Say,” Globe and Mail, December 20, 
1980.
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with invitations from leaders of sovereign states, some international orga-
nizations continued to fi nd the prospect of sending international election 
observers to be incompatible with their organization’s other objectives.
Most notably, the UN began receiving invitations to observe elections 
from sovereign states as early as 1957, but they did not consent to send 
observers until thirty-three years later, for the 1990 Nicaraguan elections. 
Although they continued to receive requests to observe elections, the 
UN followed a general guideline of organizing observation missions only 
when self-determination of a nonindependent territory was at stake. In the 
post–World War II period, and during the early Cold War, the UN and 
its members were concerned with territorial sovereignty and were will-
ing to send observers to occupied regions only when elections were held 
and only to elections or plebiscites concerning other territorial issues. 
This policy began to change in the late 1980s when pro-democracy mem-
ber states argued for a change in policy.28 In response to the successive 
UN resolutions between 1988 and 1992 on the principle of periodic and 
genuine elections, UN Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali argued 
that UN policy in the area of electoral assistance “emerged in response 
to the rising tide of interest in democratization and requests for United 
Nations support.”29 Yet at the end of the 1990s, the UN remained a re-
luctant and occasional player in election monitoring, offering technical 
assistance to support democratic elections far more frequently than the 
organization consented to provide election observers to sovereign states, 
even when they were invited.
Democracy Promotion and International Benefits
The actions of democracy promoters during the Cold War, including 
their initial reluctance to send election monitors and the absence of evi-
dence that norm entrepreneurs or powerful states pressured governments 
to invite observers, represents additional support for my argument. How-
ever, the work of advocates for democracy promotion (rather than advo-
cates for election monitoring) provides a clear link between my theory 
and the leading theories of norm development outlined in previous chap-
ters. Although I have argued that neither norm entrepreneurs nor pow-
erful states were central in generating the norm of election monitoring, 
28. Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms.”
29. Boutros-Ghali, An Agenda for Democratization, 15–16; Kelley, “Assessing the Complex 
Evolution of Norms,” 240.
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advocates for democracy and the institutionalization of support for it 
within international organizations led to the development of democracy 
as an international norm and were central in increasing support for its 
promotion in the late 1980s.
Within Europe and the former Soviet sphere, election observation was 
virtually nonexistent before 1989 but became quickly institutionalized 
within the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE, 
later the OSCE) and eventually within the European Community/ Eu-
ropean Union. The initial proposals within the CSCE focused on sup-
porting democracy and democratic elections. Between 1989 and 1990, 
the United States, the United Kingdom, and other Western governments 
began to pressure for more overt forms of support for elections and de-
mocracy within the Soviet sphere of infl uence. At the 1989 meeting of the 
CSCE in Paris, the U.S. representatives introduced a proposal “calling for 
free elections and the establishment of multiple political parties within all 
the signatory countries,” which they said “represents a long-term Western 
goal for democracy in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.”30 At the 
time, the proposal was not considered realistic. Just a year later, however, 
after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the proposal was adopted by the organi-
zation in the 1990 Copenhagen agreement. In part based on the demand 
for observers from the CSCE for several elections in late 1989 and early 
1990, this document also explicitly called for CSCE member states to 
invite international and domestic observation of their elections, setting 
the stage for the organization’s future provision of international election 
observers to member states.31 Signatories to the 1990 Copenhagen Docu-
ment agreed to abide by a variety of democratic commitments, invite in-
ternational election observers, endorse the general principle that “the will 
of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine 
elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of government.”32 
The OSCE /ODIHR now refers to the 1990–1994 period as the “free and 
fair years,” before the organization sought to make its observation more 
comprehensive and systematic.33
Also in the early 1990s, a number of organizations began sending ob-
servation missions to sub-Saharan Africa, including U.S.-based NGOs 
30. CSCE, Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearing before the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe, 1–2.
31. OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE.
32. Ibid., Article 6.
33. OSCE/ODIHR, A Decade of Monitoring Elections: The People and the Practice.
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such as the Carter Center, the National Democratic Institute ( NDI), and 
the International Republican Institute ( IRI ), as well as the Organization 
for African Unity, the Commonwealth Secretariat, and the International 
Organization of La Francophonie.34 The European Commission began 
by observing several high-profi le elections, including Russia’s fi rst multi-
party parliamentary elections in 1993 and the fi rst postapartheid election 
in South Africa in 1994. Since 2000 the European Commission has of-
fi cially considered election observation “part of the mandate of the EU, 
whose Treaty considers the protection and promotion of human rights as 
well as support for democratisation as cornerstones of EU foreign policy 
and EU development co-operation.”35
A number of scholars recognized the post–Cold War strengthening 
of the link between democracy and international benefi ts. As Kristian 
Gleditsch and Michael Ward argue, “after the Cold War, when the stra-
tegic importance of allies in the developing world [had] declined . . . many 
long-standing autocratic rulers who had enjoyed international support 
found themselves increasingly isolated.”36 Similarly, Judith Kelley empha-
sizes the legitimacy of democratic governance after the Cold War, in that 
“running an illegitimate government became increasingly costly as inter-
national actors moved toward more democratic conditionality and exerted 
greater pressure on governments to be seen as legitimate.”37
Since the end of the Cold War democracy has become more widely 
accepted by citizens, states, and political leaders than at any point in 
history. Strikingly, even among nondemocracies, there are few leaders 
willing to admit that their country is not moving toward democracy. As 
Michael McFaul points out, “they either claim that their regimes are al-
ready democratic even if they are not (Russia) or that their political lead-
ers are moving their countries ‘step by step’ toward democracy (China).”38 
No institutional alternative to democracy has gained popularity, and for 
nearly all states in the international system since the 1990s, democratic in-
stitutions are already in place or democracy has been outlined as the stated 
goal. Francis Fukuyama articulated the most extreme form of this argu-
ment, arguing that Western liberal democracy would be the “fi nal” form 
34. Anglin, “International Election Monitoring”; Sives, “A Review of Commonwealth 
Election Observation.”
35. European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on EU Election As-
sistance and Observation,” 3.
36. Gleditsch and Ward, “Diffusion and the Spread of Democratic Institutions,” 278.
37. Kelley, “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms,” 246.
38. McFaul, “Democracy Promotion as a World Value,” 148.
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of government.39 Although there are exceptions and other priorities that 
often trump democracy, it is clear that a large increase in international 
pressure for democracy took place during the 1990s.
Underscoring the magnitude of this change, the economist and Nobel 
Prize winner Amartya Sen pointed to “the emergence of democracy as 
the preeminently acceptable form of governance” as “the single most im-
portant event of the twentieth century.”40 John Ikenberry calls democracy 
promotion the “hidden grand strategy” of American foreign policy, repre-
senting a remarkably consistent yet not necessarily coordinated agreement 
among a variety of policy actors that promoting democracy is in the best 
interest of the United States.41 Rhetorically, support for democracy and 
democracy promotion has become a mainstay of the U.S. presidency, and 
is relatively consistent across Democratic and Republican administrations. 
Many U.S. presidents since 1960, including John Kennedy, Jimmy Carter, 
Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and 
Barack Obama, incorporated democracy promotion explicitly into U.S. 
foreign policy priorities. In a March 1961 speech, Kennedy said that “de-
mocracy is the destiny of humanity” and it is the United States’ obligation 
is to “serve as the single largest counter to the adversaries of freedom.”42 
Carter, in 1977, said that “because we are free, we can never be indifferent 
to the fate of freedom elsewhere.”43 Reagan, in a widely cited address to the 
British Parliament, said that “we must be staunch in our conviction that 
freedom is not the sole prerogative of a lucky few, but the inalienable and 
universal right of all human beings,” and “it would be cultural condescen-
sion, or worse, to say that any people prefer dictatorship to democracy.”44 
Beginning with George H.W. Bush, the link between U.S. security and 
democracy promotion became more overt, with Bush arguing that “the 
community of democratic nations is more robust than ever, and it will gain 
strength as it grows . . . abandonment of the worldwide democratic revolu-
tion could be disastrous for American security.”45 Clinton continued with 
this argument, in 1993 stating that the United States’ “overriding purpose 
must be to expand and strengthen the world’s community of market-based 
democracies.”46 George W. Bush in 2005 said that “it is the policy of the 
39. Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, 137.
40. Sen, “Democracy as a Universal Value,” 4.
41. Ikenberry, “Why Export Democracy?,” 56.
42. March 22, 1961. Quoted in Smith, America’s Mission, 214.
43. Ibid., 241.
44. June 8, 1982. Address to British Parliament.
45. December 15, 1992. Quoted in Smith, America’s Mission, 311.
46. September 27, 1993, speech before the United Nations General Assembly.
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United States to seek and support the growth of democratic movements 
and institutions in every nation and culture, with the ultimate goal of end-
ing tyranny in our world.”47 Addressing an audience in Cairo, Obama said 
that even the controversy over democracy promotion generated by the 
Iraq War “does not lessen my commitment . . . to governments that refl ect 
the will of the people . . .” and that such governments are “ultimately more 
stable, more successful, and more secure.”48
As Mark Peceny argues in reference to U.S. decisions to promote 
democracy following military interventions, although “realist” security 
concerns sometimes override U.S. interest in democracy promotion, 
“the promotion of democracy is one of the most important tools Amer-
ican leaders use to transcend the potential contradictions involved in 
being a liberal great power.”49 Although democracy promotion has con-
sistently been part of U.S. foreign policy, it should not be mistaken for 
an entirely U.S.-driven mission. Many other states and international ac-
tors promote democracy, sometimes in spite of U.S. involvement. I have 
already mentioned democracy promotion by the German political party 
foundations, or Stiftung, and their role in some of the early “third-wave” 
democratic transitions.50 Democracy promotion outside the United 
States increased with the end of the Cold War. French Presidents Fran-
çois Mitterrand (fi rst in 1990) and Jacques Chirac (fi rst in 1995) each 
laid out democracy promotion as part of their administrations’ foreign 
policies, with Chirac stating that “the requirement of democracy and 
the respect for human rights have to fi gure among the main criteria 
of our international action.”51 In 1997, Tony Blair’s fi rst foreign sec-
retary, Robin Cook, pledged that the British government would “work 
through international forums and bilateral relationships to spread the 
values of human rights, civil liberties, and democracy, which we demand 
for ourselves.”52
The controversy surrounding the Iraq War caused some leaders to jus-
tify their support for democracy promotion in spite of growing domestic 
sentiment against the United States. Defending Danish democracy pro-
motion efforts against domestic charges of U.S. imperialism, Prime Min-
ister Anders Fogh Rasmussen said that “In the fi ght between democracy 
47. Bush, January 20, 2005, Second Inaugural Address.
48. Obama, June 4, 2009, “Remarks by the President on a New Beginning.”
49. Peceny, Democracy at the Point of Bayonets, 4.
50. Pinto-Duschinsky, “Foreign Political Aid.”
51. Quoted in Daguzan, “France, Democratization and North Africa,” 136.
52. Quoted in Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, 210.
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and dictatorship one cannot act neutrally. One must take a fi rm stand in 
favour of democracy, and against dictatorship.”53
Even in states in which the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq and subsequent 
rhetoric about democracy promotion were highly unpopular among the 
voting public, the reaction of governments was not to reject democracy 
promotion out of hand but to object to the Bush administration’s methods 
of democracy promotion. Thus, following the 2004 Spanish election in 
which the winning party had committed to withdrawing Spanish troops 
from Iraq, democracy promotion policy was not eliminated. Instead, the 
Spanish turned to emphasizing an alternative “dialog-based” approach to 
democracy promotion, and the country’s efforts to promote democracy 
continued.54
Intergovernmental organizations that have made democracy a member-
ship condition include the Organization of American States, the Council 
of Europe, the Commonwealth, the African Union (formerly the OAS), 
the Pacifi c Islands Forum, La Francophonie, and the European Union.55 
In 2004, the UN commissioned a document detailing relevant policies 
and agreements published by intergovernmental organizations pertain-
ing to the promotion of democracy, a document that totaled nearly fi ve 
hundred pages and included agreements from IGOs throughout the 
world, many of them with relatively few Western democratic members. 
Additionally, dozens of prominent states and international organizations 
have detailed provisions for democracy promotion and standards for 
democratic elections, many of which have been compiled by the Euro-
pean Commission for ease of enforcement by their election-monitoring 
delegations.56 Avery Davis-Roberts and David Carroll published an over-
view of existing international legal obligations that states have made to 
hold democratic elections.57 Considerations for democracy are woven 
into other policy areas such as poverty alleviation, postconfl ict economic 
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Thus, the rhetorical record of increased support for democracy is diffi -
cult to dispute. For my argument to be supported, however, benefi t-seeking 
states must believe that democracy-contingent benefi ts exist. Even with-
out advocating for election observation per say, democracy promoters 
play an important role in my argument by increasing the “democracy pre-
mium” and therefore giving benefi t-maximizing states the incentive to 
signal their commitment to democratic elections.
If it were not for growing international acceptance of democracy and 
increasing rewards attached to a country’s status as a democratizing state, 
international election observation would not have become an international 
norm. In my argument, the decision to invite international observers is 
conditioned on leaders perceiving some level of international benefi ts 
tied to democracy. This argument does not specify why other actors tie 
international benefi ts to democracy, or whether democracy promoters 
are motivated by normative, self-interested, or other reasons. Democ-
racy promoters’ motivations are less important in this context. So long 
as democracy-contingent benefi ts (or autocracy-contingent costs) exist, 
they should affect the behavior of benefi t-seeking states in a similar man-
ner regardless of the motivations of pro-democracy actors. As European 
Union policy on the subject has been summarized,
democracy and protection of human rights are universal values to be pur-
sued in their own right; they are also seen as integral to effective work on 
poverty alleviation . . . as vital tools for confl ict prevention and resolution, 
and as the indispensable framework for combating terrorism. Democratic 
processes of accountability are also key to ensuring government transpar-
ency and combating corruption.59
Thus, from the perspective of benefi t-seeking leaders, it is only nec-
essary that some desired international benefi ts are tied to democracy 
or democratization. The composition of anticipated international ben-
efi ts varies by recipient country. Links between democracy and inter-
national benefi ts may be implicit or explicit and include the following: 
direct democracy assistance, provisions within bilateral and multilateral 
agreements, membership conditionality in international organizations, 
articulation of preferences for trading with democracies, emphasis on de-
mocracy by foreign investors, diplomatic pressure, and normative or legal 
appeals, such as those articulated by Thomas Franck as the “emerging 
59. European Commission, “Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Democracy and 
Human Rights.”
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right to democratic governance.”60 Other scholars have explored this 
topic in much greater detail and point to demonstration or contagion ef-
fects stemming from developed democracies, in addition to more overt 
forms of pressure for democracy.61
In promoting democracy overtly, dozens of countries and international 
organizations fund democracy assistance, place democratic conditions on 
foreign aid, and even support intervention to restore democracy following 
the overthrow of democratically elected leaders. One of the remarkable 
features of the post–Cold War era is the fact that democracy promotion 
is a policy adopted by so many international actors other than the United 
States.62
Measuring the precise amount of benefi ts tied to democracy is diffi cult, 
for the reasons outlined above and in chapter 2. Nevertheless, measures 
of democracy assistance illustrate the over-time changes in international 
support for promoting democracy. Figure 3.2 shows the annual amount of 
bilateral foreign aid from OECD donors to government and civil society, a 
category that includes overt democracy assistance. Similarly, fi gure 3.3 shows 
the percentage of U.S. and foreign offi cial development assistance devoted 
to democracy and governance, as reported by Finkel et al. and used as a 
variable in chapter 2’s empirical analysis.63 Neither indicator presents com-
prehensive data on available democracy-contingent benefi ts, but both show 
that such benefi ts exist and that they have increased considerably over time 
in parallel with patterns in the global diffusion of election observation.
The diversity in support for democracy, both in terms of the number 
of states and international organizations that reward it and the great vari-
ety of methods of democracy promotion, combine to underscore the idea 
that international benefi ts tied to democracy exist, that leaders of benefi t-
seeking states are aware that they exist, and that the relative importance 
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of democracy promotion has fl uctuated over time, growing considerably 
with the end of the Cold War.
In addition to supporting democracy more generally, democracy pro-
moters accepted internationally certifi ed elections as a meaningful signal 
that a government was committed to democratization. This dynamic cre-
ated the belief among democracy promoters that governments that refuse 
to invite observers or that receive negative reports are pseudo-democrats. 
In the next sections, I examine how international actors react to negative 
reports from international observers, show that negative reports lead to re-
ductions in several widely used measures of a country’s level of democracy, 
and document and explain the few governments that refuse observers after 
the norm developed.
Democracy Promoters vs. Pseudo-Democrats
It is surprising to many political scientists that leaders who invite inter-
national election observers are caught committing election fraud. Inviting 
observers, cheating, and getting caught is not an expected strategy for any 
type of leader, particularly before the norm of election monitoring devel-
oped. In the model presented in chapter 1, pseudo-democrats should at-
tempt to manipulate the election enough to win while minimizing the risk 
that they will be caught. They are motivated to conceal election fraud from 
observers because they can gain international benefi ts if they are recog-
nized as a democratizing country and because they will face consequences 
if they are caught stealing the election. The empirical record shows, how-
ever, that leaders do not always successfully employ such strategic ma-
nipulation. Democracy promoters have attempted to increase the quality 
of election monitoring (as I document further in chapter 5), and leaders 
are periodically caught and condemned for election manipulation.
Negative reports in the early period of election observation were rare 
because true democrats were driving the trend, and investment in the qual-
ity of observation missions was just beginning. As more pseudo-democrats 
had the incentive to invite observers, and as the quality of observation 
increased, negative reports became more likely. For example, following 
the fraudulent 1986 elections in the Philippines, internationally observed 
elections in Panama (1989) and Pakistan (1990) were also strongly crit-
icized, as were the 1992 elections in Cameroon, Kenya, Romania, and 
Yugoslavia. All else held equal, the increased willingness of observers to 
criticize fraudulent elections could be expected to slow the spread of ob-
served elections among pseudo-democrats. Yet the increased willingness 
of observers to criticize elections coincided with the dramatic increase in 
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democracy-contingent benefi ts at the end of the Cold War. Rather than 
avoid observers entirely, many pseudo-democrats instead had the incen-
tive to invite observers and attempt to avoid being caught.
Defining Negative Reports
It is an inherently subjective exercise to evaluate whether a given re-
port from international observers is negative. In general, when I refer 
to negative reports, I mean that foreign observers seriously questioned 
the winner of the election or the legitimacy of the process. Some groups 
use diplomatic language, and other organizations are blunt. The more 
professionalized observer groups—including those most likely to criti-
cize election manipulation where it exists—issue numerous interim state-
ments throughout the election period, providing feedback to the election 
authorities and sometimes pressuring governments to remedy problems 
such as incomplete voter registration lists before election day. In these 
cases, high-quality election monitors may interact with the government 
during the pre-election period in a manner that actually prevents nega-
tive reports because observers pressure governments to improve election 
quality.
Nevertheless, most missions issue a postelection statement detail-
ing preliminary fi ndings, which the international news media cite most 
widely. Reputable organizations also issue a comprehensive fi nal report 
several months after the election and include reports of their monitoring 
of the postelection period, certifi cation of results, and resolution of any 
postelection disputes.
In order to gather a more systematic picture of negative reports over 
time, I collected the summary statements from the offi cial fi nal reports or 
from the widely cited postelection press releases. When neither of these 
was available, I also coded the evaluation of observers from news reports 
following the election. Comparing observer reports on an objective scale 
may not be possible, and judging whether an individual report is more or 
less negative than any other report is diffi cult. However, several features 
of statements from observers provide clear indications that an election was 
judged to be fraudulent or otherwise received serious condemnation from 
international observers.
The strongest possible international observer criticism of elections oc-
curs when observers are invited but refuse to send a mission or withdraw 
an already deployed mission because they judge that credible elections 
are highly unlikely. This is a relatively rare occurrence, but when it does 
happen, it sends a strong message that pre-election conditions are so bad 
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that a democratic election is virtually impossible. When observers cancel 
a planned mission before election day, their decision and criticism of the 
election is widely reported in international news coverage of the election.
Many negative reports from international observers are strongly worded 
and are clearly intended to cast doubt upon the legitimacy of the process, 
but they stop short of arguing that the winner would have been different 
in a more democratic election. Thus, when observers do assert that the 
“wrong” party won, it is a strong condemnation and draws more nega-
tive attention to the election as being “stolen.” Reports that question the 
integrity or the legitimacy of the process are also interpreted as serious 
condemnation, even if they suggest that the outcome would have been the 
same in a free and fair process. This type of summary judgment is most 
likely when the margin of victory is quite large, yet the process is obvi-
ously fl awed, as in Belarus.
Following the 2003 Georgian parliamentary elections, the head of 
the OSCE observer mission said that the observed irregularities caused 
the process to be “spectacularly fl awed.” Following the 1995 elections 
in Niger, NDI condemned the elections, stating that the irregularities 
they observed “represent a willful effort to subvert the process in order 
to achieve predetermined results.”64 In Zambia in 2001, the EU summary 
judgment was that “in view of the administrative failures on polling day, 
the serious fl aws in the counting tabulation procedures, together with the 
close outcome of the elections, we are not confi dent that the declared 
results represent the wishes of the Zambian electors on polling day.”65 
Summary statements from the OSCE /ODIHR tend to focus on whether 
the elections met the country’s commitments as an OSCE member state. 
For example, the 1998 report on the Armenian elections concluded that 
they did not “meet the OSCE standards to which Armenia has committed 
itself in the Copenhagen Document of 1990.”66
Even when observer reports are critical, most are written in diplomatic 
language and emphasize positive components of even the worst elections, 
such as praising voters for their patience, enthusiasm, willingness to stand 
in long lines at polling stations, and their support for the democratic pro-
cess. This praise, when it was presented along serious criticism, was not 
64. National Democratic Institute, “Statement by the National Democratic Institute on 
the July 7 and 8 Presidential Election in Niger,” news release, July 19, 1996.
65. European Union Election Observation Mission, “Final Statement on the Zambia 
Elections 2001,” news release, May 2, 2002.
66. OSCE /ODIHR, “Republic of Armenia Presidential Election March 16 and 30, 1998, 
Final Report,” 3.
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interpreted as an endorsement of the election in my coding, because some 
positive comments are present in nearly all observer reports.
Figure 3.4 presents the frequency of negative reports over time. Elec-
tion monitoring reports were coded as negative if they questioned the 
winner of the election or seriously questioned the legitimacy of the pro-
cess.67 If an election receives a negative report from more than one moni-
toring group, it is only counted once in fi gure 3.4. Out of all observed 
elections between 1995 and 2005, about 35% were criticized by one or 
more international observer groups.
Building on the theory outlined in chapter 1, if pseudo-democrats vary 
in their ability and willingness to conceal election manipulation, lead-
ers are most likely to be caught stealing elections in two circumstances. 
Some pseudo-democrats have little to lose from international condem-
nation, or the risks of political liberalization may be too great to allow 
plausibly democratic elections. As electoral autocrats, they are willing to 
67. Summary statements from observers were coded a second time by a research assistant 
in the absence of any identifying information about the elections, and the limited disagree-
ments in coding were resolved by carefully rereading each case and considering how observer 
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invite observers in order to avoid pariah status, as in the Armenian case 
described in chapter 4, but nevertheless engage in massive election fraud. 
Similarly, as I discuss below, if a leader is aware that their country’s other 
characteristics outweigh any attention given to democracy, or if they do 
not need international benefi ts, they may be willing to refuse observers 
entirely, such as in Iran, Egypt, and Malaysia. In some countries, leaders 
may enjoy domestic support for taking anti-Western positions and there-
fore the domestically imposed “sovereignty costs” associated with inviting 
observers are greater.
A subset of pseudo-democrats are heavily dependent on international 
benefi ts, and when these leaders get caught manipulating the election, it 
is frequently because they lack the resources, skill, or support from other 
government offi cials to conceal their efforts at manipulation. It is these 
leaders that are most likely to face serious consequences when they are 
condemned for election fraud. Thus, my expectations about international 
responses to negative reports are nuanced. Leaders who have little to lose 
if they are caught stealing elections or who are unwilling to give up au-
thoritarian control are less motivated to conceal election manipulation, 
correspondingly more likely to get caught and criticized, and may work to 
discredit the negative reports of international observers rather than pre-
vent them. It is a sign of the norm’s strength that these leaders continue 
to invite observers who condemn them, rather than simply refusing them 
entirely.
More interesting from a substantive perspective are those benefi t-seeking 
leaders who lack the resources or skill to engage in successful strategic 
manipulation. These leaders tend to be more heavily dependent on in-
ternational support and may have weaker domestic authority, making it 
diffi cult for them to marshal the resources to carry out covert election 
manipulation. Because of their reliance on international support, these 
leaders are unlikely to refuse international observers, particularly after 
election monitoring became an international norm.
International Consequences of Observer Criticism
When elections are criticized by international observers, what are the 
international consequences? This is a diffi cult empirical question for a 
variety of reasons: international benefi ts cannot be comprehensively mea-
sured, leaders are both rewarded and punished for their elections, and 
governments that successfully develop economically and democratize re-
ceive less foreign aid because they no longer need it, not because they 
are being penalized. Additionally, given my argument, if commitments by 
114 The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma
democracy promoters to support democratizing states are credible, ob-
servable shifts in international support for countries based on whether 
they signal their commitment to democracy should follow changes in the 
postelection beliefs among democracy promoters about a government’s 
commitment to democracy.
International reaction to the reports from observers should depend 
on previous perceptions of leaders’ types and the levels of international 
support the government already receives. Following an election, pro-
democracy actors update their belief about the incumbent’s “type.” There 
are many reasons why the perceptions of a government’s commitment to 
democracy change, as well as why foreign support of a given government 
changes. Many foreign aid donors are particularly reluctant to withdraw 
aid from the poorest countries or from strategic allies, even if they hold 
relatively poor elections.
Nevertheless, several empirical implications are clear. Other scholars 
have demonstrated that relatively more democratic institutions—as mea-
sured by various indices of democracy and regime type—are correlated 
with a variety of other international benefi ts, such as foreign direct invest-
ment 68 and international trade.69 When a government receives a negative 
report from international election observers, its perceived level of democ-
racy should decrease. International actors turn to a variety of sources when 
evaluating a country’s level of democratization. It is worth noting that 
several widely used measures, including the Freedom House measures of 
political rights and civil liberties (a source widely used in policy circles) 
and the Polity measure of regime type, now explicitly incorporate the re-
ports of international observers into their coding. The coding checklist 
for political rights asks whether “established and reputable national and/
or international election monitoring organizations judge the most recent 
elections for head of government to be free and fair?”70 Similarly, several 
of Polity IV component variables explicitly code the reports of “interna-
tional and domestic election observers” in determining the quality of the 
election and in turn, the country’s level of democracy.71 Given this infor-
mation, it is unsurprising that both indices change systematically based on 
whether observers are invited and whether they issue a negative report. 
68. Jensen, “Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Investment”; 
Jensen, “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations.”
69. Mansfi eld, Milner, and Rosendorff, “Free to Trade”; Milner and Kubota, “Why the 
Move to Free Trade?”
70. Freedom House, “Freedom House: Methodology.”
71. Marshall and Jaggers, Polity IV Project, 58.
115Democracy-Contingent Benefits
To demonstrate this correlation between the reports of observers and 
widely referenced annual measures of country’s level of democracy, I esti-
mate several statistical models with three measures of regime type as the 
dependent variables.72 Inviting observers is associated with a statistically 
signifi cant increase in a country’s Polity2 score of 1.7 points, and inviting 
observers and receiving a negative report is associated with a reduction of 
almost 1 point.73
Freedom House data are arguably more widely used by policymakers. 
From 1973 to 2006 (all available data), inviting observers is associated 
with a statistically signifi cant 0.4 point improvement in a country’s po-
litical rights score, whereas receiving a negative report from observers is 
associated with a 0.5 point decline in the civil liberties score.74 Other mea-
sures of democracy are similarly sensitive. Even the International Country 
Risk Guide’s measure of political risk, an indicator marketed to foreign 
investors, is likely to increase when observers are invited.75
Overtime Variation in International Benefits within Countries
As stated previously, leaders already receiving some level of interna-
tional benefi ts should experience reductions in international benefi ts fol-
lowing internationally criticized elections, and leaders without signifi cant 
existing international support should not gain additional benefi ts. These 
consequences are in addition to any domestic costs caused by reported 
election fraud, such as increased support for postelection protests and the 
72. The reported estimates are from the following model, yit = yit−1+ β1 Electionit + β2 
Observedit + β3 Negativeit + α i + εit , where y is a variable representing country i ’s democracy 
score at time t, and α i represents country fi xed-effects.
73. The Polity2 variable ranges from –10 to 10, with higher values representing more demo-
cratic political institutions. The coeffi cient on Observed is 1.70 with a standard error of 0.12. 
The coeffi cient on Negative is –0.87 with a standard error of 0.21. The coeffi cient on Election 
is 0.11 with a standard error of 0.06.
74. Freedom House political rights and civil liberties indices range from 1 to 7, with 
1 representing the highest levels of political rights and civil liberties. The coeffi cient on 
Observed is –0.40, with a standard error of 0.04. The coeffi cient on Negative is 0.50 with a 
standard error of 0.07. The coeffi cient on Election is –0.13 with a standard error of 0.02.
75. Political Risk theoretically ranges from 0 to 100. The coeffi cient on Observed is 1.12 
with a standard error of 0.5. The reported estimates are from the following model, yit = 
yit−1 + β1 Electionit−1 + β 2Observedit−1 + β 3 Negativeit−1 + α i + εit , where y is a variable representing 
country i ’s Political Risk score average over the current year t , and α i represents country fi xed 
effects. Independent variables are lagged by one year to ensure that the monthly political risk 
score incorporates months following the election but excluding the developed democracies, 
Observed has a coeffi cient of 0.40 and a standard error of 0.12. Negative is not statistically 
signifi cant.
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increased potential for an electoral revolution, as in Yugoslavia, Georgia, 
and Ukraine. Empirical predictions about the consequences of negative 
reports must consider whether the country expects to gain new inter-
national benefi ts or avoid losing existing benefi ts by inviting observers. 
For countries already receiving low levels of international benefi ts, either 
because they have previously committed blatant anti-democratic actions 
and /or human rights abuses or because they have never been recognized 
as a democratizing country, internationally approved elections may be re-
quired for international benefi ts to increase or resume. If such states re-
ceive negative reports from election monitors, international benefi ts may 
not change, but the negative report causes these governments to forgo 
benefi ts that would have followed internationally certifi ed elections.
When elections are criticized in countries that were previously perceived 
as democratizing, existing levels of international benefi ts should be no-
ticeably reduced. However, for the poorest and most aid-dependent coun-
tries, donors cut off international support only reluctantly. International 
reaction to Haitian elections reveals both the reluctance of pro-democracy 
actors to punish very poor countries and their willingness to do so fol-
lowing blatant violations of democratic norms. The United States and 
other Western donors to Haiti had high hopes for Jean-Bertrand Aristide, 
fi rst elected to the presidency in 1990 in what was widely regarded as the 
country’s fi rst democratic election. Aristide was soon deposed in a coup, 
but reinstalled as president by the U.S. military in 1994. Aristide’s govern-
ment received massive but short-lived increases in aid, especially from the 
United States and the European Community, a condition of which was a 
promise to leave offi ce at the end of his constitutionally allowed term.76 
Although he technically kept his promise, rather than allowing open com-
petition for the presidency, he engineered the 1995 victory of his chosen 
successor, René Préval. Reportedly ruling from behind the scenes until 
he could run for reelection, Aristide’s democratic luster began to fade. 
Rigged legislative by-elections in 1997 provoked further international 
condemnation and, combined with the 1999 disbandment of parliament 
and the lack of a legitimate government, led to the suspension of most 
foreign aid to the country.77
76. Marilyn Greene, “Haiti to Get Infusion of Cash / Nations Plan More Than $1 Bil-
lion,” USA Today, October 6, 1994.
77. Michael Norton, “United Nations Suspends Election Aid in Haiti,” Associated Press, 
August 22, 1997; Ives Marie Chanel, “Haiti: Political Crisis Undermines Foreign Aid,” Inter 
Press Service, December 27, 1999.
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Aid resumption and other forms of international support were condi-
tioned on new, democratic, and internationally certifi ed legislative elec-
tions, which were postponed four times before they were held in May 
2000. The elections were preceded by “a wave of murders of opposition 
leaders and candidates.”78 Aristide was reelected president in November 
2000 with 92% of the vote in an election boycotted by all major opposi-
tion parties. Observers judged the 2000 elections to be “fundamentally 
fl awed,” and aid was suspended or channeled through private organi-
zations. Aristide’s attempts to reassure donors and restore aid were not 
successful, and in February of 2004, he left offi ce under disputed cir-
cumstances and was replaced by an interim leader.79 His ouster and the 
country’s near-crisis conditions—exacerbated by a devastating hurricane 
in 2004—led major donors to begin releasing foreign aid and other forms 
of support in order to “help the country promote democracy and eco-
nomic recovery.”80 Figure 3.5 illustrates trends in bilateral aid from the 
country’s biggest donors over time, although note that foreign aid was not 
the only international benefi t that was withdrawn from Haiti during this 
period. Aid is, however, more easily quantifi able than other international 
benefi ts.
When some governments invite observers, they do so because they have 
already developed reputations as pseudo-democracies or electoral author-
itarian regimes. These countries may have experienced military coups, 
already held blatantly fraudulent elections, or have never held elections 
at all. For example, the period leading up to Peru’s 2000 presidential elec-
tions was characterized by rapid democratic reversal. Incumbent Presi-
dent Alberto Fujimori’s 1992 autogolpe brought signifi cant international 
attention to these threats to Peruvian democracy, but the 2000 elections 
were viewed as the point of no return. International election observers 
were invited by Fujimori, who was eager to put concerns about his author-
itarian tendencies to rest. Failing to invite observers to the 2000 elections 
would have been a sure sign that they were blatantly fraudulent. Inviting 
observers allowed Fujimori some additional scope for manipulation but 
also increased the possibility that he would be caught and internationally 
condemned for election fraud.
78. “The Inevitable President,” Economist, November 16, 2000.
79. Whether or not Aristide was forced to resign or did so willingly is the subject of 
debate, but it is not disputed that he was escorted out of Haiti on a U.S. military jet to the 
Central African Republic on February 28, 2004.
80. Nicolas Brulliard, “Donors Pledge $1 Billion in Aid to Haiti,” United Press Interna-
tional, July 20, 2004.
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Following the fi rst round of the 2000 elections in Peru, Fujimori was 
found to have engaged in widespread efforts to manipulate the election, 
and various observer organizations levied stinging criticism. The OAS 
head of mission said that “something sinister is happening here,” and the 
mission issued a statement that “the Peruvian electoral process is far from 
one that could be considered free and fair.”81 The joint NDI/Carter Cen-
ter report called the process “irreparably damaged,” and the fi nal report 
similarly left little room for interpretation:
The 2000 election process in Peru failed dramatically to meet minimum 
international standards for a genuine, democratic election. As a result, the 
people of Peru were denied the opportunity to exercise their right to dem-
ocratic elections, and the government that emerged from the elections 
lacks a legitimate mandate based on the will of the electorate.82
81. Clifford Krauss, “Peruvian’s Lead in Vote Prompts Charge of Fraud,” New York Times, 
April 10, 2000.
82. National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center, Peru Elections 2000: Final Re-
port of the National Democratic Institute/Carter Center Joint Election Monitoring Project, 35.
Figure 3.5. Bilateral foreign aid to Haiti
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After the clearly fraudulent fi rst round, the Carter Center, NDI, the 
European Union, the OAS, and thousands of domestic observers withdrew 
their offi cial delegations in protest. Announcing their withdrawal from the 
second round, the EU said that “the elections could not take place in a 
credible manner and in accordance with international standards.”83 As evi-
dence of the unquestionably large-scale fraud, in the second round, offi cial 
government tallies initially reported that the number of votes cast exceeded 
the number of registered voters by 1.4 million.84 Not surprisingly, the neg-
ative reports by election observers were enough to discredit Fujimori as a 
democratically elected leader, although the international reaction to the 
fraudulent elections was not fully realized; discovery of videotapes proved 
that his offi ce had engaged in widespread bribery of government offi cials 
and he subsequently resigned.85 As Arturo Santa-Cruz writes,
What was important in the Peruvian case was not just that the Andean 
country was perceived as undemocratic, but that this fact endowed the 
international community with the right to advance claims on Fujimori’s 
government, just as it also endowed the Peruvian people with the right to 
advance claims on the international community.86
By the 1990s it became common for states and international organiza-
tions to suspend support for regimes that had committed blatant violations 
of democracy or human rights.87 Many pro-democracy states made overt 
commitments to support democratic states and made provisions for such 
support an explicit part of their foreign policy. For example, an amendment 
to the 1986 U.S. Foreign Assistance Act prohibited U.S. aid to “any coun-
try whose duly elected head of government is deposed by decree or military 
coup.”88 Following such a suspension, the resumption of bilateral foreign 
aid and normal diplomatic relations with many developed democracies be-
came increasingly conditioned on the holding of free and fair elections.
The case of Togo clearly demonstrates this dynamic. Amid widespread 
pressure on African governments to hold multiparty elections in the early 
83. European Union, “Peru Presidential and Congressional Elections—EU Observa-
tion,” news release, April 6, 2001.
84. Taylor, “Patterns of Electoral Corruption in Peru.”
85. Cooper and Legler, Intervention Without Intervening?
86. Santa-Cruz, “Monitoring Elections, Redefi ning Sovereignty,” 767.
87. Donno, “Defending Democratic Norms: Regional Intergovernmental Organizations, 
Domestic Opposition and Democratic Change.”
88. Committee on International Relations and Committee on Foreign Relations, “Legis-
lation on Foreign Relations Through 2002.”
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1990s, the Togolese government’s failure to hold plausibly democratic 
elections led to a near-total suspension in nonhumanitarian foreign aid for 
more than a decade. General Gnassingbe Eyadema, who came to power 
in a 1967 coup d’état, came under increasing international pressure in 
the early 1990s to hold multiparty elections (he allowed noncompetitive 
presidential elections in 1979 and in 1986). In early 1993, major donors, 
including the United States, France, Germany, and other members of the 
European Commission suspended foreign aid to Togo over the “worsen-
ing political situation” and the president’s “unwillingness to create condi-
tions for a peaceful transition to democracy.”89 Following the suspension, 
Eyadema agreed to multiparty elections but allowed only forty-fi ve days 
of preparation and campaigning. International observers from the Carter 
Center, NDI, the Organization for African Unity, La Francophonie, and 
several smaller NGOs deployed missions to the country.
After elections were scheduled and international observers arrived, 
conditions deteriorated, ultimately leading all major international ob-
servers except La Francophonie and the OAU to suspend their missions. 
Following ten months of observation, and after the government refused 
to delay the elections, the joint Carter Center and NDI statement said 
that the “minimum conditions did not exist to conduct meaningful 
elections.”90 The problems cited in their statement included the refusal 
of all major opposition candidates to participate and the resulting lack 
of real competition; the election commission’s own concern about their 
preparations for the election; out-of-date, manipulated, and infl ated voter 
registration lists; the election commission’s failure to distribute electoral 
identifi cation cards to voters; the government’s refusal to accredit non-
partisan domestic election observers; the printing of many more voter 
identifi cation cards than registered voters; unbalanced media time; the 
distribution of faulty indelible ink; misuse of state resources for cam-
paigning; and the overt partisanship of election offi cials.91 As reported 
in the international news media the day after the election, the decision 
by international monitors to withdraw was a “fatal blow to the elections’ 
credibility.”92
89. “Aid to Togo halted,” Globe and Mail, Reuters News Service, February 12, 1993.
90. National Democratic Institute, “National Democratic Institute / Carter Center Joint 
Post-Election Statement on Withdrawal from 1993 Togolese Elections,” news release, Sep-
tember 1, 1993.
91. Ibid.
92. Karl Maier, “Poll Deemed to Lack Credibility,” Irish Times, London Independent 
Service, August 26, 1993.
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Even the leader of the delegation from La Francophonie, an organi-
zation that rarely criticizes election fraud, was quoted as saying that the 
election was “meaningless.”93 Their twenty-member delegation stayed 
to observe election day proceedings and found that the election scarcely 
took place.
Nearly one-third of the polling stations were either closed or did not exist. 
The second third of the polling stations opened, but no one came to vote 
[and] the remaining third of polling stations functioned more or less cor-
rectly, but with a voter turnout of only fi ve to fi fteen percent.94
In 1998 Eyadema again held presidential elections and invited interna-
tional observers. The EU and The Carter Center again found the elec-
toral process to fall far short of international standards, and aid was not 
resumed from the EU and other bilateral donors. Virtually the same pro-
cess was repeated in 2003 and again in 2005, following the death of Eya-
dema. In 2006, after the Togolese government complied with a series of 
mandated democratic reforms, the EU released 40 million Euros in for-
eign aid. When Togo held its fi rst credible elections in October 2007, the 
EU and other donors resumed full development cooperation. Figure 3.6 
illustrates the trend of aid from the European Community to Togo.
The relationship between internationally certifi ed elections and for-
eign support for governments is not always clear-cut, and there remains 
room for pseudo-democrats to engage in strategic manipulation or try to 
discredit the reports of observers. However, the perception of a connec-
tion between international benefi ts and internationally certifi ed elections 
is widespread. Governments that are already facing cuts in international 
support because of previous anti-democratic actions must hold inter-
nationally certifi ed elections in order to resume international benefi ts. 
Consistent with the norm of election monitoring, the vast majority of 
countries now invite international election observers. I now explore those 
few governments that do not.
Refusing to Invite International Observers
By 2000, few countries were violating the norm and not inviting in-
ternational observers. One interesting feature of the evolving game be-
tween international observers and pseudo-democrats is how rarely leaders 
93. “Presidential Election in Togo: This Election Was Meaningless!” Le Figaro, August 29, 
1993.
94. Ibid.
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simply refuse to invite international observers. Outside of the exclusive 
club of wealthy and stable democracies, a small subset of countries re-
fused observers even after the norm became widely accepted. As men-
tioned in previous chapters, some countries stopped inviting observers 
because they became widely regarded as democracies, such as the Czech 
Republic and Chile, and were no longer expected to have their elections 
observed. Other countries, such as Cuba, North Korea, Oman, Vietnam, 
and Turkmenistan, held elections in which multiparty competition was 
impossible and therefore stood no chance of holding plausibly democratic 
elections.
Figure 3.7 summarizes patterns of election monitoring for all countries 
that did not invite observers to at least one national election between 2000 
and 2006. I have excluded noninviting countries that are long-term con-
solidated democracies, members of the European Union, or countries that 
are considered to have very democratic political institutions (with a Polity2 
score of 8 or higher). The fourteen countries that never invited observ-
ers during this period are Bahrain, Cuba, Egypt, Guinea, Iran, Jordan, 
Kuwait, Laos, Malaysia, North Korea, Oman, Syria, Turkmenistan, and 
Vietnam. As indicated in fi gure 3.7, some of these elections lacked any real 
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Figure 3.6. Bilateral foreign aid to Togo
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in these cases is not why they refuse international election monitors, but 
why they hold elections at all.
Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, Iraq, and Singapore invited election mon-
itors to some but not all of their elections in this period. Malaysia and 
Gabon are two of the very few countries that invited international observ-
ers in the 1990s and then stopped after the norm had developed. Guinea 
invited observers from the European Union to elections in 2002, but the 
EU declined to send a mission.
Benin is considered one of the more democratic countries in Africa 
but does not meet the conditions that I have used to exclude democracies 
from fi gure 3.7. The country invited international observers to all but the 
2003 national assembly elections. Madagascar similarly invited observers 
to most elections since 1990 and resumed inviting observers after the dis-
puted 2002 presidential elections.
Other countries (such as Iran and Malaysia) do not rely heavily on in-
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Figure 3.7. Noninviting countries, 2000–2006
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violating the norm (such as Egypt). As referenced previously, Egypt is 
heavily dependent on international support but receives aid despite its 
political institutions and because of its strategic importance to the United 
States in the Middle East. Yet even Egypt has responded to the norm of 
election monitoring. Before the 2005 elections, heated debate took place 
within the Egyptian government about whether to invite international 
observers, with President Mubarak’s son Jamal unsuccessfully arguing in 
favor of international observers in response to U.S. pressure on the coun-
try to hold democratic elections.95 The decision in part sparked wide-
spread editorializing about “Egypt’s Imitation Elections,” including the 
following condemnation, reprinted in the International Herald Tribune:
Here are some simple ways to identify a real democratic election. The rul-
ing party should not be allowed to shape the election arrangements and in-
timidate voters. The candidates should be able to compete on a reasonably 
level playing fi eld. Impartial observers should be welcome and given time 
to deploy themselves at polling places nationwide. Not one of these defi n-
ing features was evident in last week’s Egyptian presidential voting.96
Despite the fact that opposition parties were allowed to compete for the 
fi rst time in the presidential elections, the Egyptian elections were widely 
viewed as a charade. Overall, the vast majority of governments invite ob-
servers, and the majority of governments that do not comply with the 
norm are unambiguous autocrats or unambiguous democrats.
Evidence of the Democracy-Contingent Benefits
In this chapter I have provided evidence in support of three of the em-
pirical implications outlined in chapter 1 and documented the role of de-
mocracy promoters in contributing to the norm of election monitoring. 
Democracy promoters play a fundamental role in explaining the diffusion 
of international election monitoring by increasing democracy-contingent 
benefi ts, but they did not advocate for the norm. Rather, by increasing 
support available to governments that were committed to democratiza-
tion, and eventually by recognizing internationally endorsed elections as 
a signal sent by all true democrats, they gave governments the incentive 
95. “US Presses Egypt to Allow in Election Monitors,” Agence France Press, August 29, 
2005. Q & A: Egypt’s Election Issues. November 15, 2005.
96. “Egypt’s Imitation Election,” New York Times, September 11, 2005.
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to initiate international election monitoring and increased the constraints 
on pseudo-democrats. By the late 1990s, choosing not to invite observ-
ers signaled with certainty that a government was a pseudo-democracy 
not interested in internationally recognized elections. By inviting ob-
servers, pseudo-democrats risked a negative report and a reduction in 
international benefi ts. However, for governments already perceived to 
be pseudo-democracies, gaining a positive report from international ob-
servers was the path back to full international support, as demonstrated 
by Togo. Inviting observers and receiving a negative report is not an ex-
pected strategy for any type of leader. By showing that some governments 
are punished for failing to hold internationally certifi ed elections, I have 
demonstrated that a plausible connection between election monitoring 
and democracy-contingent benefi ts exists and that this connection is ob-
servable to other governments that decide whether to invite observers. 
The threat of reduced international benefi ts is only one of several ways in 
which inviting monitors can be costly to pseudo-democrats. In the next 
chapter, I document how election monitors can have a direct effect on 
election day behavior and present causal evidence that observers can de-
crease vote share for pseudo-democrats but that observers do not neces-
sarily have the same effect for true democrats.
Are international election monitors more costly to pseudo-democrats 
than to true democrats? In this chapter, I continue investigating the con-
sequences of internationally monitored elections as they relate to norm 
formation and show that the presence of international observers correlates 
with several types of costs to incumbent leaders. I also use experimental 
evidence involving the randomization of short-term election observers to 
demonstrate that international observers can have a direct deterrent ef-
fect on election day fraud. By causing a reduction in vote share through 
fraud deterrence, at the very minimum election monitors make it more 
diffi cult for pseudo-democrats to steal elections, a cost that must exist 
for election monitoring to be a credible signal of a government’s com-
mitment to democratic elections. I also show that for true democrats, the 
same cost does not exist and present evidence that observers can have 
unintended consequences that help incumbent true democrats. Chapter 5 
continues this investigation by exploring the evolving game of strategy 
between international observers and pseudo-democrats. Here I provide a 
detailed examination of whether international observers have both direct 
and micro-level effects on election day behavior in two elections, either 
by deterring fraud or making it more likely that polling offi cials follow 
the rules.
An important empirical implication of my theory is that election ob-
servation must be more costly to pseudo-democrats than to true demo-
crats. Supporters of election observation argue that observers improve 
the quality of elections and make it more likely that election fraud will 
be uncovered. Cross-nationally, the presence of international observers 
is correlated with a variety of outcomes that are costly to the incumbent 
governments that invite them. These correlations suggest that, on average, 
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is more likely to lose such elections. I present these cross-national descrip-
tive statistics to support my argument and to contrast them with the ex-
perimental evidence provided later in this chapter. Although it is true that 
incumbents are more likely to lose elections when monitors are present, 
such evidence cannot demonstrate a causal relationship between observ-
ers and increased costs to pseudo-democrats, unlike the natural and fi eld 
experimental evidence shown in this chapter.
Incumbent Turnover and the Correlates 
of Observed Elections
In chapter 1, I argued that pseudo-democrats, all else equal, should 
perform worse when international monitors are present. The descriptive 
statistics below provide some support for this claim, but establishing cau-
sality is diffi cult. Critics of international election monitoring have been 
especially vocal in arguing that the central raison d’être of observers is 
to legitimize fl awed elections.1 It is true that observers sometimes legiti-
mize fl awed elections. My argument suggests, however, that the possibil-
ity that observers will not condemn a manipulated election is a central 
reason why pseudo-democrats are willing to invite them in the fi rst place. 
Nevertheless, the fact that pseudo-democrats take this risk should increase 
the chances that they will lose, either directly, through fraud deterrence, 
or indirectly, by making election fraud more expensive and diverting re-
sources that could be used elsewhere. Consider the following descriptive 
statistics for elections held between 1990 and 2006, when international 
observers were widely available (I exclude the consolidated democracies 
for ease of interpretation):
• Out of all elections in which the incumbent leader or governing party 
was replaced, 75% were internationally monitored (161 of 215).2
• Out of all elections in which the offi ce of the incumbent executive was 
contested, and in which the incumbent both ran and was replaced, 
68% were internationally observed (45 of 66).3
1. Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation and Democratization in Africa; Geisler, 
“Fair?”
2. Data are from the Hyde and Marinov NELDA dataset described in appendix B.
3. Coding of leaders from the Archigos dataset, Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza, “In-
troducing Archigos.” Other data from NELDA data described in appendix B (Hyde and 
Marinov, “National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy”).
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• From 1960 to 1989, observers were present at only 10% of elections 
in which there were signifi cant concerns before the election that it 
would not be free and fair. After 1989, this number increases to 69% 
and to 75% when single-party elections are excluded.
• Out of all elections in which the vote count was considered a “gain 
for the opposition,” observers were present at 70% (258 of 368).
These data suggest that observers are invited by incumbent governments 
to many elections that are more competitive and that are more likely to re-
sult in negative outcomes for the incumbent regime. Yet it is possible that 
governments were more likely to invite observers in these circumstances. 
Although they are suggestive, these cross-national data do not demon-
strate that observers caused more competitive election outcomes.
An Alternative Micro-level Approach to Testing 
the Effects of Observers
One persistent alternative argument is that it is costless for leaders to 
invite international election monitors, and the phenomenon is therefore 
not interesting as a case of international norm formation. This chapter 
disputes this alternative explanation by showing that inviting monitors 
can have several types of direct effects on election day behavior. Using 
experimental methods involving the randomization of international elec-
tion observers, I show that in Armenia (2003) the ( pseudo-democratic) 
incumbent president performed much worse in polling stations that were 
monitored compared with those that were not. In Indonesia (2004), in 
what was widely considered a democratic election, observer presence ac-
tually increased votes cast for the incumbent true democrat, who went on 
to lose the election and peacefully transfer power.
Natural and fi eld experimental tests are increasingly popular within the 
social sciences because of their potential to demonstrate cause and effect. 
The cases included in this chapter are described in greater detail elsewhere 
and are condensed here in order to link the results from these projects to 
the international norm of election observation.4 The distinguishing char-
acteristic of experimental methods versus observational research is that 
the central independent variable, or “treatment” variable, is randomly 
assigned. In fi eld experiments such as those conducted recently by Alan 
4. See Hyde, “The Observer Effect in International Politics”; Hyde, “Experimenting 
with Democracy Promotion”; Dunning and Hyde, “The Analysis of Experimental Data.”
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Gerber and Donald Green,5 Edward Miguel and Michael Kremer,6 Ben-
jamin Olken,7 and Leonard Wantchekon,8 the researcher supervises the 
random assignment of the treatment variable. In natural experiments, the 
researcher does not manage the assignment of the treatment variable, but 
natural experiments can occur when the variable is assigned “as if ” the 
assignment was random.9 The burden in natural experiments rests on the 
researcher to provide evidence that the treatment can, in fact, be treated 
“as if ” it had been randomly assigned. Existing natural experiments vary 
in the degree to which the treatment approaches true randomization.10
There are few published natural or fi eld experiments within the dis-
cipline of comparative politics and fewer within international relations. 
Exceptions for comparative politics include the work of Mei Guan and 
Donald Green;11 Macartan Humphreys, William Masters and Martin 
Sandbu;12 and Wantchekon.13 Despite the relative scarcity of experimental 
work, the advantages are well established: properly conducted experimen-
tal work is one of the few means by which causal inference can be tested, 
and as has been noted in the leading political science journal, experiments 
have an “unrivaled capacity to demonstrate cause and effect.”14
I evaluate the micro-level effects of observers using evidence from two 
different natural and fi eld experiments surrounding elections in Armenia 
in 2003 and Indonesia in 2004. In both cases, I exploit the randomization 
of international observers during their election day observation in order 
to test for differences between the areas that were visited and the areas 
that were not. Due to the randomization (or in the case of Armenia, the 
“as if ” randomization), any differences between the groups can be causally 
attributed to international election observers. By combining experimen-
tal tests of the effects of international observers with cross-national and 
qualitative evidence, I provide a more complete picture of the effects of 
election monitoring, provide some hard evidence that election monitors 
 5. Gerber and Green, “The Effects of Canvassing.”
 6. Miguel and Kremer, “Worms.”
 7. Olken, “Monitoring Corruption.”
 8. Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior.”
 9. For examples of natural experiments, see Snow, On the Mode of Communication of 
Cholera; Schargrodsky and Galiani, “Property Rights for the Poor.”
10. Dunning, “Improving Causal Inference.”
11. Guan and Green, “Noncoercive Mobilization in State-Controlled Elections.”
12. Humphreys, Masters, and Sandbu, “The Role of Leaders in Democratic Delibera-
tions.”
13. Wantchekon, “Clientelism and Voting Behavior.”
14. Druckman et al., “The Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Politi-
cal Science,” 627.
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are costly to pseudo-democrats, and link my theory of international norm 
formation with its micro-level implications.
Direct Effects on Election Day Behavior
Although academics remain skeptical that observers can have direct ef-
fects on election day behavior, practitioners and proponents of interna-
tional election observation frequently assert that international observers 
reduce election fraud and otherwise improve election quality. As refer-
enced above, a cross-national study of this issue cannot demonstrate cau-
sality: elections that are clean because they are internationally observed 
are indistinguishable from elections that are observed but would have 
been clean without international observers. Although the cross-national 
data are consistent with the argument that observers reduce election fraud 
and observed elections are systematically more competitive than unob-
served elections, there is no set of “control” variables that could disprove 
the alternative argument: leaders are more likely to invite observers when 
they know elections are going to be more competitive.
This chapter illustrates that the effects of international election observ-
ers can be measured by exploiting subnational variation in election re-
sults. In the most clear-cut case, if observers reduce election fraud directly 
owing to their presence in polling stations, this effect should be revealed 
by differences in voting patterns between monitored and unmonitored 
polling stations.
The typical election observation mission includes teams of observers who, 
throughout the course of election day, roam within predefi ned geographic 
areas. Observers take note of activities in and around polling stations and 
frequently talk to voters, polling station offi cials, political party witnesses, 
domestic nonpartisan observers, and to other international observers.
Observers are also able to observe fraud directly, and observers some-
times express surprise that election fraud is carried out blatantly in front 
of them. Teams of foreign observers have directly witnessed many forms 
of outright election day manipulation, including premarked and bundled 
stacks of ballots clearly visible within transparent ballot boxes; the alloca-
tion of multiple ballots to individual voters; theft of ballot boxes and burn-
ing of ballots before the count; overt vote-buying schemes; prohibitions 
on secret voting, including the presence of individuals who “assist” voters 
by fi lling out their ballots for them and /or accompanying each voter into 
the voting booth; illegal disenfranchisement of eligible voters; or wide-
spread voting by children.
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Less overt “irregularities” are also commonly witnessed by interna-
tional observers, and these may or may not be a sign of intentional elec-
tion manipulation. These more ambiguous irregularities include polling 
stations that open late or without suffi cient materials, a lack of provisions 
for secret voting, the failure to follow procedures that prevent multiple 
voting, election day violence and disturbances that reduce voter turnout, 
extremely long lines, and the presence of unauthorized individuals, police, 
or military in polling stations.
Although it is clear from the records of election-monitoring missions 
that election manipulation tactics are frequently carried out in front of 
observers, observers may reduce election fraud without eliminating it en-
tirely. Similarly, even though international monitors witness irregularities, 
polling station offi cials may be more likely to follow rules and regulations 
when they are being watched by international monitors. The remainder 
of this chapter tests for an “observer effect” across varying conditions, 
including in the presence of overt election day fraud (in the case of Arme-
nia) and in relatively democratic elections (in the case of Indonesia). The 
inclusion of both studies in this chapter demonstrates that, at least in this 
comparison, observers were more costly to the pseudo-democratic gov-
ernment (in Armenia) than the incumbent government in Indonesia that 
was revealed to be a true democrat.
There are a few other points about election-observation methodology 
that are not unique to these countries but that are important to note. First, 
international observers do not preannounce which polling stations they 
will observe on election day. Keeping deployment plans confi dential is 
standard practice for reputable international observer groups and is in-
tended to enhance the safety of the observers by making it diffi cult for 
potential attackers to anticipate where observers will be. It also makes it 
diffi cult for the competing parties to anticipate the arrival of observers and 
thereby restrict their cheating to polling stations at which international 
observers are not expected.
Second, international observers are usually mobile, moving from poll-
ing station to polling station throughout election day. During the course 
of one day, an observer team could visit between ten and twenty polling 
stations or neighborhoods based on the length of the election day and 
the distance between polling stations. Critics of election observation are 
fond of pointing out that it would be very diffi cult to catch any irregulari-
ties in such short periods of observation. However, if there are ongoing 
problems or red fl ags indicating that there might be problems, observer 
teams are instructed to stay for as long as they think is useful, which in 
some cases can be as long as several hours. The questionnaires fi lled out 
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by international observers include a number of observations related to the 
structure of the polling station, the available staff and materials, and the 
order of voting procedures that are immediately obvious. If the seal on 
the ballot box has been broken, international observers are most likely to 
see this and other evidence of fraud as soon as they enter a polling station. 
In addition, the partisan witnesses in each polling station remain there 
throughout the day and are often able to report irregularities to the inter-
national observers.
Elections in Armenia and Indonesia
The 2003 presidential elections in Armenia provide the opportunity for 
a direct test of whether international observers can reduce election fraud. 
During these elections, international observers from the Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe’s Offi ce for Democratic Institutions 
and Human Rights (OSCE/ODIHR) were assigned to polling stations in 
a way that closely approximates randomization, making this case a natural 
fi eld experiment. In the 2004 presidential elections in Indonesia, I worked 
directly with the Carter Center in designing the deployment plans. The 
Carter Center, founded by former U.S. President Jimmy Carter and 
Rosalynn Carter and based in Atlanta, GA, is a well-respected interna-
tional election-monitoring group. The fi eld experiment was generated by 
randomizing the assignment of international observers within predefi ned 
geographic areas.
The case of Armenia demonstrates that when election day fraud occurs, 
election monitoring can cause a reduction in the vote share of the cheating 
candidate. The Indonesian case provides an interesting contrast because 
election day fraud was not widely expected, and the incumbent government 
was not accused of cheating. Even so, international observers increased 
the vote share of the incumbent candidate, I argue, by making it more 
likely that polling station offi cials followed election day regulations.
By presenting these cases together, I show that international election 
observers can have important effects on election quality. Particularly when 
election day fraud is widespread, observers can reduce election day fraud 
directly, making it more diffi cult for pseudo-democrats to steal elections. 
True democrats experience no such costs, and even when elections are 
widely perceived to be democratic, international observers can have im-
portant and sometimes unanticipated effects on election day behavior. In 
Indonesia, these unanticipated effects actually increased the vote share for 
the incumbent, who went on to lose the election and peacefully transfer 
133Does Election Monitoring Matter?
power. Overall, the results strongly refute the alternative hypothesis that 
inviting international observers is costless to pseudo-democrats or is 
equally costly to both types of leaders.
For both cases, I provide a brief background to the election, an evalu-
ation of the randomization, and a summary of the empirical results and 
conclusions. I then conclude the chapter by discussing the results of these 
experiments in relation to my theory.
The 2003 Presidential Elections in Armenia
Of all countries that invite international election monitors, Armenia 
represents what might be termed a repeat offender. Between independence 
in 1991 and the 2003 presidential election, Armenia held six elections, 
none of which were viewed as democratic. Political participation by voters 
and by most candidates generally complied with democratic standards, 
but the executive offi ce participated in elections in a manner that has been 
labeled “fl agrantly undemocratic.”15 Following independence, the elected 
president Levon Ter-Petrossian and his supporters successfully consoli-
dated power within the executive offi ce while other nascent parties were 
still attempting to gain organizational strength.16 As a result, the president 
is generally the controlling force in Armenian politics by virtue of his 
authority to dissolve parliament, appoint all judges, and declare martial 
law.17 Strong political parties did not develop as a challenge to executive 
power, in part because of Ter-Petrossian’s overt efforts to prevent any such 
opposition party from organizing.18 As of 2003, there were more than 
one hundred registered political parties. Because successful election day 
manipulation requires at least minimal organizational capacity, the politi-
cal structure in Armenia points to the incumbent executive as the political 
actor with the preponderant ability to commit widespread fraud.
The two most prominent political fi gures in the postindependence pe-
riod are Ter-Pertrossian and Robert Kocharian. The former was president 
until 1998, when he resigned amid wide public dissatisfaction as a result 
of his failure to increase the standard of living and his willingness to ne-
gotiate with Azerbaijan over the territorial confl ict in Nagorno-Karabakh. 
15. Welt and Bremmer, “Armenia’s New Autocrats,” 78.
16. Welt and Bremmer, “Armenia’s New Autocrats.”
17. Diamond, Developing Democracy, 55.
18. Welt and Bremmer, “Armenia’s New Autocrats.”
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Kocharian, who was elected to replace Ter-Pertrossian in 1998, was the 
incumbent candidate in the 2003 presidential election.
The 2003 elections were viewed as a potential turning point for Arme-
nian democracy. As an OSCE /ODIHR offi cial report states,
The election provided an important test of the progress of democratic prac-
tices in Armenia, since the previous presidential elections were character-
ized by serious fl aws and generally failed to meet international standards. 
Issues of concern at the two previous presidential elections . . . included in-
accuracy of voter lists, shortcomings in the election administration, media 
bias, abuse of State resources, fl awed voting by military personnel, the 
presence of unauthorized persons during polling and counting and dis-
crepancies in the vote count.19
The only item on the ballot for the 2003 elections was the presidential 
race, in which nine candidates ran. The incumbent president Robert Kocha-
rian was the front-runner; he faced a serious challenge from Stepan Demir-
chian, the son of the late speaker Karin Demirchian, who had been killed in 
a 1999 attack on parliament.20 The other notable challenger was Artashes 
Geghamian, the last Soviet-era mayor of the capital city of Yerevan.
The ongoing confl ict with Azerbaijan over the Nagorno-Karabakh re-
gion has been the single most important postindependence issue in Ar-
menian politics. Kocharian, a native of Nagorno-Karabakh, was seen as 
a resolute supporter of its independence. Ter-Petrossian’s willingness to 
negotiate with Azerbaijan over the territory in 1998 was partly responsible 
for his resignation from the presidency and Kocharian’s succession to his 
post through the 1998 special elections.
Kocharian, who did not have his own political party, offi cially ran as an 
independent. He had been supported by a shifting coalition, which in 2003 
included the ruling Republican Party of Armenia and the Armenian Revo-
lutionary Federation (also known as Dashnak, or the Socialist Party). He 
also enjoyed the strong support of the military. Although his resolute un-
willingness to negotiate on the Nagorno-Karabakh confl ict was his most 
defi ning characteristic, in 2003 he also campaigned on the promise of eco-
nomic stability, as did all of the candidates. Thus, the relative homogeneity 
19. OSCE /ODIHR, Republic of Armenia Presidential Election 19 February and 5 March 
2003, 3.
20. Armenian politics are characterized by violence, which overshadowed the 2003 elec-
tions. Most notably, in 1999 the parliament was attacked by gunmen, and eight prominent 
politicians were assassinated. The 2003 presidential elections were the fi rst to be held after 
the attack.
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of Armenian politics, the lack of other issues on the ballot, the fact that the 
incumbent ran without a political party, the presence of a dominant execu-
tive, and the central issue of Nagorno-Karabakh provide the background 
to the 2003 presidential election and the context of the natural experiment, 
making it a relatively clean setup to evaluate the effects of international 
observers on election fraud committed by the incumbent government.
The fi rst round of Armenia’s 2003 presidential elections took place on 
February 19, followed by a runoff on March 5. The Armenian constitu-
tion requires a second-round runoff if no presidential candidate garners 
more than 50% of the vote in the fi rst round of the single-district national 
election. The offi cial fi rst-round vote share for Kocharian was 49.48%, 
thus triggering a runoff election.
Several months prior to the election, the Armenian Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs invited the OSCE /ODIHR to sponsor an international election-
observation mission. The delegation included members of the Parliamen-
tary Assembly Council of Europe. In the fi rst round of the election, the 
OSCE deployed 233 observers from thirty-fi ve participating countries. 
The second round was observed by 193 short-term observers from twenty-
one countries.
The Natural Experiment Research Design in Armenia
In the Armenian election, international observers were assigned to poll-
ing stations on election day using a method that I did not supervise but that 
approximates random assignment. If election day fraud occurs in any elec-
tion, it should have the observable implication of increasing the vote share 
of the fraud-sponsoring candidate. In the case of Armenia, the incumbent 
sponsored the majority of election day fraud. Therefore, if international 
observers have no effect on election day fraud, then the incumbent should 
perform equally well in both groups of polling stations: those that were 
monitored and those that were not. If international observers reduce elec-
tion fraud, the incumbent’s average vote share should be lower in moni-
tored polling stations than in unmonitored polling stations.
There are three unique features of the 2003 Armenian elections that 
allow a test of whether the presence of international observers reduced 
election day fraud. First, widespread and centrally orchestrated fraud oc-
curred on election day. As the Economist described it, the 2003 election was 
“one of the dirtiest even Armenians can remember.”21 Fraud (and there-
fore fraud deterrence) can occur at many points in the electoral process. 
21. Economist, “Democracy, It’s Wonderful,” February 22, 2003.
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However, it would be diffi cult to test for election day costs to a pseudo-
democratic government if no fraud occurred.
Eyewitness reports from international observers, domestic observers, 
and journalists documented many varieties of fraud. The OSCE /ODIHR 
observed “signifi cant irregularities” in more than 10% of the polling sta-
tions they visited, the most blatant of which were ballot box stuffi ng, “car-
ousel” voting, direct vote buying, individuals voting more than once, the 
intimidation of witnesses for political parties, the presence inside poll-
ing stations of government offi cials who attempted to intimidate offi cials 
and voters, and one isolated incident of the removal of more than fi fty 
passports from a polling station by a policeman.22 During the count-
ing process, there were numerous attempts to change the vote totals by 
the polling-station offi cials, and observers recorded additional evidence 
of blatant ballot box stuffi ng. In some cases the international observers 
were prevented from observing the counting process, which was inter-
preted as an attempt to conceal illicit behavior.
The second characteristic of the 2003 presidential elections is that the 
Armenian Central Election Commission made disaggregated election re-
sults available. The process of recording and making public polling station-
level election results requires a certain level of administrative competence 
and transparency that is not always present, even in developed democra-
cies. In countries that experience signifi cant amounts of electoral fraud, 
these data are often “lost” or kept private. The Armenian election data, 
disaggregated to the level of the polling station, were made public by the 
election commission on their website.23
The third and most important favorable feature of the 2003 Armenian 
elections for analysis is that the international observers were assigned in a way 
that approximates random assignment. Although the OSCE /ODIHR mis-
sion did not assign observers using a random numbers table or its equivalent, 
their method would have been highly unlikely to produce a list of assigned 
polling stations that were systematically different from the polling stations 
not visited. Each team’s assigned list was selected arbitrarily from a complete 
list of polling stations. Those making the lists did not possess information 
about polling-station attributes that would have allowed prediction of voting 
patterns and the choice of polling stations based on those predictions.
In this particular election, the delegation leaders gave each team of 
the short-term observers a preassigned list of polling stations to visit on 
22. OSCE /ODIHR, Republic of Armenia Presidential Election 19 February and 5 March 2003, 19.
23. Government-reported election results were made available online at http://www.elec 
tions.am by the Central Election Commission of Armenia.
137Does Election Monitoring Matter?
election day. These lists were made with two objectives in mind: (1) to dis-
tribute the observers throughout the whole country (including rural and 
urban areas) and (2) to give each observer team a list of polling stations 
that did not overlap with that of other teams. Observers were encouraged 
to go only to those polling stations on their lists and to travel between 
polling stations in a way that minimized travel time and still ensured cov-
erage of their assigned polling stations. It is important for the validity of 
the natural experiment that the travel routes not be predictable by exter-
nal observers, including government offi cials.
The individuals who made these lists had little knowledge of polling-
station characteristics other than their general geographic location. This 
is critical for the validity of the natural experiment. If the assignment of 
observers had considered other variables that might be correlated with the 
performance of the incumbent candidate, then the assignment could not be 
considered “as-if ” random. In addition, the discussion of Armenian politics 
indicated few observable characteristics of the population (such as socio-
economic status or ethnicity) that might be correlated with the incumbent’s 
popularity. In this case, the staff did not have access to disaggregated data on 
the demographic characteristics of the Armenian voting population. OSCE /
ODIHR staff has assured me that they had no desire to (and did not) choose 
polling stations on any basis other than the two criteria cited above. In addi-
tion, even if this were not true, it is highly unlikely that the mission’s offi ce 
had the capability to choose polling stations that were more or less likely to 
favor the incumbent or the opposition candidates or that were more likely 
to experience election day fraud.24 The fact that Armenian politics are not 
predictable along partisan or demographic lines underscores that this type of 
bias in the assignment of international observers would have required enor-
mous effort, access to data that do not exist, and foresight about the trajec-
tory of Armenian politics that would be unusual for foreigners to possess.
Additionally, assigning specifi c polling stations to each team eliminated 
much of the agency’s infl uence on the individual observer teams, which, in 
the absence of a directive, could choose to visit polling sites based on their 
own selection criteria within their assigned geographic area. When ob-
servers are given leeway in choosing polling stations, the two most com-
mon alternative selection criteria (based on observation missions outside 
of the two discussed in this chapter) are to choose polling stations that are 
considered to be either convenient or interesting. Each of these decision 
24. Even if this information were inaccurately communicated to me, if observers were more 
likely to visit stations they believe to be problematic, then this would dampen an observed ef-
fect observers have on fraud. For the reasons cited, however, this is an unlikely scenario.
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criteria may create signifi cant bias in the types of polling stations that are 
observed. This has been pointed out as a problem by several critics of 
election observation.25 Observer teams that select “interesting” polling 
stations typically go to areas in which problems are expected; teams using 
this criteria may disproportionately observe and report irregularities. This 
is a common strategy among the more ambitious and enthusiastic interna-
tional observers but was discouraged in this particular mission.
Observer teams that go to convenient areas are criticized for being elec-
toral tourists. Other convenient selection methods may be observing near 
the observers’ hotel in the most comfortable urban areas or going to poll-
ing stations that are near tourist destinations. Clearly, these selection cri-
teria are nonrandom and could lead to bias in both the observers’ reported 
observations and in the natural experiment proposed here, particularly 
because a clever politician could recognize the tendency of observers to 
travel in certain areas and therefore concentrate any electoral manipula-
tion in places where observers would be unlikely to go. For these reasons 
it was particularly important for this natural experiment that this type of 
observer agency was explicitly discouraged.
In sum, the assignment of international observers to polling stations for 
both rounds of the 2003 presidential elections in Armenia can be char-
acterized as approximating randomization. The selection was made arbi-
trarily from a list of all polling stations with only geographic logistics in 
mind, and the assignment was completed with no knowledge of variables 
that might be correlated with the incumbent’s likely vote share. Teams 
were instructed to visit only the polling stations assigned to them, and be-
cause of the relatively small geographic area and limited number of poll-
ing stations assigned to each team, they had a high probability of reaching 
their assigned polling stations on election day.
Checking “As If” Randomization
Ideally, in any experimental research design the assignment of the treat-
ment could be examined in relation to a background covariate in order to 
test for balance between the treatment and control groups. In this case, the 
ideal covariate would be an independent measure of the candidates’ likely 
vote share, such as public opinion polling or past election results. These 
data were not available for Armenia at the polling-station level for the fi rst 
round, but as table 4.1 shows, observer distribution does not appear to 
follow a clear pattern that would predict Kocharian vote share. Coverage 
25. Carothers, “The Observers Observed”; Geisler, “Fair?”
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varies by region from a low of 28% of polling stations monitored in Ara-
gatsotn to 70% of polling stations monitored in the capital city of Yerevan. 
The last column of table 4.1 suggests that much of this difference is due to 
voter density, because there is relative balance in voters per monitored poll-
ing station within each region. Additionally, the OSCE mission observed 
extensively outside of urban areas where there are fewer voters and travel is 
more time consuming. To illustrate, an urban polling station is defi ned as 
one that is in the region of Yerevan, is a regional capital, or is one of the seven 
biggest cities (population >40,000). All other polling stations are nonurban, 
which includes rural and periurban polling stations. Using these criteria, 
45% of all polling stations are nonurban. In the fi rst round of the election, 
international observers visited 38% nonurban polling stations, and 35% 
nonurban in the second round. Given that there are more voters in each 
urban polling station, observers covered nonurban areas extensively.
Because the same method of assigning observers was used in both 
rounds of the election, it is possible to check the second round’s random-
ization against covariates from the fi rst round of the election (table 4.2). 
Second-round observation, because it occurred three months later and was 
random, should not be systematically related to any fi rst-round election 
outcomes. The round two presence of observers is compared with vote 
share and turnout in round one. These round-one outcomes should be 
equal between polling stations that were monitored in the second round 
and those that were not. As expected with near-random assignment, the 
presence of observers in the second round of the election is unrelated to 
voter turnout or to vote share for either of the leading candidates.














Aragatsotn 133 27.82 701 2,520
Ararat 137 53.28 1,355 2,543
Armavir 153 38.56 1,219 3,161
Gegharkunik 148 32.43 1,140 3,515
Kotayk 132 43.18 1,429 3,309
Lori 226 33.63 1,059 3,148
Shirak 273 25.64 907 3,537
Syunik 54 37.04 859 2,319
Tavush 80 28.75 1,152 4,007
Vayots Dzor 40 37.50 1,017 2,712
Yerevan 388 69.59 1,751 2,516
140 The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma
Data and Results
The central measurable effect of observers on election day fraud is to 
decrease the vote share for the incumbent. With all else constant, if in-
ternational observers did in fact reduce fraud at the polling stations they 
visited, then the incumbent should perform worse in observed polling sta-
tions. Random assignment (or “as if ” random assignment) of the treat-
ment of international observers is equivalent to all else being constant.
Because international observers can be considered randomly assigned 
to polling stations and because there were two rounds of the presidential 
election, the natural experimental design involves two rounds of “treat-
ment” and a separate observation of vote share for each round. There was 
some between-round overlap in the polling stations visited by interna-
tional observers. This divides the sample of polling station-level election 
results into four experimental groups based on the treatment of interna-
tional observation during the course of election day: one group of polling 
stations was never monitored (N = 755), one group was monitored only 
in the fi rst round (N = 385), one was monitored only in the second round 
(N = 260), and one group was monitored in both rounds (N = 363).
Groups of polling stations received all possible combinations of the in-
ternational observer treatment, including no treatment in either round 
of the election. Therefore, the natural experiment also allows a test of 
whether fi rst-round observation had any lasting effect in the second round. 
Approximately 43% of polling stations were not observed in either round 
of the election, and about 21% were observed in both rounds.26
26. Outside of the Yerevan region (where polling stations were equally likely to be visited 
in both rounds) polling stations that were visited in round one were twice as likely to be 
visited again in round two.
Table 4.2. Logistic regression of round two monitoring on background covariates
Variable (1) (2) (3)
Round 1 Turnout 0.425
(0.608)
Round 1 Kocharian Vote Share –0.751
(0.832)
Round 1 Demirchian Vote Share 0.114
(1.083)
Constant –0.878 –0.220 –0.636
(0.690) (0.653) (0.418)
Observations 1,763 1,763 1,763
Notes: Robust standard errors in parenthesis, clustered by region. *Signifi cant at 5%; 
**Signifi cant at 1%
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The Effect of Monitors on Vote Share
The dependent variable is the vote share for the incumbent presidential 
candidate, Robert Kocharian, in the fi rst and second rounds.27 The results 
presented in table 4.3 show clear evidence that during the 2003 presiden-
tial elections in Armenia, the presence of international observers reduced 
the vote share for the incumbent politician by about 6% in the fi rst round 
(Model 1) and by about 2% in the second round (Model 2). Both results are 
statistically signifi cant. This allows a rejection of the null hypothesis that 
there is no difference between observed and unobserved polling stations.
Figure 4.1 illustrates this difference with a kernel density plot of Kocha-
rian’s round-one vote share in monitored and unmonitored polling sta-
tions. Note the unusual distribution of vote share in unmonitored polling 
stations.
The results also suggest that the effect of monitoring in the fi rst round 
of the election carried over into the second round. This type of effect could 
occur if those committing fraud anticipated that polling stations visited in the 
fi rst round were more likely to be visited again. If the effect of international 
observers had lasting effects on fraudulent behavior, the polling stations 
that were monitored in the fi rst round should also experience less fraud in 
the second round. If fi rst-round observation had no effect on second-round 
27. The same tests for the other candidates are consistent with the conclusions drawn 
from these results.
Table 4.3. Effects of observations on vote share for President Robert Kocharian
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables
Round 1
Vote share for Kocharian
Round 2
Vote share for Kocharian
Observed R1 –0.059** –0.059** –0.055** –0.040**







Constant 0.542** 0.542** 0.536** 0.693** 0.702**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009) (0.005) (0.005)
Observations 1,764 1,764 1,764 1,763 1,763
R2 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.00 0.01
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by region. *Signifi cant at 5%; 
**Signifi cant at 1%
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fraud, then the difference in the second-round incumbent vote share be-
tween the groups in the fi rst round should be close to zero. Model 5 in 
table 4.3 illustrates that a fi rst-round visit by observers continued to have a 
clear effect in the second round. A fi rst-round visit caused the incumbent to 
perform about 4% worse in the second round among polling stations that 
were not visited again in the second round. This implies that polling-station 
offi cials who were visited by international observers in the fi rst round were 
less likely to commit fraud in the second round. Overall, the Armenia elec-
tion shows that under conditions of widespread election day fraud, observ-
ers reduced the vote share for the incumbent, therefore making it more 
diffi cult or more costly for his government to steal votes. The magnitude of 
the effect of observers in the fi rst round may have caused the second round 
runoff, because the national average deterrent effect was greater than the 
margin by which the incumbent failed to win the fi rst round outright.
The 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia
Armenia and Indonesia differ in many ways, most obviously in size. Indo-
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Figure 4.1. Round one vote share for incumbent in monitored vs. unmonitored polling 
stations
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countries in the world. There were fewer than 1,800 polling stations for 
the 2003 Armenian elections. In contrast, elections in Indonesia took 
place across more than 17,000 islands, approximately 155 million eligible 
voters, and more than 500,000 polling stations.
The 2004 presidential elections in Indonesia were the fi rst direct presi-
dential elections in the country’s history. Legislative elections held in 
1999 and in April of 2004 were widely considered successful given the 
size of the country and the country’s newly democratizing status. Prior 
to these elections, the president was selected indirectly. The incumbent 
in the 2004 elections, Megawati Sukarnoputri, had been in offi ce since 
her 2001 appointment by the People’s Consultative Assembly. There were 
two rounds of the 2004 presidential election; due to the fact that fi rst-
round election results are unavailable, I focus here on only the second-
round runoff between the incumbent candidate Megawati Sukarnoputri 
(commonly referred to as Megawati or Mega) and the leading challenger, 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly referred to as SBY). Expectations 
were high leading up to the 2004 elections, which were viewed as a crucial 
step in Indonesia’s democratization. Many believed that the elections were 
likely to go well, and the most common concerns in advance of election 
day pertained to logistical factors and the administration of an election 
in such a large and diverse country. However, because of the scope of the 
election reforms leading to the 2004 elections and the recent transition to 
democratic institutions, some observers worried that the election could 
deteriorate into violence or fraud.28
For the 2004 presidential elections in Indonesia, I had the opportunity 
to attempt random assignment of international observers for the Carter 
Center’s election day deployment rather than rely on “as if ” random as-
signment as in the Armenian election. To my knowledge, this was the fi rst 
attempt to randomly assign observers within the fi eld of international elec-
tion observation.29 The case of Indonesia was selected because the oppor-
tunity to attempt random assignment of international observers was made 
available by the Carter Center. The introduction of randomly assigned 
international observers had been met with some skepticism by other prac-
titioners. Although international election observation missions regularly 
28. European Union, European Union Election Observation Mission to Indonesia; Carter 
Center, The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report.
29. Since that time, randomized assignment of international observers has been con-
ducted by the Carter Center in Nicaragua (2006), by a Yale University student delegation 
participating in a U.S. Embassy mission in Mauritania (2007), and by the National Demo-
cratic Institute (NDI) in the 2006 Palestinian elections.
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use randomization to assign international observers to vote-counting cen-
ters at the end of election day as part of a parallel vote tabulation,30 ran-
dom assignment of international observers during polling was thought 
unnecessary, logistically too diffi cult, or contrary to some of the other 
goals of election observation.31
Prior to the election, there were reports of “money politics” and 
other forms of intimidation, complaints related to restrictions placed 
on domestic election observers, as well as violations of laws restricting 
campaign activity. However, overall, the environment leading up to the 
presidential elections was guardedly optimistic, and observers hoped 
that the election would be carried out peacefully. Thus, the anticipated 
effect that international observers could have on election day behavior 
was moderated by the expectation that the election would be relatively 
clean. Clear-cut cases of blatant election day fraud would have made 
this a more straightforward baseline study of whether election observers 
change election quality, as in the Armenian case. Theoretically speak-
ing, Indonesia was more complicated. Although many experts in Indo-
nesia politics had concerns in advance of the election, blatant election 
day fraud—such as ballot box stuffi ng—was not expected. In design-
ing this study, it was not clear in advance of the election which candi-
date would be more likely to benefi t from the presence of observers. 
In countries that experience widespread election day manipulation, the 
incumbent party is frequently the primary sponsor, and as shown in the 
Armenia case, evidence suggests that observers can deter blatant elec-
tion day manipulation. However, in Indonesia’s 2004 election, the in-
cumbent president had never stood for direct election to the presidency 
and did not have a reputation for carrying out widespread election day 
30. The parallel vote tabulation, or quick count, provides an independent measure of the 
election results, within a margin of error, and is traditionally more reliable than exit polling. 
Observers (domestic or international) are assigned to a random sample of polling stations 
to directly observe the counting process, and they report the tallies from the vote count. 
Because the sample is random, quick counts typically provide very accurate estimations of 
the election results and thus guard against manipulation during the counting process; Estok, 
Nevitte, and Cowan, The Quick Count and Election Observation.
31. For example, one strategy for election monitoring is to send observers to the areas 
that are expected to have problems or to send observers to areas that would “benefi t from 
seeing an international presence.” These strategies create clear bias in the content of elec-
tion day observations, but are perceived as politically important. (Personal conversations 
between the author and international election observation professionals from NDI, the 
EU, the OSCE /ODIHR, and The Carter Center.) Of course, it would be possible to 
randomize within regions that are expected to have problems in order to alleviate this 
concern.
145Does Election Monitoring Matter?
manipulation. Additionally, ahead of the second-round runoff, Mega-
wati had already lost the fi rst round of the election to SBY and was not 
expected to win. In hindsight, the fact that the incumbent ran, allowed 
democratic elections, lost, and peacefully transferred power makes clear 
that she met my defi nition of a true democrat. Observers should not, 
therefore, have been costly to Megawati in terms of her election day 
performance.
Field Experimental Design in Indonesia
The Carter Center’s mission for the second round of the election con-
sisted of fi fty-seven observers and twenty-eight observer teams, twenty-
three of which participated in the randomization. The long-term election 
observers and the Jakarta-based staff of the Carter Center selected areas 
of Indonesia (primarily kabupaten and kota, or districts and cities) to which 
the Carter Center would send election observers. The selection of districts 
to be visited by the Carter Center was not random. In order for an area to 
be selected, it had to be accessible by car or aircraft within one day’s travel 
time and had to have basic accommodations for the observer team that 
were judged as suffi ciently safe.32 There was also some effort made to 
avoid extensive overlap with the European Union election observation 
mission, as well as consideration for whether access was granted to areas in 
which foreigners are frequently prohibited from traveling, such as Banda 
Aceh, Ambon, and parts of Papua. For the participating teams, random as-
signment was applied within each district or pair of districts where Carter 
Center observers were sent.
The lists of villages and neighborhoods assigned to each participating 
Carter Center team were generated within each preselected geographic 
area using systematic random sampling (also called patterned sampling).33 
32. Security concerns are relatively standard on election observation missions but were 
heightened in Indonesia because of recent Western-targeted bombings of hotels and the 
Australian embassy.
33. For a given block (city or district) to which a Carter Center team was assigned, a 
complete list of villages and neighborhoods was compiled. The total number of units within 
each block, or Ni , was sorted by an identifi cation number that roughly identifi ed the units 
geographically but was not otherwise organized in any systematic pattern. For each block, 
a target number of randomly selected units, ni , was produced in negotiation with regional 
experts and the Carter Center staff, and for logistical reasons a greater proportion of selected 
units were allowed within some blocks. Given ni , every kth unit was selected, with k = Ni  / ni 
for all i blocks. Randomization requires that every unit within a given block has an equal 
probability of being selected. The fi rst village chosen in the skipping pattern was selected 
arbitrarily from all villages within the block.
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These lists were not released to anyone other than the Carter Center staff 
and the observer teams assigned to each area.
The unit of analysis in this study is the village/neighborhood. However, 
each village or neighborhood contained one or more polling stations, 
which observers were instructed to select using a method that approxi-
mates randomization.
To check the randomization of villages within each experimen-
tal block, I used logistic regression with assignment to the treatment 
group as the dependent variable. Because this was the fi rst direct presi-
dential election in Indonesian history, little historical precedent existed 
on which to base predictions of vote patterns for the 2004 elections. 
Only one background covariate is available at the village level: the 
total number of registered voters. Table 4.4 presents the results of the 
randomization check. Across all blocks, the null hypothesis—that as-
signment to the treatment group is not related to the number of regis-
tered voters—cannot be rejected. Also in table 4.4, when all blocks are 
pooled, assignment to the treatment group is unrelated to the num-
ber of registered voters, similarly indicating that there is no signifi cant 
Table 4.4. Logistic regression of assigned-to-treatment group on registered voters
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Registered Voters 
(1,000s)
–0.103 0.028 –0.001 –0.030 0.104 0.124 –0.078
(0.215) (0.019) (0.110) (0.102) (0.136) (0.074) (0.144)
Constant –1.125* –1.704** –0.072 –1.173** –1.500** –1.645** 0.345
(0.471) (0.333) (1.231) (0.355) (0.451) (0.353) (1.086)
Observations 90 163 23 186 117 136 45
Block (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15)
Registered Voters 
(1,000s)
0.175 0.006 –0.004 –0.021 –0.029 –0.058 0.160*
(0.128) (0.032) (0.043) (0.054) (0.075) (0.048) (0.078)
Constant –1.515* –1.495** –1.265** –1.231 –1.326** 0.339 –2.304**
(0.674) (0.379) (0.202) (0.674) (0.513) (0.801) (0.524)
Observations 46 156 243 42 31 24 103
Block (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) Pooled estimate
Registered Voters 
(1,000s)





(0.060) (0.223) (0.235) (0.136) (0.048)
Constant –1.363* –1.197* –1.645** –0.015 –1.527**
(0.576) (0.530) (0.586) (0.496) (0.346)
Observations 103 60 52 56 146
Notes: The “pooled estimate” includes dummy variables for each block (not reported). Stan-
dard errors in parentheses. *Signifi cant at 5%; **Signifi cant at 1%
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difference in the number of registered voters between treatment and 
control groups.34
Table 4.5 summarizes the areas observed by Carter Center observers at 
the village level. Out of all villages in the visited regions, Carter Center 
observers were assigned to visit 482 villages, 95 of which were actually 
visited. Within these 95 assigned and visited villages, 147 individual poll-
ing stations were visited. Note that a small proportion of villages in the 
control group were visited.35
Data and Results for 2004 Indonesian Election
In the second round of the 2004 presidential elections, Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono and his running mate Jusuf Kalla were the leading candidates, 
having won 34% of the votes cast in the fi rst round in a fi ve-candidate 
fi eld. The incumbent president, Megawati Sukarnoputri, won 27% in 
the fi rst round. The runoff was held on September 20, 2004. SBY won the 
presidency with 61% of the vote. Due to the size of the country, Carter 
Center observers could not spread out across the entire country, as was at-
tempted by the OSCE/ODIHR mission in Armenia. The randomization 
within blocks prevents generalization across the country, but within-block 
comparisons remain valid. Estimating the average effect across included 
blocks is also possible, although it is more complicated and should not be 
confused with randomization across the whole country.
Government-reported unoffi cial election results for the total number of 
votes cast for each candidate and the number registered voters for all vil-
lages were recorded in the second round of the 2004 presidential election. 
Polling station-level data for the same regions were also collected but are 
not analyzed here.36 The unoffi cial results were made public by the Indo-
nesian KPU (the general elections commission) for most of the country. 
These aggregate results were uploaded by regional election offi cials to a 
central government-run website and are subject to the usual disclaimers 
about unoffi cial election results. Unfortunately, data were incomplete for 
three of the districts where teams from the Carter Center were deployed 
34. Pooling all blocks is more complicated because of variation in the size of the blocks.
35. For some teams, visiting control group villages or neighborhoods was accidental and 
resulted from visiting polling stations near the border between urban neighborhoods. Other 
teams encountered logistical (usually transportation related) problems that caused them to 
choose to visit villages outside of their assigned list. This information is only available anec-
dotally and was not coded in the dataset.
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in the second round: Mimika, Kupang, and Manokwari. These regions 
(and the three corresponding Carter Center teams) were dropped from 
the analysis, leaving twenty experimental blocks.
Another important issue in analyzing the results pertains to treatment 
rates. Table 4.5 shows that the treatment rates, or the percentage of vil-
lages randomly assigned to be monitored that were, in fact, monitored, 
vary considerably across blocks. Several issues must therefore be consid-
ered in the analysis of the experiment. There is one block in particular 
(block 12, in Cianjur) in which there was no experiment to speak of, with 
monitors going only to less than 2% of both the treatment and control 
groups. It is also a block with an unusually large number of villages, repre-
senting a signifi cant portion of all villages in the “failure to treat” category. 
The reason for the implementation failure in this block was that the team 
of monitors assigned there did not attempt to comply with the assigned 
list of villages, a decision that was not infl uenced by the characteristics of 
the block. Although I present the summary data for this block in table 4.5, 
I exclude it from the remainder of the analysis.
Table 4.6 presents aggregate summary statistics for the 1,822 remaining 
village-level observations. I downloaded, compiled, and merged the inter-
national observer data with the unoffi cial election results. All comparisons 
include only districts in which Carter Center observers were deployed, 
where they participated in the randomization, and where village-level 
elections results were reported for the entire district.
Another issue stems from treatment rates. Given some failure to treat, 
it is tempting to move the untreated villages into the “control” group and 




Observed 1,822 0.064 0.224 0 1
Sample 1,822 0.227 0.419 0 1
Megawati (total votes) 1,822 1,394 1,662 1 22,494
SBY (total votes) 1,822 2,486 2,538 5 19,618
Overall Turnout 1,822 0.715 0.117 0.1 1
Ballots Received 1,822 5,645 5,826 35 59,567
Valid Ballots 1,822 3,880 3,848 6 42,112
Invalid Ballots 1,822 83 131 0 1,582
Extra Ballots 1,822 6 26 0 345
Damaged Ballots 1,822 43 276 0 5,923
Ballots Not Used 1,822 1,645 2,071 0 16,612
Total Registered Voters 1,822 5,639 5,821 35 59,567
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simply compare the subset of villages visited by international observers 
with those that were not. This comparison yields biased estimates when 
nontreatment is correlated with the dependent variable and does not take 
advantage of the randomization. To illustrate with this experiment, be-
cause it is plausible that some villages were more diffi cult for observers 
to locate than others and that this “fi ndability” could be related to voting 
behavior, it cannot be assumed that the factors determining which villages 
were actually monitored were completely random. All comparisons must 
therefore exploit the randomization by using assignment to the treatment 
group rather than actual treatment. As the central dependent variable of 
interest, I use the total number of votes cast for Megawati ( logged ).
The most straightforward method requiring the fewest assumptions is 
to estimate the intent-to-treat ( ITT ) effect within each block for one of 
the candidates. Here, the estimated ITT effect within each block i is the 
average difference between treatment and control groups in incumbent 
performance in villages. It would be possible to estimate the ITT effect 
without accounting for any other observed differences between villages, 
but regression analysis allows the inclusion of covariates that reduce the 
unexplained variance in vote share between villages.
I calculate the ITT effect using ordinary-least squares (OLS) regres-
sion. The central dependent variable is the performance of the incumbent 
candidate, measured as the total number of votes cast for Megawati in each 
village ( logged ). To account for varying village sizes, an additional inde-
pendent variable measuring the total number of registered voters in the 
village ( logged ) is included in the regression. This basic model can there-
fore be expressed as:
log (Yj ) = β0 + β1Tj + β 2 log (Xj ) + μj ,
where Y is the total votes vast for Megawati in village j, Tj = 1 if the village 
was assigned to the treatment group, X is a variable representing the total 
number of registered voters in the village, and μ represents unobserved 
causes of votes for Megawati.
Table 4.7 presents estimates of the effect of being assigned to the treat-
ment group within each regional block. Even given the relatively low rate 
of assigned villages that were actually visited (as shown in table 4.5), as-
signment to the treatment group is associated with improved performance 
for Megawati in 15 out of the 20 blocks, a result that is unlikely to be 
due to chance. I also provide a pooled estimate with fi xed effects for each 
experimental block. Note that in these models, Treatment Group is a mea-
sure of the intent to treat the village, not the actual presence of observers 
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on election day. Because Treatment Group is dichotomous, the coeffi cients 
represent the percentage of change in total votes cast for Megawati given 
that Treatment Group changes from zero to one and all else is constant. In 
the pooled estimate in table 4.7, assignment to the treatment group causes 
a 6.5% positive change in the number of votes cast for Megawati. To put 
this number in context, the average number of votes cast per village for 
Megawati is 1,394, and assignment to the treatment group is associated 
with an average increase of about 91 votes.
Table 4.7.  Estimated effects of intent to treat on total votes for Megawati (ordinary least 
squares, ln)
Block (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treatment Group 0.14 0.02 0.07 0.24* 0.02 0.15* 0.11
(0.11) (0.05) (0.15) (0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06)
Registered Voters 0.97** 1.04** 0.88** 1.36** 0.85** 0.94** 0.90**
(0.06) (0.03) (0.19) (0.08) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10)
Constant –2.16** –1.65** –0.69 –4.34** 0.68 –0.81* –0.50
(0.42) (0.26) (1.78) (0.60) (0.40) (0.41) (0.89)
Observers 90 163 23 186 117 136 45
R2 0.77 0.90 0.51 0.64 0.71 0.74 0.66
Block (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15)
Treatment Group 0.11 –0.07 0.03 0.06 0.19 –0.11 0.03
(0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.21) (0.15) (0.10)
Registered Voters 0.91** 1.04** 0.86** 0.87** 0.87** 1.14** 0.80**
(0.05) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.10) (0.06)
Constant –0.29 –2.00** –0.88** –0.52 –0.42 –2.98** –0.86
(0.39) (0.29) (0.28) (0.45) (0.36) (0.94) (0.52)
Observers 46 156 243 42 31 24 103
R2 0.90 0.87 0.70 0.89 0.91 0.88 0.63
Block (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) Pooled estimate




(0.04) (0.07) (0.17) (0.18) (0.15)
Registered Voters 0.89** 0.83** 0.51** 0.99** 0.92**
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) (0.07)




(0.25) (0.25) (0.64) (0.67) (0.55)
Observers 103 60 52 56 146
R2 0.91 0.92 0.42 0.73 0.58
Notes: Pooled estimate includes block fi xed effects. Standard errors in parentheses.
*Signifi cant at 5%; **Signifi cant at 1%
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This estimation of the intent-to-treat effect is the least biased estimate, 
but it does not count for actual treatment rates. Because relatively few as-
signed villages were visited by observers, the estimated effect of observers 
on villages that were visited is much larger. The average treatment rate 
across all blocks in the experiment was about 23%: a little more than one 
out of every fi ve villages assigned to observers was actually visited on elec-
tion day. Given low treatment rates, as in this case, the fi gures in table 4.7 
likely underestimate the magnitude of the observers’ effect.
Following previous applications in fi eld experiments, I use instrumental 
variable techniques to estimate the magnitude of the treatment effect.37 
Very generally, this estimate can be understood as the ITT effect divided 
by the actual treatment rates.38 Table 4.8 presents estimates from two-
stage least-squares regression (2SLS). Using 2SLS, for an instrument to 
be valid it must be correlated with the actual treatment but not correlated 
with the error term in the model. Assignment to the treatment group of 
villages within a region is random, and there is therefore no reason that 
it should be correlated with the error term. Actual treatment, or being 
visited by international observers, is a function of a village being assigned 
to the treatment group. When the actual visit by observers to a given vil-
lage is used as an explanatory variable, assignment to the treatment group 
satisfi es the conditions for a valid instrument.
Like the ITT estimates presented in table 4.7, total registered voters 
(logged) are included as an independent variable. The difference between 
the results presented in tables 4.7 and 4.8 is that the table 4.8 results ac-
count for the fact that observers did not visit all assigned villages. Consis-
tent with expectations, the estimate of the effect of observers on treated 
villages in the treatment group (also called the treatment-on-treated ef-
fect) is substantively larger and is associated with a +32% change in votes 
cast for Megawati, an average increase of 446 votes per treated village.39 
Note that this is an estimate of the size of the effect if observers had visited 
all villages in the assigned-to-treatment group.
The same estimates using vote share rather than votes cast were also 
conducted, but results are not presented here because the varying size of 
37. Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, “Identifi cation of Causal Effects Using Instrumental 
Variables”; Gerber and Green, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct 
Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.”
38. This use of experimental treatments as instrumental variables is described in greater 
detail by Gerber and Green 2000, “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, and Direct 
Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment,” 657–658.
39. Note that both tables 4.7 and 4.8 present pooled estimates in which all blocks are 
combined.
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Table 4.8.  Estimated effect of observers on total votes for Megawati in observed villages 
(two-stage least-squares regression)
Block (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Treated (Observed) 1.04 0.22 0.18 1.96* 0.09 0.50* 0.57
(0.79) (0.59) (0.42) (0.98) (0.25) (0.22) (0.38)
Registered Voters (ln) 1.00** 1.04** 0.80** 1.37** 0.85** 0.93** 0.90**
(0.06) (0.03) (0.27) (0.09) (0.05) (0.05) (0.12)
Constant –2.39** –1.66** 0.03 –4.40** 0.69 –0.69 –0.48
(0.49) (0.26) (2.40) (0.69) (0.40) (0.42) (1.07)
Observers 90 163 23 186 117 136 45
R2 0.76 0.90 0.50 0.53 0.71 0.73 0.52
Block (8) (9) (10) (11) (13) (14) (15)
Treated (Observed) 0.16 –0.49 0.32 0.13 2.41 –0.32 0.17
(0.09) (0.61) (0.93) (0.23) (4.08) (0.43) (0.55)
Registered Voters (ln) 0.88** 1.05** 0.86** 0.86** 0.45 1.21** 0.80**
(0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.71) (0.12) (0.07)
Constant –0.06 –2.08** –0.86** –0.47 2.16 –3.63** –0.84
(0.43) (0.32) (0.28) (0.47) (4.27) (1.04) (0.54)
Observers 46 156 243 42 31 24 103
R2 0.89 0.86 0.69 0.88 0.80 0.88 0.62
Block (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) Pooled estimate








(0.08) (0.46) (0.43) (0.89) (3.24)
Registered Voters (ln) 0.89** 0.94** 0.48** 0.98** 0.91**
(0.03) (0.08) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)
Constant –0.04 –0.46 1.91** –0.88 –1.76**
(0.25) (0.52) (0.71) (0.69) (0.67)
Observers 103 60 52 56 146
R2 0.91 0.87 0.37 0.71 0.40
Notes: Instrumented variable: Village visited by international observers. Exogenous variable: 
Village in treatment group. Pooled estimate includes block fi xed effects. Standard errors in paren-
theses. *Signifi cant at 5%; **Signifi cant at 1%
villages and blocks complicate the analysis. These estimates using alterna-
tive specifi cations of the dependent variable are similar.40 As an additional 
check, the estimates presented in Tables 4.7 and 4.8 were also conducted 
40. Additionally, I estimated all models with a variable indicating the presence of EU ob-
servers. EU observers were not randomly assigned. Out of the 1,822 villages included in this 
study, EU observers visited 61. Of these 61 villages, 4 were in the treatment group and also 
visited by Carter Center observers, and 6 of which were in the assigned treatment group but 
not visited by Carter Center observers. The inclusion of this variable has minimal infl uence 
on the sign and signifi cance of the (randomized) Carter Center observation variable.
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on total votes cast for SBY and are available on request. There is no sig-
nifi cant relationship between observer presence and the performance of 
the winning candidate, SBY.
Overall, the results of the Indonesia fi eld experiment show that the in-
cumbent candidate performed better and the challenger performed about 
the same in villages and neighborhoods assigned to be monitored by Carter 
Center observers. This result was not anticipated and highlights a central 
advantage of using fi eld experimental methods: the possibility that they 
can reveal effects that are not anticipated by scholars or practitioners.41 
Such a surprising result nevertheless requires some speculative explana-
tion and analysis of the unique circumstances surrounding this election. 
Why might the presence of observers increase votes cast for Megawati but 
not decrease votes cast for SBY? Why did observers infl uence what was 
widely viewed as a democratic election?
The reports of international observers, journalists, and analysts suggest 
several possible explanations. Although all major international observer 
organizations judged the observed problems with the election to be in-
signifi cant, a number of irregularities were documented and described in 
the postelection reports of international observers. The most plausible 
explanation for this fi nding stems from the early closing of polling sta-
tions. The offi cial election day was from 7:00 a.m. to 1:00 p.m., but after 
the fi rst round of the presidential election, the KPU ruled that polling 
stations could close after 11:30 a.m., provided that all eligible voters had 
voted. If this rule was followed correctly, it should not have produced 
signifi cant problems, and only those polling stations that reached 100% 
turnout should have closed early. Reports suggest, however, that a number 
of polling stations closed before all eligible voters had cast a ballot and 
well before the earliest legal closing time of 11:30.42
During the course of their observation, many Carter Center observers 
announced or implied that they could return later in the day to observe 
the closing. The presence of observers could have infl uenced the deci-
sion by election offi cials to close early by making it more likely that poll-
ing stations in visited areas would stay open until the mandated time. If 
Megawati supporters were less likely to turn out to vote without being 
mobilized to do so by party representatives or election offi cials, correctly 
following the regulations surrounding the length of election day would 
have disproportionately benefi ted Megawati voters. Local party offi cials 
41. Banerjee and Dufl o, “The Experimental Approach to Development Economics.”
42. European Union, European Union Election Observation Mission to Indonesia, 58; Carter 
Center, The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report, 63.
155Does Election Monitoring Matter?
would have more time to mobilize voters, and poll workers would have 
had greater incentive to prove that all voters had cast a ballot so that they 
could close early without violating electoral regulations. One potential 
explanation is therefore that nonobserved villages were more likely to 
close before less-motivated or reluctant voters had shown up and were less 
likely to follow the electoral regulations about staying open until 1:00 p.m. 
or until all registered voters had cast a ballot.
Several additional pieces of evidence support the possibility that Mega-
wati supporters were more reluctant to turn out and also suggest that 
she was not in control of the party or state machinery that would have 
been required to engage in widespread election day fraud. First, her party 
performed poorly in the April legislative elections and in the fi rst-round 
presidential elections. Second, in the weeks leading up to the runoff elec-
tion, it was widely speculated in the media that she would lose, with public 
opinion polls from several organizations predicting support for SBY at 
about 60% and support for Megawati at around 29%.43 Third, although 
Megawati had some incumbency advantages, including the ability to make 
public appearances throughout the country outside of the legal three-day 
campaign period, her support from several prominent parties was unstable. 
For example, Megawati was endorsed by the powerful Golkar party, which 
won the April 5 legislative elections and which possessed well-developed 
local party machinery that could have been used to mobilize the vote for 
Megawati. But several weeks before the election, national and local party 
leaders split publicly over the decision to endorse Megawati, and before 
the election, analysts predicted that “Golkar will not be able to fully bring 
its formidable party machinery behind Megawati.”44 Postelection polling 
revealed that the vast majority of Golkar voters who cast a ballot voted 
against their party’s endorsement and for SBY.45 Relative to incumbent 
presidential candidates in other countries, Megawati’s election day advan-
tage was minimal.
If Megawati supporters were reluctant to turn out, she should have per-
formed better in those areas in which turnout was higher. Although it 
is not conclusive evidence, scatter plots of votes cast for Megawati ver-
sus turnout across all 1,822 villages included in the experiment illustrate 
43. “Indonesia’s Megawati Heading for Defeat, Two Polls Show,” Associated Press 
Worldstream, September 15, 2004.
44. “Golkar Party Leaders Split as Internal Rift Deepens,” The Jakarta Post, September 
1, 2004; “What Lies Ahead After Indonesia’s Election,” United Press International, Septem-
ber 14, 2004.
45. Liddle and Mujani, “Indonesia in 2004.”
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that Megawati does somewhat better in villages with higher turnout and 
SBY does worse, on average, in villages with higher turnout. These com-
parisons do not prove that increasing turnout would have necessarily 
increased votes for Megawati, but they are consistent with the idea that 
Megawati’s supporters were more reluctant to turn out and that her per-
formance increased when voter mobilization increased.
The results presented here show a clear difference between observed 
and unobserved villages, but they are subject to interpretation. The most 
likely explanation for this fi nding, in my view, is that observers made poll-
ing station offi cials more likely to follow electoral regulations and there-
fore caused visited polling stations to stay open later than they would have 
if observers had not visited. Given that the election was expected to be 
relatively free of election day irregularities, the fact that any signifi cant 
effect of observers was found is noteworthy. This result does not imply 
election fraud. If widespread election fraud by one candidate had taken 
place, and this fraud was deterred by observers, the cheating candidate 
should have performed worse in areas that were observed. Even though 
Megawati benefi ted from observers, the results do not show that SBY 
performed signifi cantly worse when observers were present, as would be 
expected if observers reduced ballot box stuffi ng or other forms of direct 
election fraud. Rather, I argue that election offi cials were more likely to 
follow the letter of the election law pertaining to closing time after having 
been visited by international observers.
The Carter Center mission concluded that “voters were able to exer-
cise their democratic rights in a peaceful atmosphere and without sig-
nifi cant hindrance.”46 The results presented here do not contradict this 
conclusion.
Inviting Observers Changes Behavior
Taken together, the micro-level results from elections in Armenia and 
Indonesia show that observers can be more costly to pseudo-democrats 
than to true-democrats, at least in terms of their election day performance. 
Particularly for pseudo-democrats who commit election day fraud, this 
chapter demonstrates that observers can make stealing elections more ex-
pensive or more diffi cult by directly reducing fraud through their presence 
46. Carter Center, The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report, 13. See also the EU 
fi nal report “European Union Election Observation Mission to Indonesia.”
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in polling stations. Even in the case of Indonesia, in which the election 
was viewed as a successful exercise in democracy, the presence of observ-
ers had a direct and measurable effect on election day behavior, perhaps 
inducing increased compliance with government regulations and having 
an unanticipated effect on turnout among the more reluctant supporters 
of the incumbent. The Indonesia study demonstrates that the incumbent 
government was not signifi cantly harmed by the presence of observers, 
and even benefi ted from their presence for idiosyncratic reasons.
More generally, these fi ndings indicate that inviting observers can be 
consequential for leaders who invite monitors and attempt to steal the elec-
tion and that these costs do not necessarily exist for incumbent true dem-
ocrats. I also showed that competitive elections outcomes are positively 
correlated with the presence of observers. In chapter 3, I showed that 
pseudo-democrats face consequences if they refuse to invite observers or 
if they are caught cheating by international observers. As I will show in 
the next chapter, in addition to potentially reducing blatant election day 
fraud, many leaders now invite observers and work to avoid international 
criticism, making the changing forms of election manipulation another 
consequence of internationally monitored elections.
The norm of election monitoring is that governments committed to dem-
ocratic elections invite international monitors. The corresponding belief 
is that noninviting states must be electoral autocracies, unless the country 
has otherwise established a reputation as a consolidated democracy. Be-
cause of the belief that all true democrats invite observers, and because 
there are consequences to being caught manipulating the election by in-
ternational observers, my theory implies that pseudo-democrats should 
devote effort to concealing election manipulation such that they are less 
likely to be caught. In addition, pro-democracy actors should push for in-
creases in the quality of election observation, and international observers 
should attempt to detect and criticize an expanding range of tactics used 
to manipulate elections. This chapter continues evaluating the empirical 
implications of my argument and provides support for the fi nal implica-
tion outlined in chapter 1: that the normalization of election monitor-
ing, including improvement in the quality of monitoring and the growing 
number of pseudo-democrats who invite observers, should increase the use 
of strategic election manipulation. Chapters 3 and 4 provided evidence of 
two ways in which election monitoring can be costly to pseudo-democrats: 
negative reports from observers can lead to reduced international benefi ts 
and international observers can reduce election day fraud directly. These 
fi ndings underscore my argument that inviting international observers is 
more costly for pseudo-democrats than for true democrats.
Adding to these fi ndings, by documenting strategic action by incum-
bents in the face of election observers, this chapter illustrates that even 
well-entrenched autocratic leaders such as Vladimir Putin of Russia and 
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe are willing to devote signifi cant effort to 
manipulating public perceptions of election-monitors’ judgments. This is 
further evidence that the norm exists and refl ects the pseudo-democratic 
5
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response to the norm. I also document how some incumbent leaders en-
gage in strategic manipulation of elections and observers.
Generally, I document three methods used by incumbents to main-
tain their hold on power while complying with the norm. First, pseudo-
democrats can attempt to use different forms of election manipulation 
that are less likely to be caught by observers. Second, they can invite low-
quality or “friendly” observers in order to ensure that at least one observer 
group endorses the elections as democratic. Third, if they are caught ma-
nipulating the election (or if they choose to cheat blatantly), they can work 
to discredit the reports of observers after the election.
For example, Russia’s efforts to both invite and manipulate observers 
are perhaps the most baffl ing, with their efforts extending throughout the 
post-Soviet sphere. By 2004, Russian elections had been observed on fi ve 
occasions by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe’s 
Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (OSCE /ODIHR). 
Since the mid-1990s, the OSCE /ODIHR has developed a reputation as a 
critical and professionalized observer group that applies relatively consis-
tent standards to the elections it observes within its member states.1
In the late 1990s, the Russian government began a campaign arguing 
that observers from the OSCE /ODIHR are biased and apply inconsistent 
criteria to countries that are not Western allies. Russia took a position 
against so-called double standards in international election monitor-
ing and began exerting signifi cant effort to ensure that OSCE /ODIHR 
observers are shadowed by international observers who are loyal to the 
Kremlin and whose not-so-secret objective is to contradict the conclu-
sions of OSCE /ODIHR reports.2
In response to OSCE /ODIHR monitoring, the Commonwealth of In-
dependent States (CIS), began to monitor elections within its member 
countries, which are also OSCE members. The CIS is an intergovernmen-
tal organization composed of former Soviet states and is headquartered in 
Belarus. It has earned a reputation for praising blatantly fraudulent elec-
tions in former Soviet states and issuing reports that are in direct opposi-
tion to the conclusions of the OSCE /ODIHR missions. In what appears to 
be deliberate effort to create confusion, in 2003 a Russian-based nongov-
ernmental organization (NGO) was founded with the same name as the 
intergovernmental organization’s election-monitoring arm (CIS-EMO), 
but claimed no connection. The CIS-Elections Monitoring Organization, 
1. OSCE, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE.
2. Kupchinsky, “CIS: Monitoring The Election Monitors.”
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registered as an NGO in Nizhny Novgorod, Russia, deploys international 
observer delegations alongside CIS (the IO) and OSCE /ODIHR delega-
tions. The NGO issues virtually identical election observation reports as 
the Minsk-based CIS reports, conceivably so that they can claim inter-
governmental organization and NGO certifi cation of elections criticized 
by the OSCE.3
Additionally, at meetings of the OSCE, Russia has advocated reduced 
funding for OSCE /ODIHR missions and otherwise attempted to under-
mine the organization’s work as an independent but pro-democracy judge 
of election quality. Some pro-Western CIS member states have pushed 
back against Russian efforts to generate controversy about the quality of 
their elections. For example, the Moldovan government blocked a train 
carrying CIS observers at the border prior to their 2004 elections, and 
Georgia withdrew its membership in the CIS, in part to protest the orga-
nization’s involvement in elections.
Attempts by incumbents to evade observer criticism have been well doc-
umented by other scholars. As Daniel Calingaert argues, “authoritarian 
regimes have become increasingly adept at keeping up the appearance of 
meeting democratic norms while subverting the integrity of the electoral 
process.”4 Similarly, in his widely cited 1997 article critiquing election ob-
servation, Thomas Carothers notes that, in part due to an “overemphasis 
on election day” by observers, “efforts by entrenched leaders to manipu-
late electoral processes to their advantage have become more subtle as 
such leaders have been socialized into the new world of global democracy 
and internationally observed elections.”5
Building on this work, this chapter provides additional evidence that 
efforts by pseudo-democrats to conceal election manipulation triggered 
an evolving game of strategy between international observers, pseudo-
democrats, and pro-democracy actors. Pseudo-democrats attempt to in-
vite observers and guarantee their own victory without getting caught, 
and observers and democracy promoters attempt to catch them, prompt-
ing improvements in observation technology, stronger and more overt 
links between the reports of observers and international benefi ts, and 
continuing innovation in the forms of electoral manipulation used by rul-
ers to stay in power. Strategic manipulation includes efforts by leaders to 
change their methods of manipulation, including the use of new methods, 
3. Ibid.
4. Calingaert, “Election Rigging and How to Fight It,” 138.
5. Carothers, “The Observers Observed,” 22.
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 recycling of old methods on which observers may no longer be focused, 
and borrowing techniques from other countries.
Over time, this “arms race” of election monitoring should jointly in-
crease the ability of observers to detect various forms of election fraud as 
well as the effort required for pseudo-democrats to evade international 
criticism, introducing further costs to pseudo-democrats. Leaders who 
do not devote suffi cient resources to manipulating the election increase 
their risk of a negative report from observers, the consequences of which 
were explored in chapter 3. As in chapter 3, although anticipated costs 
of negative reports and strategic manipulation by pseudo-democrats are 
important elements of my theory, they do not lend themselves easily to 
quantitative hypothesis testing. Instead, I rely on a series of examples 
drawn from reading of hundreds of election observation reports and case 
studies of elections, detailed information about the tactics used by pseudo-
democrats and observers, and descriptive statistics of election-monitoring 
missions.
Manipulators versus Monitors
In the remainder of the chapter, I outline over-time interactions be-
tween international observers and leaders working to manipulate them, 
including observer response to strategic manipulation and improvements 
in the methods and quality of election observation. I then discuss in 
greater detail strategies used by leaders to invite observers and success-
fully manipulate elections in front of them, illustrating forms of strategic 
election manipulation, and then briefl y discuss opposition party reactions 
to international observers.
I have already presented some indirect evidence that both pseudo-
democrats and international observers are innovating in the game of stra-
tegic manipulation. If it were the case that international observers did not 
react to more strategic forms of manipulation among pseudo-democrats, 
the rate of negative reports should have gone to zero as election observation 
spread, a prediction that is contradicted by the empirical evidence (see in-
troduction, fi gure I.1). An important effect of the normalization of election 
observation is that it increased the pressure for leaders to invite observers 
even as the stakes increased: election monitors improved their methods, 
negative reports became more likely, and pseudo-democrats became more 
constrained or more skilled at concealing election manipulation.
Counterintuitively, the fact that observers sometimes legitimate fraudu-
lent elections played a large role in motivating pseudo-democrats to invite 
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international observers, but in the long run it caused the same types of 
leaders to face a diffi cult choice between consequences for refusing observ-
ers and the risk of a negative report from them. Neither of these options is 
desirable for pseudo-democrats, who can no longer simply refuse interna-
tional observers without facing other, more certain, consequences.
Professionalized international monitors are well aware of pseudo-
 democrats’ efforts to evade criticism. By the end of the 1990s, many orga-
nizations were actively cautioning their missions to be on alert for leaders 
attempting to gain international approval for rigged elections. As a Euro-
pean Commission document warned:
Sometimes politicians in power may be tempted to organise manipulated 
elections in order to obtain international legitimacy ( Togo 1998, Kazakh-
stan 1999). Care should be taken if . . . an EU observation mission could 
contribute to legitimising an illegitimate process.6
Despite observers’ awareness and the improvements in election-
 monitoring techniques, it remains diffi cult to detect all forms of manipu-
lation, weigh their impact on the election quality, and judge the quality of 
all elections accurately. Most elections fall within the gray area between 
fl awless democratic elections and outright election theft, such as in the 
Philippines in 1986, Panama in 1989, Georgia in 2003, or Zimbabwe in 
2008. Even elections in consolidated democracies are imperfect by a num-
ber of objective standards, making the evaluation of elections in countries 
with new or fl uctuating political institutions subjective and challenging.
Transitional elections are particularly diffi cult to judge. For postconfl ict 
countries, some newly independent states, and countries holding their fi rst 
multiparty elections in decades, any sort of election is viewed as a major ac-
complishment, even if it is far from democratic. The necessary conditions 
for democratic elections were arguably not present for the 2006 elections 
in the Democratic Republic of Congo, yet because they were the fi rst 
multiparty elections in more than forty years, observers gave the govern-
ment and the election commission considerable leeway. Despite a number 
of reported problems, the missions organizing the roughly two thousand 
international observers issued generally positive evaluations. Even for the 
best-intentioned observers, evaluating election quality remains a serious 
challenge, particularly when pseudo-democrats work to manipulate elec-
tions subtly, without attracting observer criticism.
6. European Commission, “Communication from the Commission on EU Election 
Assistance,” 5.
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Despite frequent reference to universal standards for democratic elec-
tions, no such black-and-white standards exist.7 Irregularities in elections 
can stem from low levels of economic and political development, poor 
infrastructure, little experience with democracy, or challenges typical in 
postconfl ict environments rather than government-sponsored election 
fraud. Nevertheless, observers have developed a variety of techniques 
that, although they do not generate automatic and objective judgments of 
whether elections are free and fair, allow them to document many forms 
of manipulation and to issue credible and sometimes forceful condemna-
tions of elections. Democracy promoters continue to push for enforce-
ment of existing commitments to democratic elections, as well as more 
systematic techniques of election observation.8
Criticizing and Improving Election Evaluation
Observers’ willingness to invest in improved election-monitoring tech-
niques and their willingness to criticize elections increased as election 
monitoring became a widely shared international norm. Among benefi t-
seeking states, as election monitoring spread and it became clear that in-
viting observers was “the only way towards loosening the purse-strings of 
donors and creditors,” criticism of observers increased, including from 
within election-monitoring organizations.9 This criticism was followed by 
changes within many international monitoring groups, including increased 
professionalization, experience, and improved methodology. Increasingly 
sophisticated election fraud “has been matched by improvements in the 
skills and methods of election observers.”10
Since international election observation was initiated in the 1960s, many 
observers have recognized their own limitations, and organizations have 
sought methods to improve their ability to evaluate election quality. Con-
cerns about how accurately observers can judge election quality surfaced 
in some of the very fi rst election observation missions and those concerns 
have continued to drive innovations in election observation. Common 
criticisms of observers include that they legitimize fraudulent elections, 
engage in electoral tourism, ignore fraud in the pre-election period, issue 
statements prematurely, distract from more qualifi ed domestic observers, 
 7. For a recent effort to connect international law to minimal standards for democratic 
elections, see Davis-Roberts and Carroll, “Using International Law to Assess Elections.”
 8. Davis-Roberts and Carroll, “Using International Law to Assess Elections”; Donno, 
“Defending Democratic Norms”; Donno, “Who Is Punished?”
 9. Geisler, “Fair?,” 614.
10. Calingaert, “Election Rigging and How to Fight It,” 138.
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and practice “electoral fetishism” by overemphasizing election day with 
respect to the broader democratization process.11
In many cases in the early 1990s, particularly in Africa, reputable ob-
server groups seemed unsure of how to evaluate elections that were clearly 
fl awed.12 Observers appeared to be aware that some elections were rid-
dled with problems but were unable to determine if the problems affected 
the outcome of the election or if criticizing the election would generate 
more problems in the country than would giving the election qualifi ed 
endorsement. Many reports from this time period in Africa evaluated 
faulty elections as “a step in the right direction.” Jon Abbink and Gerti 
Hessling refer to this as “one of the most worn-out metaphors in [election 
observation].”13 Observers were widely criticized for their failure to high-
light accurately the widespread problems in the 1992 elections in Kenya, 
Ghana, and Angola, among others, and complaints were made that “the 
presence of observers and their often hesitant reports can be easily misap-
propriated by African governments and bent in their favour.”14 Although 
the possibility that observers will endorse fl awed elections is a common 
criticism of observers, according to my theory this possibility is an impor-
tant reason why election monitoring spread to pseudo-democratic coun-
tries in the late 1980s and early 1990s.
In response to criticism of election observation, many organiza-
tions began to undertake more systematic and comprehensive election-
monitoring missions. For example, the Commonwealth, which once is-
sued statements on the quality of elections before election day was over, 
signifi cantly revised its election observation methodology and became 
more likely to criticize problematic elections.15 The more professional-
ized observer groups continue to respond to criticism and work to improve 
election observation methods, but debates over the mandate of interna-
tional observers, their appropriate role, and criteria for democratic elec-
tions are unlikely to disappear. In table 5.1, I summarize common tactics 
used to bias elections and the corresponding methods used by observers 
to mitigate them. In general, improvements in election monitoring should 
lead to less direct forms of election manipulation. Generally speaking, 
election fraud that takes place on election day is easiest for observers to 
11. Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation and Democratization in Africa; Geisler, 
“Fair?”; Carothers, “The Observers Observed.”
12. Geisler, “Fair?”
13. Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation and Democratization in Africa, 12.
14. Ibid., 8.
15. Sives, “A Review of Commonwealth Election Observation.”
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detect and condemn. As manipulation moves away from the casting and 
counting of votes, it becomes more diffi cult for observers to detect, more 
diffi cult for them to demonstrate that signifi cant election fraud took place, 
and less likely (although not impossible) that election manipulation will 
be condemned. Thus, the diffusion of the norm of election observation 
should be associated with a parallel change in the most likely types of 
election fraud used by political actors seeking to manipulate the election 
in their favor.
To illustrate, when the count and tabulation process is not observed, 
one of the easiest ways to steal elections in front of foreign observers is to 
hold entirely democratic elections and then falsify vote totals at the end 
of election day. This concern was recognized by international observers 
as early as 1966:
Our concern . . . is that the process of the fi nal tally of votes is beyond the 
possibility of verifi cation by foreign observers. If fraud took place, it would 
seem to be more likely at the point of reporting from the province and /or 
reporting from the [Central Election Commission].16
Election monitors have since developed methods of reliably detecting—
and therefore deterring—this tactic. The expectation that Ferdinand 
Marcos would steal the 1985 elections by falsifying the vote totals led a 
domestic election-monitoring group, NAMFREL, to attempt a compre-
hensive independent tally of votes from all polling stations. They planned 
to station nonpartisan observers from their organization at all polling sta-
tions in the country for the counting of votes and produce their own tally. 
It quickly became clear that the large number of polling stations would 
make aggregation unwieldy and time consuming. Recognizing this chal-
lenge, National Democratic Institute (NDI) staff recommended that ob-
servers be stationed in a random sample of polling stations for the count, 
allowing observers to produce an independent estimate of the election 
results, within a specifi ed margin of error, well before offi cial results were 
released.17 In the Philippines, this method was instrumental in demon-
strating that Marcos lost the 1986 elections. In part because of advocacy of 
the method by international and domestic observers, these “quick counts” 
or parallel vote tabulations spread rapidly with election monitoring in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s and represent one of the fi rst and most 
16. Roe, “The Committee on Free Elections,” 63.
17. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair; Estok, Nevitte, and Cowan, The Quick Count and 
Election Observation; Garber and Cowan, “The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations.”
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important innovations in election-monitoring technology. When quick 
counts are correctly administered, fraud in the vote tabulation process is 
very diffi cult to get away with.
Another concern is that observers were focusing their attention on capi-
tal cities and other urban areas, clearing the way for widespread fraud in 
rural areas. Although international observer coverage is not comprehensive 
in most cases, the average number of short-term observers has increased 
dramatically, as illustrated in fi gure 5.1, at the same time that election-
monitoring technology has improved, and since the early 1990s, long- and 
short-term observers spend signifi cant time in rural and urban areas.
Responding to concerns about pre-election manipulation, international 
observers introduced a variety of improvements, including long-term ob-
servers, or LTOs. Beginning in the early 1990s and becoming widespread 
by 1995, LTOs are deployed throughout the country months in advance 
of an election and report on all aspects of the electoral process, includ-
ing the registration of candidates and voters, campaigning, and the state 
of administrative preparations for elections countrywide. The qualitative 
evaluations provided by LTOs make the reports of international observers 
more credible.
Some organizations also conduct media monitoring. Media monitoring 
can be used to evaluate whether all candidates have suffi cient access to 
media time, to judge imbalance in coverage, and to evaluate the veracity 
of content in campaign-related advertising. In each election observation 
mission, other tactics may be employed if they are deemed useful.
In part because of the example set by NAMFREL in the Philippines, 
nonpartisan domestic election monitoring has also spread rapidly since the 
mid-1980s, and many critics of international observation believed domes-
tic election monitoring to be a superior alternative.18 In the mid-1990s, 
many democracy promoters viewed international observers as temporary 
substitutes until domestic observers could become better established. It 
soon became clear, however, that in many countries domestic election-
monitoring organizations are relatively easy for pseudo-democrats to 
discredit as biased, refuse to credential, or falsify by allowing only loyal 
government supporters to be credentialed as domestic observers. Inter-
national monitors, because their reputations are established outside the 
monitored country, are harder to discredit. By the late 1990s it was widely 
recognized by election-monitoring experts that domestic and international 
18. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair; Carothers, “The Observers Observed”; Nevitte and 
Canton, “The Role of Domestic Observers.”
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Figure 5.1. Average number of reported short-term observers per observed election, 
1960–2004
Note: The dashed line represents a locally weighted regression curve, known as a lowess 
smoother.
monitors were complementary, and coordination between reputable do-
mestic and international observers became increasingly common.19 For 
pseudo-democrats, coordination between international and domestic ob-
servers makes manipulating either group more diffi cult, and the comple-
mentary advantages of both types of observers further increase the forms 
of manipulation that are likely to be criticized.
The expanding mandate of election observation missions also increased 
attention to postelection dispute resolution and acceptance of the re-
sults. Whereas election monitors in the early 1990s were more likely to 
issue a postelection statement immediately after the election and close 
their in-country offi ces, international observer organizations in the late 
1990s were more likely to stay in the country for weeks or months after 
an election, continuing to evaluate the government’s conduct in handling 
election-related disputes. Countries with relatively frequent elections may 
invite constant observer presence, with monitoring of the upcoming elec-
tion beginning while monitoring of the previous election is completed.
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Observer organizations also sought to coordinate across organizations 
and countries. A common charged leveled against international observ-
ers, frequently by incumbent governments, is that they apply inconsistent 
criteria across elections, a problem Thomas Carothers highlights as the 
“elusive standards” of democratic elections.20 In response to this criticism, 
individual observer organizations published their own criteria and meth-
odology for election monitoring, and academics contributed recommen-
dations for how elections could be more uniformly judged.21
International Human Rights Law Group’s 1984 publication of Guide-
lines for International Election Observing was perhaps the fi rst effort to 
standardize election-monitoring practices across organizations, and it 
set out some very basic guidelines for election observation.22 The Inter-
Parliamentary Union published Free and Fair Elections: International Law 
and Practice in 1994, written by a prominent international human rights 
lawyer Guy Goodwin-Gill and updated in 2006.23 The OSCE /ODIHR’s 
Election Observation Handbook, now in its fi fth edition, was fi rst published 
in 1996.24 NDI contributed a number of guides and handbooks on elec-
tion-monitoring techniques (also aimed at domestic observers), including 
the quick count, monitoring of voter registration, and media monitoring. 
The Handbook for European Union Election Observation was fi rst published 
in 2002 and is now in its second edition.25 Initiated by the Carter Center, 
NDI, and the UN, and commemorated in 2005 at the UN headquarters 
in New York, twenty-three organizations signed on to the Declaration of 
Principles and Code of Conduct for International Election Observation, a docu-
ment that individual election observers are now expected to sign and to 
which they must adhere.26
However, despite the improvements in election-monitoring technol-
ogy and the increased investment by international actors in improving 
election monitoring, observers remain far from perfect judges of election 
quality. For leaders engaging in blatant and premeditated forms of elec-
tion manipulation, inviting low-quality election observers represented a 
reliable strategy. By 2000, the reputations of most observer organizations 
had become clear, and leaders planning blatant election fraud could either 
20. Carothers, “The Observers Observed,” 23.
21. Elklit and Reynolds, “A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality”; 
Elklit and Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair.”
22. Garber, Guidelines for International Election Observing.
23. Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections.
24. OSCE /ODIHR, Election Observation Handbook.
25. European Commission, Handbook for European Union Election Observation.
26. Carter Center, Building Consensus on Principles for International Election Observation.
170 The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma
invite observers that were not reputed to be critical or invite organizations 
of varying quality so that confl icting reports between observers were more 
likely. Even following widespread improvement in election-monitoring 
techniques, low-quality observers remained and, in some regions, prolif-
erated. For a number of African states, such as Zimbabwe, the Organiza-
tion for African Unity (now the African Union) represented a friendly 
organization that was highly unlikely to criticize, although their reputa-
tion has improved in recent years. The Arab League has sent delegations 
to elections in Northern Africa and is also unlikely to criticize election 
fraud. Although La Francophonie has issued several critical reports, their 
observers can more often be relied upon to validate questionable elections. 
The Russian controlled Commonwealth of Independent States is one of 
the most blatantly artifi cial observer groups. The Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization, which is composed of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, 
Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, has also deployed election-monitoring 
delegations in recent years, but the organization has no stated objective of 
promoting democracy.
In fi gure 5.2, I show the trends in multiple monitors and in the use of 
“friendly” organizations.27 I use a conservative defi nition of critical ob-
servers, including only those groups that have reputations for regularly 
criticizing election manipulation: the OSCE/ODIHR (including observ-
ers representing the Parliamentary Assembly Council of Europe), the 
Organization of American States (OAS), the EU, the Carter Center, the 
Commonwealth, and the NDI or International Republican Institute (IRI). 
Each of these groups has also been criticized for failing to condemn elec-
tions that others believed were fraudulent.28 However, relative to other 
organizations, their reputations are much more professional, and they 
condemn elections more frequently than do any other organizations. If I 
instead code each organization as “critical” after it has condemned at least 
one election, more organizations qualify as critical after 1995 and substan-
tially fewer elections are observed by only uncritical observers.
As in the Russian case described in the introduction to this chapter, 
governments frequently accuse observers of bias, applying double stan-
dards, or of not understanding elections or democracy in the region. 
Although these criticisms are sometimes well deserved, such government-
sponsored criticism is more likely to be leveled by leaders seeking to 
distract media attention from their own behavior. Some leaders actively 
27. See also Kelley, “The More the Merrier?”
28. Kelley, “D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election 
Observation.”
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court professionalized observer organizations, convince them to monitor 
the election, and then try to discredit them after they arrive in the country. 
For example, the Zambian government sought European Union observ-
ers for the 2001 presidential elections, welcomed them into the country, 
and then almost immediately accused them of favoring the opposition 
candidate before they had made any statements.29
The reputed master manipulator of elections and international observ-
ers is Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe.30 Over the course of elections in 2000, 
2002, 2005, and 2008 the Mugabe government attempted to control, ma-
nipulate, and discredit international observers using a variety of tactics. 
Despite his efforts, Mugabe did not succeed at eliminating criticism of the 
elections, but on several occasions these efforts appear to have muddied the 
waters suffi ciently to lessen the effects of international condemnation.
Mugabe’s tactics against observers vary. By the late 1990s, some ob-
server groups were in the habit of deploying pre-election missions to 
29. “Zambia: EU Denies Supporting Opposition Candidate,” Africa News, January 7, 2002.
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Figure 5.2. Trends in international observation missions
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evaluate whether they should send an observer mission should they re-
ceive an invitation from the host government. This practice of sending 
pre-election missions before government invitations were issued was in 
many cases welcome and noncontroversial, yet it was not strictly compli-
ant with the norm that observers should be invited by the host govern-
ment. U.S.-based NGOs NDI and IRI deployed a pre-election mission 
for the planned 2000 Zimbabwean elections, but they chose to announce 
that the conditions for credible democratic elections did not exist, provok-
ing a forceful reaction from the Zimbabwe government. The government 
revoked NDI and IRI staff visas before the election and launched a com-
prehensive campaign to manipulate foreign observers. It is noteworthy 
that Zimbabwe did not simply ban all foreign observers from the country, 
which would have been a violation of the norm. By 2000, refusing observ-
ers would have been an unambiguous sign that the election would not be 
democratic and likely would have led to immediate sanctions.
Instead of banning observers outright, Mugabe issued a blanket invita-
tion to observers and then changed the requirements continuously until 
election day, attempting to dictate their nationality and their numbers and 
decreasing the likelihood they would criticize the election. Ultimately, the 
government banned all NGOs from monitoring the election, refused to 
credential any observer from the United Kingdom, and mandated that 
the EU delegation contain members from EU member countries only, 
effectively banning observers from Kenya and Nigeria who had planned 
to serve on the EU delegation.31 The election was eventually observed by 
the EU, the Commonwealth, the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 
and the Southern African Development Community (SADC).
After giving up their pursuit of credentials, IRI condemned the election 
based on their pre-election observation: “The process is so fl awed that 
it cannot adequately refl ect the will of the people. Those responsible for 
elections in Zimbabwe have failed their country.”32 In contrast, the OAU 
and SADC missions praised the elections as free and fair, and the Com-
monwealth mission issued what the EU later called a “wishy-washy” re-
port.33 Citing pre-election violence, the Commonwealth report said that 
there were “impediments placed in the way of enabling the electorate to 
freely choose their representatives,”34 but did not argue the election was 
31. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair.
32. Ibid., 199.
33. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 201.
34. Commonwealth Observer Group, Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe: 24–25 June 
2000, 34.
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fundamentally fl awed. Of the groups permitted in the country, the EU is-
sued the most critical report, citing “serious fl aws and irregularities in the 
electoral process,”35 but they were subsequently criticized on all sides: by 
African observer groups for “not allowing Africans to express themselves,” 
from Mugabe himself for applying biased standards, and by the banned 
observer groups for implicitly condoning the manipulation of observers 
by failing to withdraw their mission.36
For the 2002 presidential elections, tensions increased, as did the Mugabe 
government’s sometimes impressive and confusing tactics. Mugabe report-
edly met with the EU team about potential deployment of an EU mission 
but stormed out of the meeting, telling them to “keep out,” that “Zimba-
bwe would not allow other countries to run our elections,” and protesting 
after the meeting that “some of them were our former colonizers.”37 The 
government later backpedaled on Mugabe’s statements and the EU ob-
server ban, announcing they were only opposed to “monitors” but would 
accept “observers.”38 Zimbabwe later prohibited observers from Denmark, 
Finland, Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, and the United Kingdom, 
causing the EU to withdraw its efforts to deploy a mission, instead impos-
ing economic sanctions.
The quality of the 2002 elections was again quite poor, with widespread 
government-sponsored violence and election fraud. Unsurprisingly, the 
Organization for African Unity found it to be “transparent, credible, free 
and fair.” In contrast to the 2000 elections, however, the Commonwealth 
and SADC Parliamentary Forum condemned the elections, along with the 
EU and other groups that had refused to deploy observers. The Common-
wealth suspended Zimbabwe from the organization for twelve months. 
Within a month of the elections, economic sanctions or aid suspensions 
were instituted by Germany, Norway, Japan, Canada, Switzerland, the 
United States, and Denmark, and it was estimated that Zimbabwe lost 
$4 billion in development aid in the year after the 2002 elections.
Mugabe’s efforts to manipulate observers succeeded on some fronts, 
because he was able to gain a positive report from international observers 
35. European Union, “Elections in Zimbabwe on 24–25 June 2000.”
36. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair, 201.
37. “Zimbabwe; Foreigners ‘Welcome’ to Observe Poll,” Africa News, November 26, 2001.
38. This is a common rhetorical distinction in diplomatic circles and is sometimes empha-
sized by governments attempting to avoid high-quality election observation. Some organiza-
tions use monitoring and observing interchangeably. Other organizations use only the word 
observation, which is meant to imply a less interventionist method of poll watching. However, 
because no international observer groups adopt an interventionist approach to international 
election monitoring, the rhetorical distinction loses practical value for researchers.
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from the OAU and generated voluminous media attention to the question 
of whether Westerners could fairly judge African elections. It is impossible 
to know for certain whether Mugabe would have faced the same forms of 
international condemnation if international observation had not become 
an international norm, yet it is clear that international condemnation of 
the elections from foreign observers caused the government to forgo a va-
riety of international benefi ts, including severe reductions in foreign aid, 
suspension from international organizations, travel bans on Mugabe and 
other prominent government offi cials, freezing of their assets, and the la-
beling of Zimbabwe as a pariah state. Zimbabwe presents a clear example 
of government efforts to manipulate observers as well as the international 
response when leaders fail to evade international criticism.
Strategies of Election Manipulation
Willful manipulation of elections and electoral processes is wide-
spread, diverse, sometimes obvious, and frequently innovative. As An-
dreas Schedler emphasizes, “rulers may choose any number of tactics 
to help them carve the heart out of electoral contests.”39 Within electoral 
authoritarian regimes, case-based research and recent theoretical work 
documents the use of a variety of tactics used by governments to maintain 
their hold on power.40 Observers do not cause election manipulation to 
exist. Rather, observers infl uence the form of manipulation employed by 
governments and parties to bias elections in their favor. In my theory, 
pseudo-democratic governments that invite observers should attempt to 
manipulate elections without getting caught or criticized, an effort I refer 
to as “strategic manipulation.”41
As American politics literature has documented, strategic manipulation 
is not confi ned to the developing world.42 For example, in urban political 
39. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” 41.
40. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation”; Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy; Brownlee, 
Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization; Schedler, “The Nested Game of Democratiza-
tion by Elections”; Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism; Simpser, “Making Votes Not Count”; 
Schaffer, Elections for Sale; Taylor, “Patterns of Electoral Corruption in Peru”; Alvarez, Hall, 
and Hyde, Election Fraud: Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation; Calingaert, “Elec-
tion Rigging and How to Fight It.”
41. Schedler, Electoral Authoritarianism; Beaulieu and Hyde, “In the Shadow of Democ-
racy Promotion.”
42. Alvarez, Hall, and Hyde, Election Fraud; Detecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation; 
Campbell, Deliver the Vote; Cox and Kousser, “Turnout and Rural Corruption.”
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machines, Jessica Trounstine cites various biasing strategies in voter access 
to information, voting, and the ways in which votes are translated into 
seats, many of which are diffi cult to prove or are not perceived as illegal. 
Trounstine lists media control, suppression of civic groups, vote bribery, 
obscure polling sites, misuse of government resources, violence aimed at 
voter suppression, ghost voting and the discarding of ballots, candidate 
disqualifi cation, gerrymandering, and malapportionment.43 Similarly, but 
illustrated in the comparative politics literature on electoral authoritari-
anism, Schedler describes the “menu of manipulation” used by leaders, 
which includes overt election fraud, political repression, manipulating the 
ability of politicians to participate, manipulating the forum for debating 
policies or access to the relevant means of communicating with voters, 
manipulating the rules of competition, and making competition unfair.
As Michael Bratton points out with respect to elections in Africa, in-
cumbents use executive power not simply to break electoral rules, but to 
bend the rules in their favor, including, for example “the disqualifi cation 
of leading candidates, the spotty coverage of voter registration, the lack 
of internal democracy in ruling parties, [and] the abuse of government 
resources during the campaign.”44 Leaders possess an array of tactics and 
rely on diverse strategies in order to maintain a “semblance of democratic 
legitimacy” in the presence of international observers.45
As election monitoring has evolved, so have the strategies used by 
pseudo-democrats to evade international condemnation of their elections. 
For example, as election monitoring began to spread rapidly throughout 
Africa in the early 1990s, Gisela Geisler criticized the disproportionate 
focus by observers on election day and the fact that elections in Kenya and 
Ghana were “already ‘rigged’ before the votes were cast and counted.”46 
This and related criticism lead observers to increase emphasis on observa-
tion of the pre-election period.47
It would be impossible to defi ne and measure all strategies of manipula-
tion, because strategic manipulation should, by defi nition, include unob-
servable forms. Strategic manipulation may also be obvious and  observable, 
but it is distinguishable from outright election theft because it is intended 
43. Trounstine, “Challenging the Machine-Dichotomy”; Cox and Kousser, “Turnout and 
Rural Corruption”; Campbell, Deliver the Vote; Alvarez, Hall, and Hyde, Election Fraud; De-
tecting and Deterring Electoral Manipulation.
44. Bratton, “Second Elections in Africa,” 60–65.
45. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” 36.
46. Geisler, “Fair?,” 615.
47. Bjornlund, Beyond Free and Fair.
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to evade detection and criticism. Strategic election manipulation may in-
clude tactics that are legal, such as electorally targeted manipulation of 
fi scal policy, changing the electoral system, or gerrymandering. For ex-
ample, following three previously unsuccessful attempts at running for 
president, Daniel Ortega was elected as president of Nicaragua only after 
he spearheaded a change in the electoral rules so that a president could be 
elected with 35% rather than the previously necessary 45% of votes cast. 
In 2006 he won with 38% of the vote in an election that was endorsed by 
reputable international monitoring missions despite the blatant manipula-
tion of the electoral rules to engineer his own victory.48
Cleverly, some governments change election-related laws in order to 
make their intended manipulation strategies legal, such as passing obscure 
candidate citizenship requirements, modifying voter registration laws, or re-
quiring opposition candidates to pay enormous registration fees. Of course, 
some leaders manipulate elections blatantly in order to demonstrate their 
strength or dominance or for other domestic reasons.49 President Alexan-
der Lukashenko of Belarus has boasted that he is so popular that he had to 
commit election fraud by artifi cially lowering his own vote share so as to 
be credible to international observers.50 Lukashenko has also engaged in 
more traditional forms of election fraud, banned any criticism of his regime 
in public discourse, employed a widespread campaign of violence and in-
timidation against suspected regime opponents, branded opposition party 
members as traitors, and kept tight control of state-run media.51 Lukash-
enko, and leaders like him, make little effort to conceal such manipulation. 
They employ a different form of strategic manipulation by instead waging a 
war of public opinion and arguing, for example, that their popularity makes 
political repression irrelevant because they would win even in free and fair 
elections, or by attempting to discredit international observers.
In order to bias elections in their favor while avoiding the most ex-
treme and obvious forms of election theft, governments have intimidated 
journalists and shut down independent media outlets; monopolized or 
misused state-run television; falsely accused their opponents of crimes; 
threatened and intimidated opposition candidates, their families, and their 
48. Birch, “Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct.”
49. Lust-Okar, Structuring Confl ict in the Arab World; Magaloni, Voting for Autocracy; 
Simpser, “Making Votes Not Count.”
50. Jan Maksymiuk, “Belarus: Lukashenka—Father of the Nation, Or Loudmouthed 
Autocrat?,” Radio Free Europe, Prague, November 24, 2006.
51. OSCE /ODIHR, Republic of Belarus Presidential Election 19 March 2006, OSCE /ODIHR 
Election Observation Mission Report.
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supporters; and taken other actions aimed at increasing their own chances 
at winning the election without being condemned for election fraud. I 
discuss how these tools are used strategically below.
Candidate exclusion and dividing the opposition represent very effec-
tive forms of biasing election outcomes because they are not on their own 
likely to provoke severe international criticism, as their use is often hard to 
prove. At its most extreme, candidate exclusion includes indefi nite disap-
pearance of candidates, jailing, actual or attempted murder, intimidation, 
or “voluntary” exile. These extreme forms of candidate exclusion provoke 
international condemnation if the government is clearly responsible, but 
perpetrators frequently remain unknown. The suicide bombing and as-
sassination of leading Pakistani opposition candidate Benazir Bhutto at a 
campaign rally led international observers to condemn violence leading 
up to the 2008 elections, but the overall evaluation of the election was 
ultimately positive, in part because the ruling party was defeated.
If leading opposition candidates do not “choose” to compete, it is 
much easier for the incumbent party to win without using other forms 
of manipulation. Screening candidates through intimidation, political 
imprisonment, or even murder is a highly effective tactic. In countries 
with extreme levels of political violence, such as Afghanistan, prospective 
politicians face an increased risk of assassination. Less violently but just as 
effectively, candidates in the 1995 Haitian elections could be barred from 
competing if they were members of the ruling party during the Duvalier 
dictatorship; however, the determination about which candidates fi t this 
description was subjective, and some argue that the criterion was applied 
unfairly. In Côte d’Ivoire, the leading opposition candidate and former 
prime minister (1990–1993), Alassane Dramane Ouattara, was disquali-
fi ed as a candidate from the 1995 and 2000 presidential elections because 
of a newly introduced nationality clause in the electoral law that required 
candidates to prove that they and their parents were Ivorian. Eligible op-
position parties boycotted the Indonesian election of 1997 because, they 
claimed, one popular opposition candidate had been barred from compet-
ing in the election, ostensibly due to his health, even though the govern-
ment argued these exclusions were within the scope of the law.
Underscoring the success of these strategies, recent research on electoral 
authoritarian regimes has shown that unless opposition parties are able to 
form a coalition to challenge the incumbent regime with a united front, 
“liberalizing electoral outcomes” are unlikely.52 Although the  methods vary, 
52. Howard and Roessler, “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes.”
178 The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma
it is frequently the case that “incumbents fi nd ways to engineer the failure 
of opposition parties.”53 Because electoral autocrats are rarely beaten by di-
vided or weak opposition parties, engineering a weak or divided opposition 
remains one of the most powerful strategies for incumbent governments to 
stay in power.
Another form of indirect manipulation of elections refl ects the im-
portance of information in campaigns and elections. Governments can 
monopolize state-run media to campaign for government candidates, 
and they are frequently criticized for such actions by international ob-
servers. Drawing less attention is the more subtle, but potentially just as 
effective, method of exploiting state-run media in a manner that harms 
the opposition but is not technically campaign related. For example, in 
Cambodia in 1993, the government played the movie The Killing Fields on 
state television just days before the election, which was arguably intended 
to discredit Communist Party candidates.54 Playing a movie on state-
run television sounds relatively innocuous, but this type of strategy can 
bias the election using resources available only to the state, while avoid-
ing overt or illegal forms of election manipulation. Alberto Simpser and 
Daniela Donno argue that international election observation can actually 
harm governance by leading incumbents to resort to the rigging of courts, 
media repression, and control of other administrative bodies.55
Violence and political repression can be used to display dominance of 
the regime, but it can also be employed in manner intended to avoid inter-
national condemnation. As Schedler writes, “irregular episodes of harass-
ment and intimidation make fewer international headlines than systematic 
human rights violations, and they may be equally effective in dissuading 
dissidence and imposing self-censorship.”56 This method of manipula-
tion is clearly not part of a democratic political process and is likely to 
be condemned by observers if it is blatantly or systematically undertaken 
by the government. Prior to the 2006 election in Belarus, President Lu-
kashenko preemptively threatened any supporters of a postelection at-
tempt to overthrow the government, saying that “we will break the neck 
[of protesters] immediately—like a duckling’s.”57 Although the statement 
53. Schedler, “The Menu of Manipulation,” 41.
54. Roberts, “The Cambodian Elections of 1993.”
55. Simpser, “Unintended Consequences of Election Monitoring”; Simpser and Donno, 
“Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?”
56. Schedler, “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections,” 106.
57. “Belarus Leader to ‘Break Neck’ of Election Demonstrators,” Agence Free Press, 
March 17, 2006.
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 obviously threatened protestors, its actual effect on the behavior of voters, 
journalists, and opposition political parties is hard to gauge, and observers 
have diffi culty distinguishing between opposition supporters who are in-
timidated and those who are simply indifferent. Threats of violence have 
a chilling effect on competition that may be impossible to prove because 
successful intimidation leaves little observable evidence.58 Similarly, in an 
effort to justify the use of violence toward opposition party supporters, 
governments have been discovered planting armed agitators at otherwise 
peaceful rallies, a charge levied at the Ethiopian government following the 
2005 elections. Subsequent government crackdowns on “violent protes-
tors” are then less likely to be criticized by international observers.
State bureaucracies sometimes enact discriminatory policies aimed at 
biasing the election without giving the appearance of impropriety. Because 
many bureaucracies in developing countries already have existing reputa-
tions as being incompetent (or they can quickly earn them), claims that 
opposition candidates did not properly fi le candidate registration papers, 
cumbersome voter registration processes, lost election materials, suppos-
edly broken computers (famously following the 1988 Mexican elections), 
duplicate voter registrations for government supporters, and similarly 
ambiguous election irregularities are potential forms of intended election 
fraud that are diffi cult to prove as such. If an outdated voter register favors 
the incumbent, it can be an effective form of strategic manipulation simply 
to underemphasize the importance of voter registration or divert bureau-
cratic energies elsewhere and blame the out-of-date rolls on a lack of time 
and money. Politically captured election administration bodies can falsify 
vote counts or adjudicate electoral disputes in favor of the incumbent. 
Intent matters, particularly in countries with little electoral experience. 
When intentional manipulation and administrative incompetence are ob-
servationally equivalent, it becomes diffi cult for observers to condemn an 
election without additional evidence that administrative problems were in 
fact intentional manipulation of the electoral process.
Similarly, partisan control of the election administration body may be 
gained through legal measures, although it can be used to confer an unfair 
advantage and manipulate electoral outcomes. For example, in Azerbai-
jan in 1998, President Aliev’s control of the central election commission 
was cited as the central opposition party complaint. Although OSCE /
ODIHR observers criticized the administration of the election, Aliev 
retained control of the election commission, which disqualifi ed several 
58. Kuran, Private Truths, Public Lies.
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opposition parties from participating in the 2000 election, including the 
most popular party.
Vote or abstention buying are also relatively common strategies used 
both by government and opposition parties, some of which can be well 
concealed from international observers.59 Although these techniques are 
not new, when campaigns pay voters to stay home in an effort to suppress 
turnout for supporters of their opponent, international observers may 
note that turnout is unexpectedly low; however, a well-orchestrated ef-
fort could realistically be concealed from international observers. For ex-
ample, a widespread vote-buying strategy with a diverse pedigree goes by 
many locally known names, including the “Tasmanian dodge,” the “cat-
erpillar” in Russia, the “shuttle” in the Philippines, and chain voting or 
carousel voting in other countries.60 The goal of this vote-buying scheme 
is to allow vote buyers to evade the secret ballot and decrease uncertainty 
that vote sellers followed through on their side of the transaction. The 
scheme begins with a ballot that has been stolen or smuggled out of a poll-
ing station. The vote buyer marks the ballot and gives it to a vote seller, 
who then smuggles the premarked ballot into the polling station, casts it 
as his or her own, and then must smuggle out the voter’s own ballot, still 
unmarked, in order to be paid by the vote buyer. The newly obtained 
blank ballot is then marked and cast by the next vote seller. Although this 
tactic has been documented and criticized by international observers on a 
number of occasions, it is possible to conceal it from international moni-
tors. It serves as an example of election manipulation that can evade the 
protections of the secret ballot, take place in otherwise functioning poll-
ing stations, and not be observable by anyone but the participants in the 
vote-buying scheme.
Efforts to engage in strategic manipulation are not foolproof, and 
sometimes they fail spectacularly. In the 2000 elections in Côte d’Ivoire, 
coup leader and presidential candidate General Robert Guei attempted 
to win his election through fraud and gain international certifi cation, but 
he managed to fail at both. To limit competition without eliminating it 
entirely, the Guei regime ensured that fourteen of the nineteen prospec-
tive presidential candidates, including those from the two largest political 
parties, were barred from running by the Supreme Court. These actions 
led the UN-coordinated observer mission to withdraw from the country 
59. Schaffer, Elections for Sale.
60. Schedler and Schaffer, “What Is Vote Buying?,” 23.
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and issue a strong condemnation. However, Guei apparently did not cheat 
enough to win the election, and in a surprise outcome, one of the four 
remaining opposition candidates won the elections with 59% of the vote.
Although some forms of election manipulation are uniquely available to 
the incumbent because they require government complicity or the exploi-
tation of state resources, opposition political parties or other civic groups 
are capable of election fraud, and some governments diffuse criticism of 
their own fraud by accusing the opposition of cheating as well. Inter-
national observers at the 1999 Nigerian elections witnessed widespread 
 election fraud, including ballot box stuffi ng, voter intimidation, and infl a-
tion of the voter register. In part because both sides were cheating, how-
ever, they had diffi culty determining whether the observed irregularities 
infl uenced the winner of the election. Despite the poor quality of the elec-
tions, the Carter Center’s postelection statement refl ected their uncer-
tainty about the overall effect of widespread election fraud committed by 
multiple parties and did not condemn the election as strongly as it might 
have had only the government had been caught cheating:
While we witnessed a number of abuses, the delegation has no system-
atic evidence indicating that these abuses would have affected the overall 
outcome of the election. Nevertheless these abuses may have substan-
tially compromised the integrity of the process in the areas where they 
occurred.61
Incumbents who are caught and criticized by international observers fre-
quently attempt to diffuse criticism. Incumbent governments may argue 
that observers are biased and imperialist, that they are too few in number 
to accurately judge elections, and that they act only for their host country’s 
interests.
In addition to these examples, many forms of strategic manipulation 
may be unobservable. Like a perfect crime, perfectly orchestrated strate-
gic manipulation leaves no evidence but guarantees victory for the gov-
ernment and defeat for the opposition. Because of the potential for this 
dynamic to exist, and because of the possibility that opposition parties are 
better equipped to document such covert manipulation, I briefl y explore 
the reaction of opposition parties to international observers and strategic 
manipulation.
61. Carter Center and National Democratic Institute, Observing the 1998-99 Nigeria Elec-
tions, Final Report, 59.
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Opposition Parties, Observers, and Election Fraud
Across all observed elections, the reaction of opposition parties to in-
ternational observers is diverse. Opposition parties may actively pressure 
their government to invite international election monitors, as in Jamaica 
in 1997. If they think that observers will legitimize what they anticipate 
will be a seriously fl awed process, they lobby against them. Writing on 
opposition parties in Africa, Oda van Cranenburgh notes that initially 
“opposition parties were the primary actors urging for international ob-
servation to ensure a free and fair process . . .” but that “many opposition 
groups have become disenchanted with election observation.”62
Opposition parties also engage in election fraud, although the dynamics 
between observers and opposition parties are distinct from those between 
pseudo-democratic leaders and the observers they invite. When the gov-
ernment holds democratic elections, it is rare for opposition parties to en-
gage in nationally orchestrated election fraud and even less likely that an 
election will be internationally condemned for opposition-only election 
fraud. Nevertheless, documented forms of opposition party manipula-
tion include local schemes in areas of opposition party control, clientelism 
and vote buying, or intimidation and violence perpetuated by nonstate 
groups.
The strategy of opposition parties hinges on whether they anticipate 
that observers will judge election fraud accurately. For opposition political 
parties, the worst possible outcome is that the government rigs the elec-
tion and international observers nevertheless praise it. Observer praise 
of an election makes postelection complaints by opposition parties less 
credible, and successful strategic manipulation by the government reduces 
their ability to win political representation. Indeed, this is precisely the 
outcome that pseudo-democrats are trying to achieve.
Thus when governments are engaging in strategic manipulation, the 
opposition has an increased incentive to signal their complaints to observ-
ers and to demonstrate that their complaints are valid. This dynamic, as 
recent research shows, led to increases in opposition party election boy-
cotts during the 1990s when observers were present and their ability to 
judge election fraud was still in question.63 More so than postelection pro-
test, successful pre-election boycotts are costly for opposition parties. Not 
only do successful boycotts involve signifi cant organization, they require 
that the parties forgo any possibility of representation. Threatening or 
62. Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation and Democratization in Africa, 31.
63. Beaulieu and Hyde, “In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion.”
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carrying out an election boycott has been used in many countries to draw 
attention to unfairness in the electoral process, to pressure governments 
to rectify problems in the administration of elections, and to draw inter-
national and domestic attention to election manipulation.64
False accusations of government-sponsored election fraud may also be 
triggered by the presence of international observers because the possibil-
ity of causing negative international media attention increases the incen-
tive for opposition groups to invent claims of election fraud, particularly 
if their chances of winning are otherwise low. Pre-election complaints of 
fraud inoculate the opposition against the possibility that they will per-
form poorly in the election. If the opposition party wins, the complaints 
become irrelevant, and if they lose, their performance can be blamed on 
unfair competition. This strategy is not foolproof, and it backfi res if op-
position complaints of fraud are believed to be exaggerated. Opposition 
parties suspected of such falsifi ed complaints themselves become targets 
of observer criticism.
Nevertheless, some complaints made by opposition parties cannot be 
proven or disproven. Some involve complicated conspiracies or point to 
types of manipulation that are legal, such as targeted increases in govern-
ment spending. Other opposition complaints are hard to believe. In the 
Dominican Republic in 1966, one observer faithfully reported opposition 
party claims that “they had been warned to expect white phosphorous to 
be placed in the ballot envelopes causing them to burst into fl ames when 
opened.”65 No burning ballots were documented in the Dominican elec-
tion, but similarly creative accusations have continued along with govern-
ment innovation in the use of strategic manipulation.
In short, opposition response to observers is not uniform, but rather it 
reveals that opposition parties have an interest in exposing government-
sponsored manipulation when it exists, sometimes accuse the government 
of fraud that it did not commit, and are generally wary of participating in 
a process that could be manipulated but not criticized by the international 
community. If they believe that foreign observers will improve the quality 
of the process in either the short or the long term, and thereby improve 
their chances of winning, opposition parties are also likely to pressure 
governments to invite high-quality election observers.
64. Lindberg, “Tragic Protest”; Beaulieu, “Protesting the Contest: Election Boycotts 
Around the World, 1990–2002.”
65. Keys, “Observing the Elections,” 77.
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Strategic Interaction under the Norm 
of International Observation
Many forms of strategic manipulation follow the letter of the law, but 
they bend the laws governing democracy such that the playing fi eld is 
steeply tilted. Other forms of strategic manipulation that may be encour-
aged by election monitoring are clearly illegal and violate the letter and 
the spirit of rules governing democratic elections, such as bringing about 
the mysterious disappearance of opposition candidates, engaging in well-
concealed vote buying, and manipulating the voter registration lists in 
opposition strongholds. As I have shown in this chapter, observers have 
responded to this diversity in tactics and have become more likely to criti-
cize many forms of election manipulation that take place before and after 
election day.
The evolving game of strategy between international observers and 
pseudo-democrats suggests continuing innovation on the part of lead-
ers, observers, and democracy-promoting international actors. As elec-
tion monitoring became more widespread, international actors invested 
in improving election observation, thus increasing the scope and quality 
of election monitoring and giving leaders the incentive to modify their 
methods of strategic manipulation. After the norm became established, 
few leaders chose not to invite observers, and many leaders who were not 
otherwise inclined to signal their democratizing intentions invited reputa-
ble international observers. The fact that monitoring is costly to pseudo-
democrats makes it an effective signal, and it is a central reason that 
international actors accepted the practice. Overall, for pseudo-democrats, 
the norm of election monitoring—and the widespread international sup-
port for democratic regimes—increases pressure on all governments to 
hold elections and increases the uncertainty over the outcome of those 
elections. To comply with international expectations, leaders must now 
hold elections, invite observers, and receive a positive report. For lead-
ers who do not wish to give up power but who cannot afford to shun 
pro-democracy international actors or become a pariah state, the norm of 
election monitoring means they must devote increased effort to conceal 
election manipulation, risk the consequences of a negative report, over-
come any direct deterrent effect that observers have on election fraud, 
and still guarantee their hold on power. This calculation is increasingly 
complicated as observers and pseudo-democrats interact under the norm 
of election monitoring.
Prior to the 2006 Belarusian election, President Aleksander Lukashenko 
invited observers from the Organization for Security and Cooperation 
in Europe (OSCE), the National Democratic Institute, and the Com-
monwealth of Independent States. Reportedly a popular incumbent, Lu-
kashenko nevertheless engaged in many forms of electoral manipulation, 
including vote buying, intimidation, mass arrests, and monopolization of 
the media. The OSCE criticized the electoral process, saying that that it 
was “severely fl awed due to arbitrary use of state power and restrictions on 
basic rights.”1 The United States responded to the fraudulent elections by 
declaring the results invalid, refusing to accept Lukashenko as the winner, 
and calling for a new election.2 The European Union barred President 
Lukashenko and thirty of the country’s offi cials from entering EU mem-
ber states, and vowed to support Belarus’s opposition movement and the 
development of an independent press.3
This international involvement in the Belarusian election is not unique. 
In fact, the elections are typical in that an incumbent who planned on 
manipulating the election willingly invited high-quality international ob-
servers. Predictably, the fraudulent elections were denounced by interna-
tional observers, the international community responded by attempting 
to delegitimize the elections, and pro-democracy actors used the reports 
1. OSCE /ODIHR, “Belarusian Election Severely Flawed Due to Arbitrary Use of State 
Power and Restrictions on Basic Rights,” news release, Minsk, March 20, 2006.
2. C. J. Chivers and Steven Lee Myers, “U.S. Calls Belarus Vote for Leader Invalid,” New 
York Times, March 20, 2006.
3. “Europe Bars Its Doors to Belarus President and 30 Offi cials,” New York Times, April 22, 
2006; “Election in Belarus Did Not Meet Standards, Observers Say,” New York Times, March 20, 
2006.
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of observers to justify the imposition of costs on the government. In 
some cases, similar scenarios following fraudulent elections have resulted 
in massive domestic uprisings and the eventual removal of the incum-
bent government. In other cases, the parallel vote tabulations organized 
by domestic and international observers have prevented the incumbent 
government from falsifying the results during the tabulation process, also 
resulting in the ouster of the incumbent government.
Over the past fi fty years, the trajectory of election observation refl ects a 
widespread increase in global support for democracy. Democracy has be-
come the world’s most popular form of government. Long-standing democ-
racies devote signifi cant resources toward encouraging the development of 
democratic political institutions in other countries, and regimes not already 
perceived as consolidated democracies face direct and indirect pressure to 
liberalize their political institutions. How do leaders react to this pressure? 
More generally, when the preferences of powerful states change, how do 
other governments respond and what are the lasting consequences? Mo-
tivated by these questions, this book examines how the movement toward 
democracy and international pressure on states causes behavioral changes 
among governments seeking foreign support. I argue that an important 
outcome of this pressure is that efforts by regimes to increase their share 
of international benefi ts can generate lasting changes in global governance 
through the creation of new and self-enforcing international norms.
This book opened with an empirical puzzle. Leaders throughout the 
developing world are now expected to invite international observers and 
receive their endorsement, and those few leaders who refuse now send an 
unambiguous signal to international and domestic audiences that they are 
holding undemocratic elections and they reject international engagement. 
Strikingly, even the majority of leaders planning to commit widespread 
election fraud comply with the norm, risking international condemna-
tion of their elections. Many leaders now face “the pseudo-democrat’s di-
lemma,” in which they must choose between two undesirable outcomes: 
inviting observers and risking the consequences of a negative report or 
refusing to invite observers and sending an unambiguous signal that their 
country’s elections will not be democratic.
Now tied to broader international support for democracy, good gover-
nance, and political stability, inviting foreign observers has become linked 
to a variety of internationally allocated benefi ts, including membership 
in international organizations, foreign aid, international investment, in-
creased trade, tourism, normal diplomatic relations, and international le-
gitimacy. Similarly, refusing foreign observers or earning their criticism 
now leads to reduced or eliminated international support.
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The case of international election monitoring illustrates why states in-
vite potentially costly foreign intrusions into their domestic affairs and 
how actions intended to signal a government’s type become international 
norms. Increasing global integration and the widely held view that states 
can and should infl uence the domestic politics and policies of other states 
make this argument particularly relevant to modern international rela-
tions theory. Norms help govern international interactions in the absence 
of global government. The international relations literature to date has 
focused almost exclusively on two types of international norms: those that 
facilitate cooperation within international institutions or that are imposed 
by powerful states and those that result from the work of norm entrepre-
neurs, motivated by principled ideas, whose efforts bring about desired 
change in the state behavior.
At least one other class of norms is important in global governance, 
and it does not fi t neatly into either of the previous categories. Signaling 
norms are distinct both because of the mechanism that creates them and 
because of their consequences, as I have argued throughout this book and 
as I summarize below. Signaling norms are diffusely motivated behaviors 
that are initiated as a strategic response to changes in the international en-
vironment but that become widely shared—and enforced—“standards of 
appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity.”4 In explaining the 
norm of international election monitoring, I have argued that the global 
movement toward democracy triggered a game between leaders seeking 
international benefi ts and democracy-promoting actors, ultimately result-
ing in the widely held expectation that leaders holding credible elections 
should invite international election monitors to judge them. In the re-
mainder of this chapter, I summarize my theory and the fi ndings presented 
in the book and evaluate the implications of my argument, including the 
implications for theories of international norm formation, the quality of 
elections, the behavior of pseudo-democrats, and the policies related to 
election observation and democracy promotion.
Theory in Brief
My central argument is that that states seeking international benefi ts 
can generate unintended yet consequential international norms. In my 
model of norm development, states are divided into two groups: those 
4. Finnemore and Sikkink, “International Norm Dynamics and Political Change,” 891.
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seeking foreign support and those allocating international benefi ts. Actors 
within each group behave independently, without explicit coordination 
with other actors in their group. Benefi t-seeking states are further divided 
into “good” types of regimes, which are preferred by benefi t-giving states, 
and “bad” types of regimes, which international actors would prefer not 
to support. In explaining the norm of election monitoring, good types of 
leaders or regimes are committed to democratization and bad leaders are 
pseudo-democrats, or leaders who hold elections but who are willing to 
violate the rules of democracy.
Leaders of many states in the international system work to maximize 
their share of international benefi ts. These international benefi ts are tar-
geted toward states possessing desirable characteristics and withdrawn 
from states that are revealed not to possess them. Information between 
states is asymmetric: governments possess accurate information about 
their own type, but other international actors can have diffi culty judging 
whether another state is a desirable type. Thus, even when international 
actors prefer to interact with specifi ed types of states, they cannot always 
distinguish good from bad regime types and, all else equal, prefer to avoid 
states of uncertain value that might possess undesirable characteristics. 
Benefi t-seeking states with desirable characteristics are thus motivated to 
fi nd credible signals of their type to other international actors.
If an attempted signal is successful in communicating a state’s valued 
characteristic to international audiences, it is rewarded. Mimicry of suc-
cessful signals causes the new behavior to spread. The behavior becomes an 
international norm when benefi t-giving actors believe that all good govern-
ments send the signal. More states are motivated to adopt the signal, even 
those that must fake it, and the behavior becomes widespread and expected, 
even in the absence of explicit advocacy or pressure on states to adopt the 
new behavior. Acceptance of the signal as an internationally held norm re-
inforces the incentives for states to continue the signaling behavior.
The normalization of a signal also ties the behavior more closely to 
a characteristic that is valued by powerful international actors. Initially, 
these benefi t-giving international actors may be indifferent to the signal, 
but once it is accepted as a means by which they can more effi ciently 
target their support to states possessing desirable characteristics, they are 
motivated to invest in the quality of the signal, making it more diffi cult 
for undesirable types to fake it. Therefore, when a signal becomes a norm, 
it increases the costs for leaders who refuse to signal and simultaneously 
makes it riskier for undesirable types to attempt to signal.
Although this theory can be applied to other signaling-based norms, I 
have developed and evaluated it using international election observation. 
189Conclusion
Reacting to increases in international benefi ts tied to democracy, govern-
ments seeking increased Western support were motivated to fi nd a sig-
nal that demonstrated their commitment to democracy. Although other 
signals were attempted, government invitations to nonpartisan foreign 
election monitors became a successful—and therefore widely imitated—
signal of a government’s commitment to democratic elections. Foreign 
observers are not perfect judges of election quality, but because they are 
frequently willing to condemn elections that are stolen, their reports are 
a valuable source of information to democracy-promoting actors, and in-
viting observers and receiving their endorsement became recognized as 
a credible signal that a government was committed to democratization. 
Because election observation was initiated by state leaders and observers 
continue to be invited by host governments, the practice evaded concern 
among democracy promoters regarding the issue of international inter-
vention in the domestic affairs of sovereign states.
My theory also provides a direct theoretical link between the causes and 
consequences of signaling norms. More than arguing that norms matter, I 
show that the fact that election monitoring is risky for electoral autocrats is 
not only an interesting feature of international election monitoring, but it 
is also a central reason why inviting observers became a widely accepted 
international norm. This feature of signaling norms is counter intuitive 
because it implies that the bad types who would least prefer a signal to 
become a widely held norm—in this case the pseudo-democrats—are the 
driving force in spreading the behavior and in demonstrating to interna-
tional actors that the signal is informative. To illustrate, if inviting moni-
tors was costless for pseudo-democrats, it would be cheap talk and easier 
for them to mimic, but the potential rewards of signaling would be di-
minished. If election observation were not riskier for pseudo- democrats, 
the practice would not have become an informative signal of a govern-
ment’s commitment to democracy, inviting observers would not have 
been rewarded by pro-democracy actors, and pseudo-democrats would 
not have had the incentive to mimic the signal. Thus, the fact that election 
monitoring is a useful but imperfect tool to separate true democrats and 
 pseudo-democrats is both a consequence of the norm and a central reason 
why it became an international norm at all.
By initiating a new and potentially costly signal of an internationally 
valued characteristic, states seeking democracy-related international ben-
efi ts generated the norm of election observation. Norm generation was 
not the explicit goal of democratizing leaders or democracy-promoting 
actors; yet over time, the response by individual states to changes in the 
international environment led to an important change in internationally 
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held expectations about the behavior of governments throughout the 
developing world.
Findings
I presented a variety of evidence in support of my argument, includ-
ing cross-national data on the spread of election observation; detailed 
descriptions of the characteristics of inviting and noninviting countries; 
evidence of three ways that election monitoring is costly to pseudo-
 democrats, including several detailed cases demonstrating the existence 
of democracy-contingent international benefi ts; micro-level experimental 
tests showing that observers can deter fraud and otherwise improve the 
quality of elections (an effect that is more costly to pseudo-democrats 
than true democrats); and qualitative evidence illustrating the escalating 
game of strategic manipulation between pseudo-democrats, international 
monitors, and pro-democracy international actors. Additionally, I rely on 
diverse sources of documentation, including the rhetoric from leaders 
who discuss their decision to invite observers, archives of international 
organizations and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), reports from 
individual observers, and a variety of election-based cases, to show that 
election monitoring was initiated as a signal to international audiences by 
governments that were committed to holding democratic elections but 
whose reputations were not well established. As international benefi ts tied 
to democracy increased, and as the number of governments inviting ob-
servers and receiving international endorsements increased, more govern-
ments began to invite international election monitors.
During the Cold War, Western reticence to support governments that 
were not overtly anti-communist outweighed their relatively weak prefer-
ence for supporting democratic governments. Consistent with my theory, 
nearly all early inviters were governments that were already recognized 
as anti-communist Western allies and who could therefore marginally 
increase their value by signaling their commitment to democratization. 
Countries that were not already anti-communist were unable to improve 
their share of international benefi ts by signaling their commitment to de-
mocracy because of the disproportionate weight given to a country’s op-
position to communism.
As Cold War politics waned, the relative weight of a country’s commit-
ment to democracy increased, as did the overall amount of international ben-
efi ts devoted to promoting democracy. Governments throughout the world 
felt international pressure to democratize, and invitations to international 
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election observers spread rapidly, becoming a widely recognized signal of a 
country’s commitment to democratize. In the 1990s most newly indepen-
dent states and countries holding their fi rst multiparty elections invited in-
ternational observers. By the late 1990s, more than 80% of elections in the 
developing world were internationally monitored. Without pressure from 
powerful states or morally motivated activism, and at the invitation of lead-
ers seeking international endorsement of their elections, inviting interna-
tional observers became an international norm.
Using cross-national data on election observation, I explore several ob-
servable implications of my theory pertaining to the causes of interna-
tionally observed elections. I show that leaders were more likely to invite 
observers as international pressure for democracy increased, particularly if 
their regime type was highly uncertain (previous elections were suspended, 
country was run by transitional leadership, the elections were the country’s 
fi rst for which multiparty competition was allowed); if they were not already 
recognized as a democratizing country; and if they had invited observers 
previously. The central alternative explanations for the norm of election 
observation, including other theories of norm development, the regional 
and international diffusion of policies, and existing work on election moni-
toring, are undermined by a lack of evidence. Although norm entrepre-
neurs were active in promoting democracy and human rights, there is little 
evidence that activists helped initiate and spread the practice of election 
observation. Most organizations sending international observers were at 
fi rst reluctant participants in election observation and declined invitations 
from leaders of sovereign states to send election monitors. Election moni-
tors sent by human rights NGOs, rather than advocating election moni-
toring for its own sake, appeared to be exploiting leaders’ enthusiasm for 
election observers in order to gain access to otherwise restricted informa-
tion on human rights abuses. Evidence of overt pressure on states to invite 
observers (rather than pressure to democratize), exerted by either inter-
national or domestic actors, did not appear until the later stages of norm 
development, as election monitoring became a widely expected practice. 
In contrast to the literature on diffusion, I also fi nd that the regional rate 
of election monitoring does not predict observed elections.5
The fi nal alternative explanation that I consider in the book is that it 
is costless for leaders to invite international election observers, and the 
norm of election monitoring is therefore entirely inconsequential. I eval-
uated this alternative explanation by examining the domestic political 
5. Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett, The Global Diffusion of Markets and Democracy.
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implications of my theory. Evidence of signifi cant domestic consequences 
of election monitoring refutes the alternative explanation that it is costless 
for pseudo-democrats, and tests several key empirical implications of my 
theory. For election monitoring to be an effective signal of a government’s 
type, it must be costly for undesirable types to imitate. Although election 
monitoring does not separate types perfectly, I exploit subnational experi-
mental evidence in order to demonstrate that observers can deter fraud 
directly and therefore cost cheating parties a signifi cant number of votes 
that they would have received in the absence of election observers. This 
is just one of many ways that election monitors can be costly to pseudo-
democrats, but it presents clear causal evidence that inviting observers is 
not cheap talk and that it is more costly for pseudo-democrats to invite 
observers than it is for true democrats.
Not only do observers criticize elections, but consistent with my the-
ory, a variety of international actors began reacting to negative reports 
from observers by withdrawing international benefi ts or by refusing to 
reopen channels of foreign support following elections that did not meet 
international standards. The norm of election monitoring means that 
pseudo-democrats must choose between inviting observers and risking a 
negative report and refusing observers and facing a virtually nonexistent 
chance that their elections will be recognized as democratic. I further 
explore the types of leaders who do not invite observers and show that, 
after the norm developed, the countries most likely to refuse observers 
were holding elections in which competition is banned or severely re-
stricted, such as Cuba, Laos, North Korea, Singapore, Turkmenistan, and 
Vietnam. Other governments, such as Iran and Malaysia, hold somewhat 
competitive elections but represent rare cases in which the parties in 
power receive domestic support for refusing international engagement. 
I also show that this second strategy is less likely than one might expect. 
Even countries such as Belarus, Russia, and Zimbabwe devote signifi cant 
effort to inviting observers and manipulating their reports, rather than 
simply refusing to invite them.
In addition to generating observable implications about the spread of 
election monitoring, my theory also predicts an evolving game of strategy 
between pseudo-democrats, who try to mimic the signal of inviting ob-
servers without being criticized, and international observers, who improve 
their ability to catch election manipulation over time by expanding their 
mandate and improving election-monitoring techniques. I demonstrate 
that pseudo-democrats engage in strategic manipulation by providing nu-
merous examples of government attempts to manipulate elections without 
being caught and illustrate the changing practices of international election 
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observers by focusing on how they respond to innovations in strategic 
manipulation. If pseudo-democrats had successfully fooled international 
election observers, the over-time trends should show negative reports be-
coming increasingly rare. In contrast, if my predictions of an evolving 
game of strategy in which innovations in cheating are met with improve-
ments in election monitoring are correct, the rate of negative reports 
should remain relatively constant after the norm is created. The pattern 
of internationally criticized elections is relatively stable after about 1995, 
implying that pseudo-democrats are not entirely successful in evading ob-
server criticism.
The types of evidence presented in this book are diverse and range from 
micro-level tests of whether observers reduce rates of blatant election 
fraud to cross-national examinations of whether international pressure for 
democracy coincided with governments choosing to invite observers. By 
evaluating the evidence at several levels of analysis and by employing mul-
tiple methods, I demonstrate signifi cant support for my argument: lead-
ers initiated election monitoring as a signal to international audiences of 
their commitment to democratization. Other leaders, including pseudo-
democrats, mimicked the signal in order try to gain the endorsement of 
observers and increase their access to international benefi ts. Because elec-
tion monitoring was risky for pseudo-democrats and provided valuable 
information about leaders’ types to pro-democracy actors, it was rewarded 
by pro-democracy audiences. The fact that observers were invited by host 
governments rather than forced upon them by democracy promoters side-
stepped early concerns that election monitoring violated sovereignty, and 
eventually this fact was used by democracy promoters to make interna-
tionally certifi ed elections a necessary condition for an even greater range 
of international benefi ts, further raising the stakes and expanding the di-
lemma faced by pseudo-democrats.
The Norm of Election Observation
The consequences of the norm of international election monitoring 
continue to evolve. Two trends in particular underscore the acceptance 
of election observation as an international norm, highlight its near-global 
acceptance by even the most powerful states in the world, and refl ect how 
democracy promoters respond to efforts by pseudo-democrats to manipu-
late the institution of election observation.
The fi rst trend resulting from the norm is that international observers 
are now invited to monitor elections in many long-standing democracies. 
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The empirical analysis provided in this book covers 1960–2006. From 
2002 to 2010, election observation spread most rapidly among the de-
veloped democracies such as Belgium, France, Italy, Norway, the United 
Kingdom, and the United States. The diffusion of election observation to 
long-standing democracies has not yet been fully explained, in part be-
cause it can only recently be described as a trend and because observation 
in recognized democratic states is by one account “still largely unnoticed 
by the general public.”6 OSCE Magazine published a 2010 article intended 
to highlight and explain the practice to the OSCE community.7 Among 
democracy promoters, election observation in developed democracies re-
mains controversial. On one hand, supporters of election observation are 
reluctant to devote scarce resources to observing elections that they know 
they will judge to be democratic. On the other hand, countries such as 
Cuba, Iran, Malaysia, and perhaps most vocally, Russia, supported a nar-
rative that accused the developed democracies of hypocrisy for support-
ing observation in other states but not welcoming observation of their 
own elections. As election observation became more widely accepted 
as an international norm, pseudo-democratic governments increasingly 
complained about double standards in election observation. Although it 
is possible that the Russian government was genuinely concerned with 
promoting democracy and improving the quality of elections when they 
proposed a number of changes to OSCE Offi ce for Democratic Institu-
tions and Human Rights (ODIHR) observation practices, a more likely 
interpretation is that the Russians were attempting to undermine criticism 
of their own elections, as well as diffuse international support for pro-
democracy movements in former Soviet states.
Thus, in part to guard against charges of hypocrisy and double stan-
dards, many democracy-promoting states with well-established reputa-
tions as democracies now invite observers. This trend is consistent with 
widespread acceptance of the international norm of election observation, 
decreasing domestic sovereignty costs associated with inviting observers, 
and a desire on the part of democracy-promoting OSCE member states 
to demonstrate that they are not exempt from the rules. As the direc-
tor of the ODIHR, Ambassador Janez Lenarčič, explained, “all OSCE 
participating states are under the same obligation to implement election-
related commitments and to invite international observers to verify this . . .” 
and that “established democracies are not immune from election-related 
6. Eschenbächer, “Assessing Elections in Established Democracies,” 30.
7. Ibid.
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problems.”8 He went on to state that OSCE member states that have 
long democratic transitions can, “as mature and self-confi dent democra-
cies . . . serve as positive examples for countries which still meet election 
observation with suspicion and fear of international interference.”9
The OSCE missions to the U.S. elections, for example, have been for-
mally documented since 2002, with the fi rst national deployment of an 
OSCE mission taking place in 2004. Prior to 2002, some OSCE states 
viewed the invitation to observers to be implicit in their 1990 commit-
ment to the Copenhagen Document. An offi cial report pertaining to the 
2004 U.S. elections states that the United States has invited observers 
from the OSCE to “every presidential and midterm election in the U.S. 
since 1996.”10 Although there remain questions about the equality of 
missions deployed across countries, with leaders of countries such as Ar-
menia, Belarus, Russia, and Uzbekistan within the OSCE, as well as the 
governments of Algeria, Malaysia, and Zimbabwe attempting to challenge 
the legitimacy of election observation by arguing that observers employ 
inconsistent standards, observation in even the developed democracies 
undercuts their argument.
The second trend relates to the supply of observer missions. Even 
China has become involved in sending international observers through 
the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), an international orga-
nization composed of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan, 
and Uzbekistan.11 The Chinese government’s apparent interest in sup-
porting international election observation missions is noteworthy primar-
ily because China is the world’s largest and best-known autocracy, as well 
as one of the few remaining countries in the world that does not itself 
hold direct national elections.12 Election observation by the SCO, along 
with the observation missions sponsored by the Commonwealth of Inde-
pendent States, make clear that one consequence of the norm is the adop-
tion of international election observation by international actors who have 
no interest in promoting democracy. Although some practitioners worry 
that this trend undermines the practice of election observation, I would 
argue that the deployment of election observers by autocratic govern-
ments is an indication of the strength of the norm of international election 
 8. Ibid., 30.
 9. Ibid., 31.
10. Jones, Observation of U.S. Elections, as delivered by Chargé d’Affaires Paul W. Jones to the 
Permanent Council, Vienna.
11. Cooley, “Cooperation Gets Shanghaied: China, Russia, and the SCO.”
12. See appendix B.
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observation. Since the late 1990s, rather than reject the norm, even auto-
cratic governments have attempted to infl uence the content of election 
observer reports, going so far as to sponsor election observation missions 
through clearly anti-democratic international organizations.
Extending the Theory to Other International Norms
Although I have focused on international election observation as a sub-
stantively important topic and an informative case of norm creation, the 
theory outlined in this book can be applied to other issue areas. In democ-
racy promotion alone, government efforts to signal their type and increase 
internationally allocated benefi ts have led to the normalization of a variety 
of behaviors, including the spread of national elections to nearly all coun-
tries in the world, the adoption of independent election commissions, the 
widespread use of transparent ballot boxes and indelible ink, the public 
release of precinct-level election results, and even reserved parliamentary 
seats for women and minorities.13 Like election monitoring, some of these 
practices are adopted by governments because they want to be perceived 
as democratizing countries, not necessarily because they are committed to 
democratization.
There are other characteristics that are valued by international actors, 
such as transparency, stability, rule of law, good governance, and business-
friendly investment climates. The theory offered in this book suggests 
that benefi t-seeking states should respond to changes in the relative value 
of such characteristics, and my theory can help explain the widespread 
adoption of independent central banks, bilateral investment treaties, 
liberalization of the media, the use of credit-rating agencies, and even 
perceptions about countries that refuse to allow international weapons 
inspectors. Similarly, governments and transnational actors such as cor-
porations invite international monitoring in areas as diverse as child-labor 
practices, pollution, the production of coffee, and compliance with inter-
national trade agreements.14 The theoretical issues surrounding signal-
ing and monitoring within other issue areas are similar in many ways to 
those surrounding international election monitoring, including questions 
of why states give access to international actors so that they can judge 
their internal processes, and even more interestingly, why states often seek 
13. S. Bush, “International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures.”
14. Auld, “Assessing Certifi cation as Governance”; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom, Govern-
ing Through Markets: Forest Certifi cation and the Emergence of Non-State Authority.
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various forms of international monitoring even when negative judgments 
can be very costly. Although it is outside the scope of this book to provide 
complete documentation of these extensions, I briefl y discuss the applica-
tion of my theory to several other issue areas.
Attracting Foreign Direct Investment and Bilateral 
Investment Treaties
Like election monitoring, bilateral investment treaties (BITS) have 
grown from a nonexistent phenomenon in the late 1950s to being widely 
practiced throughout the world. Bilateral investment treaties are “agree-
ments establishing the terms and conditions for private investment by na-
tionals and companies of one country in the jurisdiction of another.”15 For 
governments that do not already possess well-established property rights 
protections for foreign investors, BITs are now expected by multinational 
corporations to signal that foreign investments in the country will be pro-
tected. As Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman, and Beth Simmons write, 
before BITs existed, for governments seeking foreign investment the ex-
isting system of customary international law “did not allow potential hosts 
voluntarily to signal their intent to contract in good faith.”16 Similarly, 
as Tim Büthe and Helen Milner argue with respect to preferential trade 
agreements and BITs,
A government can make a more credible commitment regarding present 
and future economic policies by entering into international agreements 
that commit its country to the liberal economic policies that are seen as 
desirable by foreign investors.17
Because BITs possess an international enforcement mechanism, the 
treaties are arguably less costly for states whose commitment to property 
rights protections is genuine and therefore represent a credible signal of 
a government’s commitment to the property rights of investors. Also like 
election monitoring, a number of powerful states, including the United 
States, initially opposed BITs. Yet despite their opposition, many host 
governments embraced BITs as a method to attract foreign direct invest-
ment. Although scholars do not typically refer to BITs as an international 
norm, I would argue that this is a result of insuffi cient interaction between 
15. Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, “Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1960–2000,” 220.
16. Ibid., 221.
17. Büthe and Milner, “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment,” 742.
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scholars working on quantitative international political economy and those 
working on international norms. BITs represent a neglected international 
norm in the international relations literature and provide an example of a 
signaling-based norm. The defi nition of international norms can easily be 
applied: under the norm of BITs, foreign investors now share the expecta-
tion that governments that desire foreign direct investment and intend 
to respect property rights will sign BITs. Additionally, foreign investors 
expect that only those countries that do not intend to respect the rights of 
foreign investors refuse BITs, thus generating pressure on less-desirable 
types of investment-seeking countries to sign BITs in order to lure inves-
tors. Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons explain the diffusion of BITs through 
a competitive process that is similar to my argument, although they do not 
use the term “international norm” or try to explain the diffusion of BITs. 
According to their argument, BITs were initiated and spread precisely be-
cause they represented a credible signal of a government’s commitment to 
enforce property rights protections for foreign investors. Those countries 
most in need of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), most likely to lose in-
vestment to competitors, and without an excellent reputation in the eyes 
of foreign investors (what they refer to as “inherent credibility”) were the 
most likely to sign on to such treaties. Additionally, like the increase in 
democracy-contingent benefi ts that triggers my theory, they predict that 
BITs should spread rapidly when there is an increase in the global amount 
of capital seeking foreign investment opportunities.
Although rationalist and institutionalist scholars of international po-
litical economy have been somewhat reluctant to discuss international 
norms, this is not because international norms do not exist or because 
these scholars necessarily think that norms are inconsequential. The added 
value of applying my theory to other substantive areas such as BITs is that 
it provides a more complete understanding of international norm forma-
tion and provides a more thorough casual explanation of the diffusion and 
persistence of new behaviors within the international system.
Applying my theory of norm formation also tentatively reconciles two 
divergent fi ndings in the political economy literature that explain the dif-
fusion of BITs and their effects on levels of FDI. Several scholars argue 
that BITs diffused because they are more costly for governments that will 
not respect property rights and that signing a BIT represents a credible 
signal of a government’s commitment to respect property rights.18 Yet 
18. Elkins, Guzman, and Simmons, “Competing for Capital”; Büthe and Milner, “The 
Politics of Foreign Direct Investment.”
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other scholars, such as Susan Rose-Ackerman and Jennifer Tobin, have 
found that BITs increase FDI only for countries that already have a sta-
ble business environment and have little effect on low- and middle- income 
countries.19 If BITs in fact signal a credible commitment of respect for 
property rights, why are they not associated with increased FDI for all 
governments?
One answer to this puzzle is suggested by the dynamics of the argument 
in this book. Foreign direct investors have diffi culty judging whether a 
given government will respect property rights. All else equal, investors 
prefer countries in which the risk of property rights violations are low. 
However, once BITs were identifi ed by investors as a signal that the 
government was committing itself to respect investors’ property rights, 
refusing to sign a BIT became a signal that a government would not re-
spect property rights. BITs diffused widely, even to countries in which 
the business environment was less than desirable. The signaling dynamics 
between investors and investment-seeking governments created pressure 
toward an equilibrium in which all governments that might respect prop-
erty rights offered BITs to investors. In the competitive market for FDI, 
investors developed the belief that governments that did not offer BITs 
were undesirable places to invest (and that many less-desirable countries 
also offered BITs). This over-time dynamic should ultimately generate 
pressure on governments to fi nd additional signals of the quality of their 
investment climates. The signaling theory of norm formation also offers 
a possible explanation for Rose-Ackerman and Tobin’s paradoxical fi nd-
ing that BITs do not increase FDI to low- and middle-income countries 
(which I assume are also less likely to be able to send other costly signals 
of the quality of their investment climate).20
Independent Central Banks
Independent central banks combined with transparent political institu-
tions have spread relatively widely throughout the world and are gen-
erally interpreted as a method by which governments can commit to a 
low- infl ationary monetary policy.21 Kathleen McNamara has argued that 
19. Rose-Ackerman and Tobin, “Foreign Direct Investment and the Business Environ-
ment.”
20. Ibid.
21. Bernhard, Broz, and Clark, “The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions”; Fran-
zese, “Partially Independent Central Banks”; Keefer and Stasavage, “Checks and Balances”; 
Broz, “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Regimes”; Bernhard and 
Leblang, “Political Parties and Monetary Commitments.”
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adopting “central bank independence is one way of signalling to investors a 
government is truly ‘modern’, ready to carry out extensive reforms to pro-
vide a setting conducive to business.”22 Sylvia Maxfi eld has made a similar 
argument.23 McNamara criticizes literature that explains the diffusion of 
independent central banks as a credible commitment device by highlight-
ing that governments sometimes adopt central banks when they do not 
necessarily need the policy credibility. She also demonstrates that central 
banks have not necessarily been successful—as the most extreme func-
tionalist argument of central bank independence (CBI) would predict—at 
ameliorating infl ation or improving economic conditions in countries that 
adopt them. Alternatively, McNamara argues that central banks and other 
organizational structures “diffused across borders through the perceptions 
and actions of people seeking to replicate others’ success and legitimise 
their own efforts at reform by borrowing rules from other settings, even if 
these rules are materially inappropriate to their local needs.”24 Her argu-
ment implies that the adoption of central banks could have diffused for 
reasons similar to my explanation for the diffusion of election monitoring. 
Like the spread of election monitoring to pseudo-democratic regimes, 
and like the diffusion of BITs, central bank independence is associated 
with lower infl ation in only a subset of cases.25
Applying my theory of norm development to the diffusion of CBI 
would suggest that one potential reason why CBI does not always have its 
intended effect of reducing infl ation is in part because some governments 
adopted the policy of independent central banks in order to appear like 
other states that adopted business-friendly neoliberal economic reforms. 
These governments may try to infl uence the decisions of the central bank 
for political gain or appoint central bankers who will not necessarily main-
tain a low-infl ation policy.
Other state behaviors have become signals of neoliberal economic poli-
cies, and my argument would suggest that if an important audience (in this 
case, either domestic constituents or international investors) develops the 
belief that all good types of neoliberal democratic states adopt indepen-
dent central banks, fi xed exchange rates, capital account liberalization or 
other such policies, and these policies are rewarded by international actors, 
failing to adopt these policies begins to signal that a given government is 
22. McNamara, “Rational Fictions,” 60.
23. Maxfi eld, Gatekeepers of Growth.
24. McNamara, “Rational Fictions,” 48.
25. Jácome and Vázquez, “Is There Any Link Between Legal Central Bank Independence 
and Infl ation?”; McNamara, “Rational Fictions.”
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not committed to neoliberal or proinvestment policies. If international 
actors believe that all states that have good investment climates send such 
signals, the behaviors can be understood as international norms.
International Weapons Inspectors
Former Iraqi President Saddam Hussein’s interactions with interna-
tional weapons inspectors illustrate the strength of connections between 
signals, norms, and internationally held beliefs about whether a state pos-
sesses desirable or undesirable characteristics. In this case, an interna-
tional norm surrounding the possession of biological and nuclear weapons 
is that states that are not carrying out covert weapons programs will allow 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) free access to inspect 
their country, a norm that could also be explained by the signaling theory 
outlined in this book.
Like the norm of election monitoring, the corollary to the norm of 
weapons inspection is that any government that refuses or resists IAEA 
inspectors must possess weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), as was 
famously illustrated by the U.S. government’s belief under the Clinton 
and Bush administrations that Iraq possessed them. As George W. Bush 
argued to Congress in the 2002 State of the Union Address, “The Iraqi 
regime has plotted to develop anthrax and nerve gas and nuclear weapons 
for over a decade. . . . This is a regime that agreed to international inspec-
tions then kicked out the inspectors. This is a regime that has something to 
hide from the civilized world.”26 As has now been documented,  although 
Hussein refused IAEA inspectors, it was not because he actually possessed 
WMDs. Rather, he wanted to maintain the illusion that he did in order to 
appear more threatening and powerful to domestic audiences and regional 
rivals.27
As recent scholarship recognizes, a number of political, economic, 
and military behaviors have diffused throughout the international sys-
tem. I have briefl y outlined how my argument can be applied to weapons 
inspection, the diffusion of bilateral investment treaties, the spread of 
neoliberal economic institutions, and how it can explain some paradoxi-
cal fi ndings in these literatures. This argument could also help explain 
the widespread reliance on sovereign credit-rating agencies; the spread 
of mechanized armies to nearly all countries in the world, despite their 
26. George W. Bush, “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002.
27. Glenn Kessler, “Hussein Pointed to Iranian Threat: Specter of Arms Allowed Him to 
Appear Strong, He Told U.S.,” Washington Post, July 2, 2009.
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disadvantages in fi ghting insurgents; and the signing of various inter-
national treaties and agreements, even by states that continue to violate 
the provisions of the treaties.28 Understanding and explaining these phe-
nomena as global signaling-based norms illustrates why states adopt new 
behaviors when they are costly, even when there is not coercive or moral 
pressure to do so. My theory also explains how such international actors 
can simultaneously serve as effective and credible signals for a subset of 
governments and be associated with empirical fi ndings that are puzzling 
to scholars looking at only whether costly signals have their intended 
effects. My theory generates dynamic over-time predictions across issue 
areas: Signaling norms should be initiated by desirable types. If benefi t-
giving actors believe that all good types send the signal, marginal types 
will also have the incentive to send the signal, and over time, nonsignaling 
types will be perceived as nonvaluable types. When less desirable types 
mimic the signal, benefi t-giving actors and valued regime types should 
work to increase the cost of the signal by making the required signal 
more costly for them to imitate. Although the signal may have initially 
allowed audiences to separate good regimes from bad, the norm—or the 
belief that all good regime types send the signal—should lead to diffusion 
of the signal among both types of governments, diluting the information 
provided by the original signal and generating demand for more costly 
(more informative) signals.
Implications and Future Research
I now turn to a discussion of the implications of this book for future 
research on international norm development, democratization, interna-
tional diffusion of costly behaviors, democracy promotion policy, election 
monitoring, and other international efforts to motivate change in state 
behavior.
Pathways to International Norms
The central contribution of this book to the international relations lit-
erature is an alternative theory of norm development. My theory does 
28. For descriptions of the empirical puzzles in these issue areas, see Hathaway, “Do 
Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?”; Lyall and Wilson, “Rage Against the Ma-
chines”; Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation; Vreeland, “Political Institutions and 
Human Rights.”
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not subsume or contradict existing theories of norm formation. Rather, I 
have argued that some types of norms, specifi cally those that grow out of 
signaling dynamics, are relatively neglected in the international relations 
literature. This focus on the existing theories raises questions about when 
the alternative logics of international norm formation are most likely to 
operate. In addition to the theory presented in this book, there are at least 
two other paths to the creation of new international norms now identifi ed 
in the existing literature. In the fi rst theory, norms are generated because 
they encourage or reinforce mutually benefi cial international cooperation. 
Individual states serve both as norm compliers and norm enforcers, and 
these cooperative norms tend to exist within broader sets of international 
institutions.
The second existing theory centers on norms initiated and spread by 
the work of norm entrepreneurs. These activist-centered norms are often 
intended to modify or prevent existing behaviors, such as the use of land 
mines, torture, child slavery, or nuclear weapons. How are these theories 
related to my argument? If they do not directly contradict each other, and 
instead explain norm formation under varying conditions, when is each 
theory most likely to apply? I offer a preliminary answer to these questions 
in part by making the simplifying assumption that states or governments 
are motivated to comply with new behaviors (potential norms) because 
they think it is in their interest to do so. This is a conservative rationalist 
assumption, indicating only that governments do not knowingly adopt 
a new behavior if they believe that doing so will make them worse off. 
The assumption says nothing about the composition of potential benefi ts, 
which may include material gains, such as foreign aid and international 
investment, or nonmaterial gains, such as legitimacy or prestige.
The interesting question, in my view, is not whether adopting a new 
behavior is in a state’s interest but rather which factors within the environ-
ment changed such that modifying existing behavior is perceived to be a 
better option than the status quo. The three (simplifi ed) theories of norm 
formation differ most clearly on why states are motivated to change their 
behavior. For cooperative norms, opportunities to institutionalize mutu-
ally benefi cial cooperation are in a state’s best interest because they directly 
benefi t the norm-complying government through gains from cooperation 
or they help institutionalize such gains from cooperation. For advocacy-
based norms, the desired change in behavior is typically not in the state’s 
interest without pressure from norm entrepreneurs. Norm entrepreneurs 
work to make compliance with the new behavior more benefi cial to tar-
get states or to increase the costs for noncompliers. Thus, activists cause 
changes in the international environment and pressure states to adopt the 
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new norm, changing their decision calculus in a manner that is distinct 
from the reason why states begin complying with cooperative norms.29
For signaling-based norms, as I argue in this book, changes in prefer-
ences among benefi t-giving actors provide diffuse incentives for individual 
states to signal their type in order to increase their share of international 
benefi ts, triggering a dynamic process that ultimately leads to interna-
tional norm formation. In comparing the reasons that states begin to 
change their behavior and comply with a potential norm, I fi nd that sin-
gling norms fall between cooperative and advocacy norms. For signaling 
norms, the driving force for states to change their behavior is a change 
in the preferences of benefi t-giving actors, although the change is not 
imposed or coerced. The broader changes in preferences among inter-
national actors can be caused by norm advocacy, although my theory is 
noncommittal on this point. Changes in preferences among international 
actors occur for a number of reasons and are treated in my argument as 
exogenous. In contrast to advocacy norms in which the behavioral change 
is caused by pressure from activists or cooperative norms in which the 
behavioral change is caused by the belief that there are mutually benefi cial 
gains from such a change, my argument is defi ned by states changing their 
behavior because it signals something to international actors about their 
own characteristics. The signal itself does not necessarily have advocates 
(although this is a point at which the two theories can converge) nor does 
it necessarily cause or enforce mutually benefi cial cooperation. Complying 
states perceive the behavior to be in their interest because it is informa-
tive to international or domestic audiences or because international actors 
have developed the belief that all good regime types send the signal.
This distinction suggests a possible pattern in the conditions under 
which each theory is most likely to apply. When the formation of a new 
norm would facilitate or enforce mutually benefi cial cooperation, inter-
national benefi ts are reciprocal and cooperative norms are most likely. In 
contrast, if complying with a new standard of behavior is not perceived 
to be in a state’s interest, but other actors wish to bring about a specifi c 
change in the behavior of states, new international norms are most likely 
the work of norm entrepreneurs. Situated between these two causal paths 
to international norms are signaling norms, which are likely when there 
are (new) potential gains for actors possessing certain characteristics but 
when it is diffi cult to judge which actors possess those characteristics.
29. Note that norm entrepreneurs can also motivate change in behavior by reframing an 
issue rather than by changing preferences over strategies, as argued in Payne, “Persuasion, 
Frames and Norm Construction.”
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Note that the suggested relationship between existing theories does 
not imply that norm formation is automatic under any conditions. In 
the best of circumstances, the formation of new international norms re-
mains unlikely. However, defi ning the varying logics by which new and 
consequential international norms are generated is a valuable theoretical 
contribution.
Constraining Election Manipulation and Pseudo-Democrats
International election monitoring attracts a variety of criticism, much of 
it warranted. This book has presented evidence suggesting that despite its 
faults—and in some cases because of them—international election moni-
toring can improve the quality of elections and constrain the behavior of 
pseudo-democrats by decreasing their scope for manipulation.
Criticisms of election monitoring are widespread. Some scholars argue 
that international election monitors fail in their objectives when they ob-
serve election fraud because they have not eliminated it entirely,30 have 
been critical of election monitoring because observer organizations have 
not condemned clearly problematic elections,31 and criticize the lack of 
consistent and universal standards for democratic elections.32 The fi ndings 
in this book suggest a more nuanced view of election monitoring in which 
both its strengths and its shortcomings are reasons why it has become a 
widespread practice and an internationally held and enforced norm.
Manipulating elections and receiving a positive report remain the cen-
tral aims of pseudo-democrats. In the early stages of election monitor-
ing, perfect detection of election manipulation by observers would have 
eliminated this strategy, and according to my theory, election monitors 
never would have been invited to low-quality elections. Thus, one of the 
central criticisms of observers—that they sometimes legitimize fraudulent 
elections—is also a reason why election monitoring spread to countries 
for which their reports now matter and in which they can deter fraud and 
improve the quality of elections.
I also explored why leaders invite observers, cheat in front of them, 
and get caught. This is not a preferred strategy for any type of leader. 
However, the fact that leaders are now regularly caught and criticized 
30. Pastor, “Mediating Elections.”
31. Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation and Democratization in Africa; Geisler, 
“Fair?”
32. Elklit and Reynolds, “A Framework for the Systematic Study of Election Quality”; 
Elklit and Svensson, “What Makes Elections Free and Fair”; Davis-Roberts and Carroll, 
“Using International Law to Assess Elections”; Goodwin-Gill, Free and Fair Elections.
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by international observers—and face a loss of international benefi ts as a 
result—is a direct consequence of the fact that election monitoring has 
become an international norm. The most direct and obvious forms of 
stealing elections are less likely because of the spread of election monitor-
ing. Although it is possible that some forms of strategic manipulation may 
be even more pernicious, some forms of strategic manipulation can exist 
in stable and functioning democracies, such as gerrymandering or less-
than factual campaign advertisements.33 The fact that pseudo-democrats 
work to conceal election manipulation and international observers work 
to detect and criticize it means that observers have expanded the scope 
of their observation over time, have improved their methods, and have 
become somewhat more willing to criticize elections even when the elec-
tion manipulation is not blatant. Thus, the methods available to pseudo-
democrats to invite observers, steal the election, and not get caught are 
constrained by improvements in election monitoring.
Taken together, international pressure for democracy and the norm of 
international election monitoring make it substantially more diffi cult for 
leaders to steal elections. Election monitoring constrains pseudo-democrats 
by limiting the tools that they can use to bias elections in their favor with-
out getting caught. The types of election manipulation that are less likely to 
be caught and criticized tend to be less direct and less certain forms of elec-
tion manipulation. Direct election fraud, as shown in chapter 4, is  reduced 
by the presence of international observers. International pressure for de-
mocracy raises the stakes for election-holding leaders by making it more 
diffi cult for pseudo-democrats to avoid criticism by international observers 
and simultaneously more costly for them to receive a negative report.
Implications for Election Observation
For reputable organizations engaging in election monitoring, this book 
presents some good news. Even short-term international monitors can 
have a direct deterrent effect on election day fraud simply by visiting poll-
ing stations on that day. This fi nding suggests that when blatant election 
day fraud is suspected, maximizing the number of short-term election ob-
servers could be a wise investment. It also implies the possibility that those 
engaging in election manipulation are sensitive to being watched, and 
targeted observation—potentially including long-term observation and 
33. For the argument that election observation has pernicious effects, see Simpser and 
Donno, “Can International Election Monitoring Harm Governance?”; Simpser, “Unin-
tended Consequences of Election Monitoring.”
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media monitoring—could successfully reduce manipulation in other ele-
ments of the electoral process, including voter registration, campaigning, 
or preparation of electoral materials. These untested propositions could 
be evaluated using similar fi eld-experimental methods.
Observer organizations, if they are so inclined, could learn a great deal 
about the conditions under which their work is effective by randomly assign-
ing international observers or other related elements of election monitoring 
when it is possible. There are still a number of questions about the effec-
tiveness of election observation that could be answered with further use of 
fi eld experimental methods and the randomization of various components 
of election observation: Are domestic and international observers substi-
tutes or compliments? Does the length of time observers spend in a polling 
station matter? What is the most effective combination of long- and short-
term observers? Do observers displace election day fraud? Is widespread 
publicity that observers will be monitoring a region more or less effective 
than actually deploying high-quality long- and short-term observers?
My argument also suggests that it is important for observers to continue 
to innovate their technologies and to avoid setting out rigid universal stan-
dards for democratic elections. Although some organizations and schol-
ars are working toward universally applied standards, the evidence in this 
book highlights some challenges inherent in this objective. Because of the 
extensive menu of manipulation provided to pseudo-democrats and their 
incentives to engage in strategic manipulation, predictable observer meth-
odology and universal standards for democratic elections would make it 
easier for pseudo-democrats to comply with the letter of these standards 
while violating their spirit and continuing to covertly manipulate elections 
in their favor. By retaining some agency in the application of methods and 
interpretation of standards, observers are able to tailor their judgments to 
the context of each country and therefore require pseudo-democrats to 
continue innovating and to employ an increasingly constrained set of tools 
to manipulate elections in their favor. This may leave them more exposed 
to charges of being unfair but may allow them further leeway to criticize 
pseudo-democrats who engage in more creative but no less effective forms 
of election manipulation.
Implications for Democracy Promotion 
and International Pressure
The history of international election monitoring also suggests several 
implications for democracy promotion and international pressure more 
generally. First, democracy promotion need not be overt in order to be 
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effective. Much of the literature on democracy promotion focuses on di-
rect democracy assistance within other countries or democracy promotion 
via military invasion or coercive tactics. This book focuses instead on how 
changes in the broader international environment can indirectly motivate 
states to change their behavior. Even in the absence of direct intervention, 
when powerful states make their preferences on an issue known, other 
states react, particularly those states working to maximize their share of 
international benefi ts. Powerful states may or may not anticipate this reac-
tion, but efforts to gain increased foreign support will continue to provoke 
behavioral changes and can eventually produce new, international norms 
regarding the appropriate behavior of governments.
In addition to exploring the consequences of international support for 
democracy, my theory also supports existing methods of democracy pro-
motion and efforts to change the policies or behaviors of other regimes. 
Governments and organizations wishing to promote democracy in other 
states should make their preferences known, support governments that 
appear to be successfully democratizing, and advertise their support of 
countries that successfully changed their policies or behavior. In some 
sense, this has already been demonstrated by studies of EU membership 
conditionality and programs such as the Millennium Challenge Corpo-
ration, which sets explicit requirements with which states must comply 
in order to receive foreign aid. Similar methods could be used outside 
of foreign aid and EU membership in order to infl uence states without 
intervening directly.
The Pseudo-Democrat’s Dilemma Explained
This book was motivated by the empirical puzzle of why incumbent 
leaders invite international election observers and cheat in front of them. 
During the period of research for this study, election observation con-
tinued to spread to elections in even more countries, including some de-
veloped democracies, and the reports of observers garnered increasing 
international attention. One of the contributions of this book is simply 
to document the global trend of election observation since its inception 
in sovereign states. It is perhaps always something of a risk to study a new 
and rapidly changing phenomenon. International election observation 
in sovereign states grew from an unheard of activity fi fty years ago to a 
nearly universal practice, and it could just as easily disappear. For the time 
being, however, international observers continue to play an integral role 
in many elections throughout the world and will likely to do so as long as 
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democracy-contingent benefi ts exist and as long as democracy promoters 
gain valuable information from observer reports.
The reasons why international observers are invited have changed over 
time, and the decision by an incumbent government to invite observers 
is closely tied to the availability of international benefi ts for countries 
perceived as democracies. Election observation began in countries with 
relatively clean elections. Today, a positive judgment from reputable in-
ternational observers confers legitimacy to the elected leaders and to the 
country. Especially for those countries with previously poor reputations, 
an internationally endorsed election brings increases in internationally al-
located benefi ts. A negative report can lead to suspension from interna-
tional organizations, reduction in foreign aid, and in extreme cases, it can 
be used to legitimize or support postelection electoral revolutions.
I have also shown that international observers can, but do not always, 
reduce election day fraud and that they have a variety of effects on forms 
of election manipulation. Taken as a whole, this study has offered a theory 
of why international observers are invited and, in this context, provided 
empirical tests of the argument and of the domestic consequences it im-
plies. In conclusion, one might ask whether election observation is good 
for democracy. In the past twenty years, international observers have been 
involved in a variety of historically important elections, and by most ac-
counts, they have had both positive and negative effects. This book con-
tributes to the debate by providing a clearer picture of the mechanisms of 
international involvement in democratization. International observers are 
consequential players in the fi eld of elections, not only because of their 
reports on election quality but also because they represent a broader trend 
among the election-holding states that are attempting to gain interna-
tional support for their domestic political institutions.

The theory presented in chapter 1 is based on a signaling game, which 
is outlined briefl y in this appendix. The game models the decision by 
incumbent governments to invite international observers. It is a fi nite 
game of imperfect information, in which incumbent governments can 
signal their commitment to democratic elections by inviting observers 
and receiving their endorsement. Because it is not modeled as a dynamic 
game, it does not formalize the over-time changes in the norm of election 
observation. However, equilibria from the game can be used to approxi-
mate different periods of the election-monitoring norm development 
and are helpful in highlighting both the conditions under which leaders 
should be expected to invite observers and how changing parameters in 
the model infl uence the decision calculus of incumbent leaders and de-
mocracy promoters.
Actors and Game Sequence
Incumbent regimes are represented by i, and can be one of two types, a 
true democrat (T ) or a pseudo-democrat (P ), i ∈ {T, P }. Democracy pro-
moters are denoted by D and are the intended recipients of signals sent by 
the incumbent. The incumbent chooses whether to invite observers and 
whether to cheat. International observers may be invited by the incum-
bent and issue reports on the quality of the election, but they are not the 
sender or the receiver of a signal.
The sequence of moves is as follows. Prior to the start of the game, 
democracy promoters set the level of the democracy premium, or the con-
tingent benefi ts, available to a government recognized as democratizing. 
In the fi rst stage, the type of the incumbent is determined by chance. 
Appendixes
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The probability that the incumbent is of type T is represented by γ, 
where 0 ≤ γ ≤1 and the corresponding probability of P is 1γ.
In order to focus on the decision to invite observers, I limit the model 
to the simplest case in which true-democrats never cheat (M  0), and the 
pseudo-democrat always cheats (M > 0). Excluding the long-term consoli-
dated democracies, democracy promoters prior beliefs are that γ < 1/2.
The incumbent chooses whether to invite international observers (  J  1) 
or not (  J  0). All governments pay a marginal cost when inviting observ-
ers, called a sovereignty cost, denoted by Y, with Y ≥ 0. All cheating is costly, 
and cost of fraud is a function of whether observers are invited c (  J ).
After choosing whether to invite observers, the incumbent chooses the 
level of manipulation, which includes any effort required to conceal elec-
tion fraud (M > 0). Pseudo-democrats cheat at some optimal level, M *, 
and the probability of victory increases in M. All cheating is costly, and the 
level of cheating is assumed to be directly proportional to its cost.
Nature moves, and the incumbent can win or lose the election, or 
e ∈ {L,W }. The base probability that an incumbent wins the election is 
denoted by p. For simplicity, I assume that the probability of victory is 
the same for both types, absent fraud. The probability of victory with 
fraud is denoted as q. Fraud increases the probability of victory, so q is 
always greater than p. Observers can infl uence the probability of victory 
indirectly by deterring fraud or making it more expensive to commit the 
equivalent level of fraud. If the incumbent loses the election, the pay-
off is zero, even if observers are invited.1 I assume that when observers 
are invited (  J = 1), the costs of fraud, or c (1) is greater. When observers 
are present, they are assumed to make election fraud more diffi cult or 
more costly, thereby requiring more fraud in order to generate the same 
probability of victory, as illustrated in fi gure 1.1 (chapter 1).
Following the election, democracy promoters update their beliefs about 
the government’s type based on whether the incumbent government won 
or lost, whether observers were invited, and whether observers criticized 
the election or not. The report of observers is denoted by R. If cheating is 
detected, observers issue a negative report, R  1, and if cheating is not 
detected, observers issue a positive report, R  1. If observers are not invited, 
R is denoted as 0. The probability that observers fi nd evidence of cheating 
is r. If there is no fraud, no evidence of cheating is produced. The reports 
issued by observers inform the updated beliefs of  democracy-promoters 
1. Note that the decision to hold elections is not included in the model. This assumption 
could be relaxed in future iterations.
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about a government’s commitment to democracy. The international 
community reverts back to its prior beliefs about the incumbent’s type 
(γ < 1/2) when beliefs are not pinned down by Bayes’ rule off the equilib-
rium path. Given the observed behavior of the incumbent, the outcome 
of the election, and the reports of observers, if any, democracy promoters 
accept the results of the election (X  1), or reject them (X  0). If the 
incumbent does not win, observers always accept the result of the election 
as a sign that the country is democratizing, but the incumbent is no longer 
in offi ce to receive benefi ts.
Summary of Timeline
Stage 1: The incumbent, i, determines whether to invite J.
Stage 2: The election outcome is realized.
Stage 3:  If i wins, observers issue a report on the election, R based on 
whether fraud was uncovered.
Stage 4: D accepts or rejects the results of the election.
Stage 5: Payoffs are accrued.
Payoffs
International benefi ts are allocated to the incumbent regime after they 
have chosen whether to invite observers, they have won or lost, and after 
democracy promoters have accepted or rejected the results of the election. 
The size of international benefi ts tied to democracy are exogenous, set 
before elections take place, and are denoted by A ≥ 0. They are based on 
the relative value of a country’s characteristics to international actors and 
whether democracy promoters’ accept or reject the results of the election, 
which is informed by the observer report R. B denotes the benefi ts of win-
ning offi ce such as salary and domestic prestige that are not dependent on 
the government’s type. Let B denote the benefi ts of winning offi ce such as 
salary and domestic prestige that are not dependent on the government’s 
type. The payoff to an incumbent is:
B  AY if W  1, J  1 & X  1;
BY if W  1, J  1 & X  0;
B if W  1 and J  0;
0 if election is lost.
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Democracy promoters are better off when they accurately support de-
mocratizing states. They gain V when they accurately reward democratic 
governments and avoid rewarding pseudo-democratic governments. I as-
sume that V > 0 when any democracy premium exists. Thus, the payoff to 
democracy promoters is:
V  if  X  1 and i  T;
V  if  X  0 and i  P;
0 otherwise.
Proposition 1: There is a unique equilibrium to this game, depending on 
the value of the democracy premium (A ) and the sovereignty costs of in-
viting observers (Y ):
If A  0, then neither T nor P invites. D rejects the results of the 
election.
If 
(Y + c (1) −c (0))
q (1− r)
 > A > Yp  , then T invites and P does not. D accepts the 
results of the election if and only if the incumbent invites observers 
and no fraud is detected.
If A > 
(Y + c (1) −c (0))
q (1− r)
 >  Yp   , then T and P invite observers. D accepts the 
results of the election if and only if the incumbent invites observers 
and no fraud is detected.
PROOF: The incumbent invites when the expected utility of inviting 
observers is greater than the utility of not inviting observers, or EUi (1, R) > 
EUi (0,0).
For T, if no democracy premium exists, or A  0, then EUT (1,1)  
pBY and EUT (0,0)  pB. By assumption, Y > 0, so EUT (1,1)  
EUT (0,0). If the democracy premium is suffi ciently greater than the 
sovereignty cost, T invites. Recall that T never cheats. Thus, T invites 
when A > Yp . In the simplifi ed case in which T is certain of victory, T 
invites when A > Y.
For P, if A  0, EUP (0,0)  qB  c ( 0 ), and EUP (1, R)  qB  c ( 1 )  Y. 
By assumption, c (1) > c (0) and Y > 0. Thus, EUP (1, M1 )  EUP ( 0, 
M0 ), because qB  c (M1)Y  qB  c( M0 ). Even if T invites, and A > 
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Y
p , P does not invite when the additional cost of cheating in front of 
observers is too high. Even in the most likely case in which P is cer-
tain of victory (q  1) and certain that no fraud will be discovered by 
observers (r  0), P does not invite so long as c ( 1 )c ( 0 )  Y > A. P 
invites if and only if the democracy premium, A, is suffi ciently large 
to outweigh the sovereignty costs and the additional cost of cheating 
in front of observers.
D accepts the results of the election if and only if J  1 and R  1. 
If J  1, D rejects the results of the election, as μ (T|1,1)  0. If 
R  0, and the incumbent wins the election, D’s post-election belief 
about the incumbent’s type is μ( T|0,0 )  γ. By assumption, γ  1/2. 
Therefore, D rejects the results of the election when observers are 
not invited.
Data used in the cross-national empirical analysis come from both origi-
nal data collection efforts and pre-existing sources. All sources are cited, 
summarized, and referenced in relation to individual variable defi nitions, 
which are also provided below.
Sources
Elections and Election Observation Data
Original data collection efforts took place in two stages. First, it was 
necessary to collect data on national level election events from 1960 to 
2006. Second, I coded whether an election was internationally observed or 
not. When possible, data also indicate which organizations observed the 
election and the content of their summary judgment about the quality of 
the election process.
In evaluating whether the government of a country invited interna-
tional observers, it is necessary to distinguish between fi rst and multi -
round elections. Because the invitation to observers in the fi nal round of 
an election is nearly perfectly determined by whether the election was 
observed in the fi rst round, data were collected on multiple rounds, with 
emphasis on fi rst-round elections. Data on election events were coded 
from a variety of sources, beginning with Tatu Vanhannen’s Polyarchy 
manuscript.2 The Oxford University Press data handbooks on elections, 
edited by Dieter Nohlen and a series of coauthors, were principal sources 




of information on multiple rounds and precise election dates.3 The IFES 
election guide was the primary source for election dates in the post-1998 
period.4 For this book, the original data collection on national election 
events used in Hyde (2006) was updated based on the NELDA dataset, 
described below, and fully reconciled. International system membership 
data are from Gleditsch and Ward (1999).
The original data collection excluded the developed democracies, 
which have been added based primarily on Matt Golder’s dataset on elec-
tions and electoral systems.5 Dates of these elections were then updated, 
cleaned, and converted into the format used in the NELDA dataset.
Observed elections were coded in the following manner. First, observer 
organizations’ offi cial reports were sought as primary sources. Except in 
rare cases, if an observer organization reported that they observed an elec-
tion, it was coded as observed. However, a number of observer organiza-
tions have lost records of some observed elections or make only a subset 
of their reports public. For every election held between 1962 and 2006, 
newswire reports and other news sources were searched for mention of 
the election and the words international, foreign, observer, and monitor. The 
secondary literature on election observation was searched extensively for 
comparison,6 with articles such as Amanda Sives’s analysis of election ob-
servation by the Commonwealth Secretariat serving as the principle re-
cord of early election observation by that organization.7 For elections in 
which it was still diffi cult to determine whether observers were present, 
academic writing on elections and personal accounts written by individual 
observers were searched for references to elections.
If it was clear from news reports that international election observers 
were invited and actually monitored a given election, it was recorded as 
observed even if it was never made clear which organization monitored 
the election. Out of the 522 observed fi rst-round national elections 
3. Nohlen, Elections in the Americas; Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut, Elections in Africa; 
Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann, Elections in Asia and the Pacifi c.
4. See http://www.electionguide.org/.
5. Golder, “Democratic Electoral Systems Around the World, 1946−2000.”
6. Beigbeder, International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections; Bjorn-
lund, Beyond Free and Fair; Lean, “External Validation and Democratic Accountability”; 
Legler, Lean, and Boniface, Promoting Democracy in the Americas; Pastor, “Mediating Elec-
tions”; Carothers, “The Observers Observed”; Abbink and Hesseling, Election Observation 
and Democratization in Africa; McCoy, “Monitoring and Mediating Elections during Latin 
American Democratization”; Middlebrook, Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions 
in Latin America; Santa-Cruz, “Monitoring Elections, Redefi ning Sovereignty”; Santa-Cruz, 
“Constitutional Structures, Sovereignty, and the Emergence of Norms.”
7. Amanda Sives, “A Review of Commonwealth Election Observation.”
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recorded in the dataset, I was unable to identify the observer organization 
for 33 elections, or 6.3% of observed elections.
Embassy delegations and delegations sent from individual countries 
were not considered offi cial observers unless they joined a multinational 
delegation, a delegation sponsored by an intergovernmental organiza-
tion, an international nongovernmental organization, or participated in 
“coordination and support” under the umbrella of the United Nations. 
Similarly, journalists, individual academics, and nonpartisan domestic ob-
servers are not considered international observers.
The National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy 
(NELDA) Dataset
In cooperation with Nikolay Marinov, data were collected on 58 vari-
ables and attributes for each election event occurring in the developing 
world between 1960 and 2006. The dataset, variables, sources, and in-
tercoder reliability tests are described in detail on the project’s website, 
http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda. The NELDA data were used to up-
date and reconcile the list of election dates originally collected for this 
project. In addition, six of the variables used in chapter 2 originated in the 
NELDA data, as cited below.
POLITY and Regime Type Data
Data on regime types come from several sources. Data on long-term 
developed democracies were compiled from Arend Lijphart’s book and 
from OECD membership data.8 As an alternative measure of regime type 
and level of democratization, the POLITY dataset was used.9
The Democracy Assistance Project
Sector-specifi c data on foreign aid are from the Democracy Assistance 
Project, a USAID-funded investigation of the effectiveness of democracy 
assistance. The data and codebook for this project are available on the proj-
ect’s website, http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html.
Data were downloaded from Phase II of the project, and they include 
two-year averages of the total amount of aid devoted to democracy and 
governance and nondemocracy and governance for 1990−2005 and for 
U.S. and non-U.S. bilateral foreign aid donors.10
 8. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy; OECD, “Ratifi cation of the Convention on the OECD.”
 9. Marshall and Jaggers, “Polity IV Project.”
10. Finkel et al., “Effects of US Foreign Assistance on Democracy Building.”
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The Democracy Assistance Project was also used as the source for data 
on the U.S. policy priority for each aid-receiving country in terms of mili-
tary assistance, as described below.
Variables
Observed
Coded by the author, this variable is equal to one if the election was ob-
served by an offi cial delegation of foreigners invited to observe and report 
on the electoral process.
Pre-election Concerns about Election Fraud
Coded from NELDA11, the variable is equal to one if the answer to 
the following question was yes, and zero otherwise: “Before elections, are 
there signifi cant concerns that the election would not be free and fair?” 
If the variable was coded as “no,” “unclear,” or “unknown,” it was zero.
Opposition Competition
This variable measures whether opposition parties were allowed to com-
pete, and was coded from three variables in the NELDA data, NELDA 3−5. 
If all three variables were coded as “yes,” Opposition Competition was equal to 
one, and zero otherwise. The three variables answer the following questions:
NELDA3: “Was opposition allowed?”
NELDA4: “Was more than one party legal?”
NELDA5: “Was there a choice of candidates on the ballot?”
Previous Elections Suspended
This variable measures whether elections had previously been sus-
pended in the country and was coded from NELDA1: “Were regular elec-
tions suspended before this election?” It is equal to one if NELDA1 is yes, 
and zero otherwise.
First Multiparty
This variable measures whether the elections were the fi rst multiparty 
elections held in a country and was coded from NELDA2: “Were these 
the fi rst multiparty elections?” It is equal to one if NELDA2 is yes, and 
zero otherwise.
Transitional Government
This variable measures whether the elections were organized by transi-
tional leadership and was coded from NELDA10: “Was the country run 
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by ‘transitional leadership’ tasked with ‘holding elections’?” It is equal to 
one if NELDA10 is yes, and zero otherwise.
Uncertain Type
This variable is a composite of Previous Elections Suspended, First Multi-
party, and, Transitional Government. If any one of these variables is coded 
as “yes,” Uncertain Type is coded as one, and is zero otherwise.
Consolidated Democracy
This is a dummy variable that indicates governments widely considered 
to be long-term consolidated democracies. This group of countries includes 
the long-term developed democracies, which are defi ned as countries that 
have been continuously democratic for forty years or more, as coded by 
Arend Lijphart,11 and that were also OECD members before 1975. These 
23 countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, United Kingdom, and United States. Consolidated Democracy also in-
cludes countries after they have joined the European Union or countries 
after they were offi cially informed by a respected international election ob-
server organization that they no longer need to invite international observ-
ers because they were widely considered consolidated democracies. I also 
consider Israel and India to be long-term consolidated democracies.
Democracy and Governance/ODA
This variable was constructed from data provided by the Democracy 
Assistance Project and collected from USAID. For each aid recipient, it 
measures the percentage of aid devoted to democracy and governance as a 
percentage of total development assistance in the previous year. The four 
variables used from the Democracy Assistance Project dataset are aid100 
(total Democracy & Governance aid from the United States, or D & G 
aid), aid000 (total non-D & G aid from the United States), oda100 (total 
non-U.S. D & G aid), and oda000 (total non-U.S. non-D & G aid). All 
four variables are two-year averages of aid in year t and year t1 and were 
reported in millions of 2000 U.S. constant dollars.12 Thus, for each elec-
tion holding country,
Democracy and Governance/ODA  (aid100  oda100) / 
(aid100  oda100  aid000  oda000)
11. Lijphart, Patterns of Democracy.
12. Finkel et al., Cross-National Research on USAID’s Democracy and Governance Programs—
Codebook (Phase II).
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U.S. Military Assistance Priority
This variable was constructed by Finkel et al. and represents the per-
centage of global U.S. military assistance (including counternarcotics) de-
voted to a given country in the previous year.13
GDP ( logged ) and GDP per capita ( logged )
Both GDP variables are from the World Development Indicators, as 
published by the World Bank.14
POLITY and POLITY Squared
The POLITY2 variable from the Polity IV dataset was used as a measure 
of regime type. Because the POLITY variables lag by one year, for newly 
independent states I assume that that the POLITY2 score for the current 
year (year of independence) can be substituted for the previous year.
Regional Percentage Observed
This variable was computed from the original data on observed elec-
tions and represents the total percentage of elections observed in a coun-
try’s region in the previous year, excluding the country’s own elections, 
if any.
13. Ibid.
14. World Bank, World Development Indicators.




Observed 727 .567 .496 0 1
Previously Observed 727 .495 .500 0 1
Opposition Competition 727 .915 .279 0 1
Consolidated Democracy 727 .184 .388 0 1
Previous Elections Suspended 727 .124 .330 0 1
First Multiparty 727 .0867 .282 0 1
Transitional Government 727 .0825 .275 0 1
Uncertain Type 727 .190 .392 0 1
Democracy and Governance/
ODAt-1 
727 .0865 .118 0 1
U.S. Military Assistance
(Current USD) t-1
727 .755 4.55 0 48.67
GDP ( logged ) 714 23.7 2.17 18.84 30.09
GDP per capita ( logged ) 710 7.54 1.57 4.62 11.09
Year 727 1998 4.27 1991 2005
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Table B.2. Countries included in analysis
Afghanistan Djibouti Laos Republic of Vietnam 
Albania Dominican Republic Latvia Romania 
Algeria East Timor Lebanon Russia 
Angola Ecuador Lesotho Rwanda 
Argentina Egypt Liberia Senegal 
Armenia El Salvador Libya Serbia (Yugoslavia)
Australia Equatorial Guinea Lithuania Sierra Leone 
Austria Estonia Macedonia 
(FYROM)
Singapore 
Azerbaijan Ethiopia Madagascar Slovakia 
Bahrain Fiji Malawi Slovenia 
Bangladesh Finland Malaysia Somalia 
Belarus France Mali South Africa 
Belgium Gabon Mauritania Spain 
Benin Gambia Mauritius Sri Lanka 
Bolivia Georgia Mexico Sudan 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
German Dem. Rep. Moldova Swaziland 
Botswana Ghana Mongolia Sweden 
Brazil Greece Morocco Switzerland 
Bulgaria Guatemala Mozambique Syria 
Burkina Faso Guinea Myanmar (Burma) Taiwan 
Burundi Guinea-Bissau Namibia Tajikistan 
Cambodia Guyana Nepal Tanzania 
Cameroon Haiti Netherlands Thailand 
Canada Honduras New Zealand Togo 
Central African 
Republic 
Hungary Nicaragua Trinidad and 
Tobago 
Chad Iceland Niger Tunisia 
Chile India Nigeria Turkey 
Colombia Indonesia Norway Turkmenistan 
Comoros Iran Oman Uganda 
Congo Iraq Pakistan Ukraine 
Costa Rica Ireland Panama United Kingdom 
Côte d’Ivoire Israel Papua New 
Guinea 
United States 
Croatia Italy Paraguay Uruguay 
Cuba Jamaica People’s Republic 
of Korea
Uzbekistan 
Cyprus Japan People’s Republic 
of Yemen
Venezuela 
Czech Republic Jordan Peru Yemen 
Czechoslovakia Kazakhstan Philippines Zambia 
Democratic Re-
public of Congo





Denmark Kyrgyz Republic Republic of Korea 
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Table B.3. Excluded countries by reason for exclusion
Micro-states with population < 500,000























Saint Kitts and Nevis
Saint Lucia
San Marino
São Tomé and Principe












Note that all newspaper and news wire sources are cited in the relevant 
footnotes rather than in the bibliography.
Abbink, Jon, and Gerti Hesseling, eds. Election Observation and Democratization in Africa. 
Houndmills, England: Macmillan Press, 2000.
Abbott, Kenneth W., and Duncan Snidal. “Values and Interests: International Legaliza-
tion in the Fight against Corruption.” Journal of Legal Studies 31 (2002): 141–178.
Aguila, Juan M. del. Cuba: Dilemmas of a Revolution, 3rd edition. Boulder, CO: Westview 
Press, 1994.
Akerlof, George A. “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market 
Mechanism.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 84, no. 3 (August 1970): 488–500.
Alvarez, R. Michael, Thad E. Hall, and Susan D. Hyde, eds. Election Fraud: Detecting and 
Deterring Electoral Manipulation. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
Anglin, Douglas G. “International Election Monitoring: The African Experience.” Af-
rican Affairs 97, no. 389 (October 1998): 471–495.
Angrist, Joshua D., Guido W. Imbens, and Donald B. Rubin. “Identifi cation of Causal 
Effects Using Instrumental Variables.” Journal of the American Statistical Association 
91, no. 434 (June 1996): 444–455.
Auld, Graeme. “Assessing Certifi cation as Governance: Effects and Broader Consequences 
for Coffee.” Journal of Environment Development 19, no. 2 ( June 1, 2010): 215–241.
Axelrod, Robert. “An Evolutionary Approach to Norms.” American Political Science 
Review 80, no. 4 (1986): 1095–1111.
Ball, M. Margaret. The OAS in Transition. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1969.
Banerjee, Abhijit V. and Esther Dufl o. “The Experimental Approach to Development 
Economics.” CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP7037 (2008). Washington DC: Center 
for Economic and Policy Research.
Barnett, Michael N. Dialogues in Arab Politics: Negotiations in Regional Order. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1998.
Beaulieu, Emily. “Protesting the Contest: Election Boycotts Around the World, 1990–
2002.” PhD Dissertation, University of California–San Diego, 2006.
Beaulieu, Emily, and Susan D. Hyde. “In the Shadow of Democracy Promotion: Stra-
tegic Manipulation, International Observers, and Election Boycotts.” Comparative 
Political Studies 42, no. 3 (2009): 392–415.
SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY
226 Selected Bibliography
Beck, Nathaniel, Jonathan N. Katz, and Richard Tucker. “Taking Time Seriously: 
Time-Series-Cross-Section Analysis with a Binary Dependent Variable.” American 
Journal of Political Science 42, no. 4 (October 1998): 1260–1288.
Beigbeder, Yves. International Monitoring of Plebiscites, Referenda and National Elections: 
Self-Determination and Transition to Democracy. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff Pub-
lishers, 1994.
Bernhard, William, J. Lawrence Broz, and William Roberts Clark. “The Political 
Economy of Monetary Institutions.” International Organization 56, no. 4 (Autumn 
2002): 693–723.
Bernhard, William, and David Leblang. “Political Parties and Monetary Commit-
ments.” International Organization 56, no. 04 (2002): 803–830.
Birch, Sarah. “Electoral Systems and Electoral Misconduct.” Comparative Political Stud-
ies 40, no. 12 (December 1, 2007): 1533–1556.
Bjornlund, Eric. Beyond Free and Fair: Monitoring Elections and Building Democracy. 
Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2004.
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros. An Agenda for Democratization. New York: United Nations, 1996.
Braddock, Daniel M. “1958 Elections: Electoral Outlook Six Weeks Prior to Elections, 
136.” Dispatch From the Embassy in Cuba to the Department of State (October 3, 1957).
Bratton, Michael. “Second Elections in Africa.” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 3 (1998): 
51–66.
Brownlee, Jason. Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007.
Broz, J. Lawrence. “Political System Transparency and Monetary Commitment Re-
gimes.” International Organization 56, no. 04 (2002): 861–887.
Burnell, Peter J. “From Evaluating Democracy Assistance to Appraising Democracy 
Promotion.” Political Studies 56, no. 2 (2008): 414 – 434.
——. Democracy Assistance: International Co-Operation for Democratization. Democratiza-
tion studies. London: F. Cass, 2000.
Bush, George W. “State of the Union Address,” January 29, 2002.
——. “Remarks on the 100th Anniversary of Cuban Independence in Miami, Florida,” 
May 20, 2002.
Bush, Sarah. “International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legisla-
tures.” International Organization 65, no. 1 (2011).
Büthe, Tim, and Helen V. Milner. “The Politics of Foreign Direct Investment into 
Developing Countries: Increasing FDI through International Trade Agreements.” 
American Journal of Political Science 52 (October 2008): 741–762.
Calingaert, Daniel. “Election Rigging and How to Fight It.” Journal of Democracy 17, 
no. 3 (2006): 138–151.
Campbell, Tracy. Deliver the Vote: A History of Election Fraud, an American Political 
Tradition—1742–2004. New York: Basic Books, 2005.
Carothers, Thomas. Critical Mission: Essays on Democracy Promotion. Washington DC: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2004.
——. “The Observers Observed.” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 17–31.
Carter Center. Building Consensus on Principles for International Election Observation. At-
lanta: The Carter Center, 2006. http://www.cartercenter.org/.
——. The Carter Center 2004 Indonesia Election Report. Atlanta: The Carter Center, 2005. 
http://www.cartercenter.org/documents/2161.pdf.
Carter Center and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs. Observing 
the 1998–99 Nigeria Elections, Final Report. Atlanta: The Carter Center, 1999.
227Selected Bibliography
Cashore, Benjamin, Graeme Auld, and Deanna Newsom. Governing Through Markets: 
Forest Certifi cation and the Emergence of Non-State Authority. New Haven, CT: Yale 
University Press, 2004.
Checkel, Jeffrey T. “International Norms and Domestic Politics: Bridging the Rationalist—
Constructivist Divide.” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 4 (1997): 
473–495.
Committee on International Relations, and Committee on Foreign Relations. “Leg-
islation on Foreign Relations Through 2002.” Washington, DC: U.S. Government 
Printing Offi ce, July 2003.
Commonwealth Observer Group. The Parliamentary Elections in Zimbabwe: 24–25 June 
2000, London: Commonwealth Secretariat, 2000.
Cooley, Alexander. “Cooperation Gets Shanghaied: China, Russia, and the SCO.” For-
eign Affairs (December 14, 2009).
Cooper, Andrew F., and Thomas Legler. Intervention without Intervening? The OAS Defense 
and Promotion of Democracy in the Americas. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006.
Cox, Gary W. “Authoritarian Elections and Leadership Succession, 1975–2000.” Type-
script. University of California, San Diego, 2008.
Cox, Gary W., and J. Morgan Kousser. “Turnout and Rural Corruption: New York as a 
Test Case.” American Journal of Political Science 25, no. 4 ( November 1981): 646–663.
Cox, Michael, G. John Ikenberry, and Takashi Inoguchi, eds. American Democracy Pro-
motion: Impulses, Strategies, and Impacts. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
Crawford, Gordon. Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy 
Assistance and Political Conditionality. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001.
CSCE. Implementation of the Helsinki Accords: Hearing before the Commission on Security 
and Cooperation in Europe. Paris Human Dimension Meeting: Commission on Secu-
rity and Cooperation in Europe, July 18, 1989.
Daguzan, Jean-François. “France, Democratization and North Africa.” Democratization 
9 (Spring 2002): 135–148.
Davis-Roberts, Avery, and David J. Carroll. “Using International Law to Assess Elec-
tions.” Democratization 17, no. 3 (2010): 416–441.
Diamond, Larry J. Developing Democracy: Toward Consolidation. Baltimore, MD: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999.
Dimitrova, Antoaneta, and Geoffrey Pridham. “International Actors and Democracy 
Promotion in Central and Eastern Europe: The Integration Model and Its Limits.” 
Democratization 11 ( December 2004): 91–112.
Donno, Daniela. “Defending Democratic Norms: Regional Intergovernmental Orga-
nizations, Domestic Opposition and Democratic Change.” PhD Dissertation, Yale 
University, 2008.
——. “Who Is Punished? Regional Intergovernmental Organizations and the Enforce-
ment of Democratic Norms.” International Organization 64 ( Fall 2010): 593–625.
Drake, Paul W. “The International Causes of Democratization, 1974–1990.” In The 
Origins of Liberty; Political and Economic Liberalization in the Modern World, edited by 
Paul W. Drake and Mathew D. McCubbins, 70–91. Princeton, NJ: Princeton Uni-
versity Press, 1998.
Druckman, James N., Donald P. Green, James H. Kuklinski, and Arthur Lupia. “The 
Growth and Development of Experimental Research in Political Science.” American 
Political Science Review 100, no. 04 (2006): 627–635.
Dunning, Thad. “Improving Causal Inference: Strengths and Limitations of Natural 
Experiments.” Political Research Quarterly 61, no. 2 ( June 1, 2008): 282–293.
228 Selected Bibliography
Dunning, Thad, and Susan D. Hyde. “The Analysis of Experimental Data: Comparing 
Techniques.” Manuscript, Yale University, 2008.
Elkins, Zachary, Andrew T. Guzman, and Beth A. Simmons. “Competing for Capital: 
The Diffusion of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 1960–2000.” In The Global Diffusion 
of Markets and Democracy, edited by Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey 
Garrett, 220–260. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Elklit, Jurgen, and Andrew Reynolds. “A Framework for the Systematic Study of Elec-
tion Quality.” Democratization 12 (April 2005): 147–162.
Elklit, Jurgen, and Palle Svensson. “What Makes Elections Free and Fair.” Journal of 
Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 32–46.
Estok, Melissa, Neil Nevitte, and Glenn Cowan. The Quick Count and Election Observa-
tion: An NDI Handbook for Civic Organizations and Political Parties. Washington DC: 
National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, 2002.
European Commission. “Communication from the Commission on EU Election As-
sistance and Observation.” Brussels: European Union, 2000.
——. Handbook for European Union Election Observation. 2nd edition. Brussels: European 
Commission, 2008.
——. “Programming Guide for Strategy Papers: Democracy and Human Rights.” 
Brussels: European Commission, 2008.
European Union. Compendium of International Standards for Elections. 2nd edition. Lon-
don: Electoral Reform International Services, 2007.
——. European Union Election Observation Mission to Indonesia. Brussels: European 
Union, 2004.
European Union Election Observation Mission. Final Statement on the Zambia Elections 
2001. Lusaka: European Union, May 5, 2002.
——. Peru Presidential and Congressional Elections—EU Observation. Brussels: European 
Union, April 6, 2001.
Fazal, Tanisha M. “State Death in the International System.” International Organization 
58, no. 02 (2004): 311–344.
Fearon, James. “Rationalist Explanations for War.” International Organization 49 
(1995): 379.
Fearon, James, and Alexander Wendt. “Rationalism v. Constructivism: A Skeptical 
View.” In Handbook of International Relations, edited by Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas 
Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 52–72. London: Sage, 2002.
Finkel, Steven E., Andrew Green, Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and C. Neal Tate. Cross-National 
Research on USAID’s Democracy and Governance Programs—Codebook (Phase II), 2007, 
http://www.pitt.edu/~politics/democracy/democracy.html.
Finkel, Steven E., Aníbal Pérez-Liñán, and Mitchell A. Seligson. “Effects of US Foreign As-
sistance on Democracy Building, 1990–2003.” World Politics 59, no. 3 (2007): 404 – 439.
Finnemore, Martha. “International Organizations as Teachers of Norms: The United 
Nations Educational, Scientifi c, and Cultural Organization and Science Policy.” In-
ternational Organization 47, no. 4 (1993): 565–597.
Finnemore, Martha, and Kathryn Sikkink. “International Norm Dynamics and Politi-
cal Change.” International Organization 52, no. 04 (1998): 887–917.
Fox, Gregory H., and Brad R. Roth. “Democracy and International Law.” Review of 
International Studies 27, no. 03 (2001): 327–352.
Franck, Thomas M. “The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance.” American 
Journal of International Law 86, no. 1 ( January 1992): 46–91.
229Selected Bibliography
Franzese, Robert J. “Partially Independent Central Banks, Politically Responsive Gov-
ernments, and Infl ation.” American Journal of Political Science 43, no. 3 (  July 1999): 
681–706.
Freedom House. “Freedom House: Methodology,” 2006. http://www.freedomhouse.
org/template.cfm?page=35&year=2006.
Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Free Press, 1992.
Garber, Larry. Guidelines for International Election Observing. Washington, DC: Interna-
tional Human Rights Law Group, 1984.
Garber, Larry, and Glenn Cowan. “The Virtues of Parallel Vote Tabulations.” Journal 
of Democracy 4, no. 2 (1993): 95–107.
Geisler, Gisela. “Fair? What Has Fairness Got to Do with It? Vagaries of Election 
Observations and Democratic Standards.” Journal of Modern African Studies 31, no. 4 
(December 1993): 613–637.
Gerber, Alan S., and Donald P. Green. “The Effects of Canvassing, Telephone Calls, 
and Direct Mail on Voter Turnout: A Field Experiment.” American Political Science 
Review 94, no. 3 (September 2000): 653–663.
Gillespie, Richard, and Richard Youngs. “Themes in European Democracy Promo-
tion.” Democratization 9, no. 1 (2002): 1–16.
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede, and Michael D. Ward. “A Revised List of Independent States 
since the Congress of Vienna. International Interactions 25, no. 4 (1999): 393–413.
——. “Diffusion and the International Context of Democratization.” International 
Organization 60, no. 04 (2006): 911–933.
——. “Diffusion and the Spread of Democratic Institutions.” In The Global Diffusion 
of Markets and Democracy, edited by Beth A. Simmons, Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey 
Garrett, 261–302. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
Goemans, Hein E., Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. “Introduc-
ing Archigos: A Data Set of Political Leaders.” Journal of Peace Research 46, no. 2 
(2009): 269–283.
Goertz, Gary, and Paul F. Diehl. “Toward a Theory of International Norms: Some 
Conceptual and Measurement Issues.” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 36, no. 4 (Decem-
ber 1, 1992): 634–664.
Golder, Matt. “Democratic Electoral Systems around the World, 1946–2000.” Electoral 
Studies 24, no. 1 (March 2005): 103–121.
Goodwin-Gill, Guy S. Free and Fair Elections: International Law and Practice. Geneva: 
Inter-Parliamentary Union, 2006.
Green, Joseph Coy, Papers. Seeley G. Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, 
Princeton, NJ. Report of the Allied Mission to Observe the Greek Elections. Athens, 1946.
Guan, Mei, and Donald P. Green. “Noncoercive Mobilization in State-Controlled 
Elections: An Experimental Study in Beijing.” Comparative Political Studies 39, no. 10 
(December 1, 2006): 1175–1193.
Hafner-Burton, Emilie M., and Kiyoteru Tsutsui. “Human Rights in a Globalizing 
World: The Paradox of Empty Promises.” American Journal of Sociology 110, no. 5 
(2005): 1373–1411.
Hathaway, Oona A. “Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?” Yale Law Journal 
111, no. 8 ( June 2002): 1935–2042.
Howard, Marc M., and Philip G. Roessler. “Liberalizing Electoral Outcomes in 
Competitive Authoritarian Regimes.” American Journal of Political Science 50, no. 2 
(2006): 365–381.
230 Selected Bibliography
Humphreys, Macartan, William A. Masters, and Martin E. Sandbu. “The Role of Lead-
ers in Democratic Deliberations: Results from a Field Experiment in São Tomé and 
Príncipe.” World Politics 58, no. 4 (2006): 583–622.
Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991.
Hurd, Ian. “Legitimacy and Authority in International Politics.” International Organiza-
tion 53, no. 02 (1999): 379–408.
Hyde, Susan D. “Experimenting with Democracy Promotion: International Observ-
ers and the 2004 Presidential Elections in Indonesia.” Perspectives on Politics 8, no. 2 
(2010).
——. “The Observer Effect in International Politics: Evidence from a Natural Experi-
ment.” World Politics 60, no. 1 (2007): 37–63.
——. “Observing Norms: Explaining the Causes and Consequences of Internation-
ally Monitored Elections.” PhD Dissertation, University of California–San Diego, 
2006.
Hyde, Susan D., and Nikolay Marinov. “National Elections Across Democracy and 
Autocracy: Which Elections Can be Lost?” SSRN eLibrary (2010). http://ssrn.com/
paper=1540711.
Ikenberry, G. John. “Why Export Democracy?” Wilson Quarterly 23, no. 2 (1999): 56.
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance. “Focus: Democracy Forum 2000, 
Attacking Poverty by Supporting Democracy.” IDEA Newsletter Archive, Janu-
ary 2000.
Jácome, Luis I., and Francisco Vázquez. “Is There Any Link Between Legal Central 
Bank Independence and Infl ation? Evidence from Latin America and the Caribbean.” 
European Journal of Political Economy 24, no. 4 ( December 2008): 788–801.
Jensen, Nathan M. “Political Risk, Democratic Institutions, and Foreign Direct Invest-
ment.” Journal of Politics 70, no. 04 (2008): 1040–1052.
——. “Democratic Governance and Multinational Corporations: Political Regimes 
and Infl ows of Foreign Direct Investment.” International Organization 57, no. 03 
(2003): 587–616.
Jens-Hagen Eschenbächer. “Assessing Elections in Established Democracies: Why 
ODIHR Sends Observers and Experts to Countries Across the Entire OSCE Region.” 
OSCE Magazine, 2010.
Jones, Paul W. Observation of U.S. Elections, as delivered by Chargé d’Affaires Paul W. 
Jones to the Permanent Council, Vienna. Report to the Permanent Council. Vienna, 
November 4, 2004.
Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World 
Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
Katzenstein, Peter J., Robert O. Keohane, and Stephen D. Krasner. “International 
Organization and the Study of World Politics.” International Organization 52, no. 4 
(1998): 645–685.
Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998.
Keefer, Philip, and David Stasavage. “Checks and Balances, Private Information, and 
the Credibility of Monetary Commitments.” International Organization 56, no. 4 
(Autumn 2002): 751–774.
Kelley, Judith. “Assessing the Complex Evolution of Norms: The Rise of International 
Election Monitoring.” International Organization 62, no. 02 (2008): 221–255.
231Selected Bibliography
——. “D-Minus Elections: The Politics and Norms of International Election Observa-
tion.” International Organization 63, no. 4 (2009): 765–787.
——. “The More the Merrier? The Effects of Having Multiple International Election 
Monitoring Organizations.” Perspectives on Politics 7, no. 01 (2009): 59–64.
——. “Supply and Demand of Election Monitoring.” Manuscript, Duke University, 
2008.
Keohane, Robert O. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1984.
——. “Reciprocity in International Relations.” International Organization 40, no. 1 
(1986): 1–27.
Keys, Donald. “Observing the Elections.” In The Lingering Crisis: A Case Study of the 
Dominican Republic, edited by Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez. New York: Las Americas 
Publishing Company, 1969.
Klotz, Audie. Norms in International Relations: The Struggle Against Apartheid. Ithaca, 
NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.
Knack, Stephen. “Does Foreign Aid Promote Democracy?” International Studies Quar-
terly 48, no. 1 (March 2004): 251–266.
Koh, Harold Hongju. “Why Do Nations Obey International Law?” Yale Law Journal 
106, no. 8 ( June 1997): 2599–2659.
Krasner, Stephen D., ed. International Regimes. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
1983.
Krasner, Stephen D. “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Inter-
vening Variables.” International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 185–205.
Kupchinsky, Roman. “CIS: Monitoring The Election Monitors.” Radio Free Europe, 
April 2, 2005.
Kuran, Timur. Private Truths, Public Lies: The Social Consequences of Preference Falsifi ca-
tion. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1995.
Lake, David A. Hierarchy in International Relations. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 
2009.
Lake, David A., and Angela O’Mahony. “The Incredible Shrinking State: Explaining 
Change in the Territorial Size of Countries.” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 48, no. 5 
(October 1, 2004): 699–722.
Lean, Sharon. “External Validation and Democratic Accountability.” In Promoting 
Democracy in the Americas, edited by Thomas Legler, Sharon F. Lean, and Dexter S. 
Boniface, 152–174. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
Legler, Thomas, Sharon F. Lean, and Dexter S. Boniface, eds. Promoting Democracy in 
the Americas. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2007.
Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. “International Linkage and Democratization.” Jour-
nal of Democracy 16, no. 3 (2005): 20–34.
Liddle, R. William, and Saiful Mujani. “Indonesia in 2004: The Rise of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono.” Asian Survey 45, no. 1 (February 2005): 119–126.
Lieberman, Joseph. “Iran Presidential Election.” Interview by Shepard Smith, Fox 
News Channel, June 15, 2009.
Lijphart, Arend. Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six 
Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.
Lindberg, Staffan I. “Tragic Protest: Why Do Opposition Parties Boycott Elections?” 
In Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition, edited by Andreas 
Schedler, 267. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.
232 Selected Bibliography
Lust-Okar, Ellen. Structuring Confl ict in the Arab World: Incumbents, Opponents, and Insti-
tutions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
Lyall, Jason, and Isaiah Wilson. “Rage Against the Machines: Explaining Outcomes in 
Counterinsurgency Wars.” International Organization 63, no. 01 (2009): 67–106.
Magaloni, Beatriz. Voting for Autocracy: Hegemonic Party Survival and Its Demise in Mex-
ico. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006.
Mansfi eld, Edward D., Helen V. Milner, and B. Peter Rosendorff. “Free to Trade: 
Democracies, Autocracies, and International Trade.” American Political Science Review 94, 
no. 2 (  June 2000): 305–321.
Mansfi eld, Edward D., and Jon C. Pevehouse. “Democratization and International 
Organizations.” International Organization 60, no. 01 (2006): 137–167.
March, James G., and Johan P. Olsen. “The Institutional Dynamics of International 
Political Orders.” International Organization 52, no. 4 (Autumn 1998): 943–969.
Marshall, Monty G., and Keith Jaggers. Polity IV Project: Dataset Users Manual. College 
Park, MD: University of Maryland (2002).
Maxfi eld, Sylvia. Gatekeepers of Growth. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998.
McCleary, Rachel M. “Guatemala’s Postwar Prospects.” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 2 
(1997): 129–143.
McCoy, Jennifer. “Monitoring and Mediating Elections during Latin American De-
mocratization.” In Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America, 
edited by Kevin J. Middlebrook, 53–90. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
1998.
McFaul, Michael. “Democracy Promotion as a World Value.” Washington Quarterly 28, 
no. 1 (2004): 147–163.
McNamara, Kathleen R. “Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social 
Logic of Delegation.” West European Politics 25 (  January 1, 2002): 47–76.
Middlebrook, Kevin J. Electoral Observation and Democratic Transitions in Latin America. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1998.
Miguel, Edward, and Michael Kremer. “Worms: Identifying Impacts on Education 
and Health in the Presence of Treatment Externalities.” Econometrica 72, no. 1 (  Jan-
uary 1, 2004): 159–217.
Milner, Helen V. Interests, Institutions, and Information: Domestic Politics and International 
Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997.
Milner, Helen V., and Keiko Kubota. “Why the Move to Free Trade? Democracy and 
Trade Policy in the Developing Countries.” International Organization 59, no. 01 
(2005): 107–143.
Monten, Jonathan. “The Roots of the Bush Doctrine: Power, Nationalism, and Democ-
racy Promotion in U.S. Strategy.” International Security 29, no. 4 (2005): 112–156.
Montgomery, Tommie Sue. Revolution in El Salvador. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 
1995.
Morrow, James D. “The Strategic Setting of Choices: Signaling, Commitment, and 
Negotiation in International Politics.” In Strategic Choice in International Relations, 
edited by David A. Lake and Robert Powell, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1999.
——. “When Do States Follow the Laws of War?” American Political Science Review 101, 
no. 03 (2007): 559–572.
Nadelmann, Ethan A. “Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in Inter-
national Society.” International Organization 44, no. 4 (1990): 479–526.
233Selected Bibliography
National Democratic Institute. “National Democratic Institute / Carter Center Joint 
Post-Election Statement on Withdrawal from 1993 Togolese Elections.” National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs, September 1, 1993.
——. “Statement by the National Democratic Institute on the July 7 and 8 Presiden-
tial Election in Niger.” Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute, July 19, 
1996.
National Democratic Institute and The Carter Center. Peru Elections 2000: Final Re-
port of the National Democratic Institute/Carter Center Joint Election Monitoring Project. 
Atlanta: NDI/Carter Center, 2000.
Nevitte, Neil, and Santiago A. Canton. “The Role of Domestic Observers.” Journal of 
Democracy 8, no. 3 (1997): 47–61.
Nohlen, Dieter, ed. Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2005.
Nohlen, Dieter, Florian Grotz, and Christof Hartmann, eds. Elections in Asia and the 
Pacifi c: A Data Handbook. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001.
Nohlen, Dieter, Michael Krennerich, and Bernhard Thibaut, eds. Elections in Africa: A 
Data Handbook. New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.
OECD. Ratifi cation of the Convention on the OECD, Paris: Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, 1960.
Olken, Benjamin A. “Monitoring Corruption: Evidence from a Field Experiment in 
Indonesia.” Journal of Political Economy 115, no. 2 (April 2007): 200–249.
Organization of American States. “Fifth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of For-
eign Affairs, Santiago, Chile, August 12–18, 1959. Final Act.” Washington DC: Pan 
American Union, 1960. Reprinted in American Journal of International Law 55, no. 2 
(April 1961): 537–539.
——. “Eighth Meeting of Consultation of Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Punta del Este, 
Uruguay, January 22–31, 1962. Final Act,” OEA/Ser.F/II.8 Eng. Washington DC: 
Pan American Union, 1962. Reprinted in American Journal of International Law 56, 
no. 2 (April 1962): 601–616.
——. “Supporting the Electoral Process,” 2006. http://www.oas.org/key_issues/eng/
KeyIssue_Detail.asp?kis_sec=6.
OSCE. A Decade of Monitoring Elections: The People and the Practice. Warsaw: OSCE 
Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2005.
——. Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human Dimension 
of the CSCE, Copenhagen: Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, 
1990OSCE/ODIHR.
——. Election Observation Handbook. 5th edition. Warsaw: OSCE Offi ce for Democratic 
Institutions and Human Rights, 2005.
——. Republic of Armenia Presidential Election March 16 and 30, 1998, Final Report. War-
saw: OSCE Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, April 9, 1998. 
http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/1998/04/1215_en.pdf.
——. Republic of Armenia Presidential Election 19 February and 5 March 2003. Warsaw: 
OSCE Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, April 28, 2003. http://
www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2003/04/1203_en.pdf.
——. Republic of Belarus Presidential Election 19 March 2006, OSCE/ODIHR Election 
Observation Mission Report. Warsaw: OSCE Offi ce for Democratic Institutions and 
Human Rights, 2006. http://www.osce.org/documents/odihr/2006/06/19393_
en.pdf.
234 Selected Bibliography
Pan American Union. Report of the Technical Assistance Mission of the Organization of 
American States on the Presidential Elections in the Republic of Costa Rica. Washington, 
DC: General Secretariat, Organization of American States, 1962.
Pastor, Robert A. “Mediating Elections.” Journal of Democracy 9, no. 1 (1998): 154–163.
Payne, Rodger A. “Persuasion, Frames and Norm Construction.” European Journal of 
International Relations 7, no. 1 (2001): 37–61.
Peceny, Mark. Democracy at the Point of Bayonets. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania 
State University Press, 1999.
Pevehouse, Jon C. Democracy from Above: Regional Organizations and Democratization. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
——. “Democracy from the Outside-In? International Organizations and Democrati-
zation.” International Organization 56, no. 03 (2003): 515–549.
Pinto-Duschinsky, Michael. “Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations 
and Their US Counterparts.” International Affairs ( Royal Institute of International 
Affairs 1944-) 67, no. 1 (  January 1991): 33–63.
Price, Richard. “Reversing the Gun Sights: Transnational Civil Society Targets Land 
Mines.” International Organization 52, no. 03 (1998): 613–644.
Program on International Policy Attitudes. “World Publics Strongly Favor Interna-
tional Observers for Elections, Including Their Own.” Washington DC: World Pub-
lic Opinion.org, September 8, 2009.
Przeworski, Adam. Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
Przeworski, Adam, Michael E. Alvarez, Jose Antonio Cheibub, and Fernando Limongi. 
Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–
1990. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000.
Rabe, Stephen G. The Most Dangerous Area in the World: John F. Kennedy Confronts 
Communist Revolution in Latin America. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1999.
Rich, Roland. “Bringing Democracy into International Law.” Journal of Democracy 12, 
no. 3 (2001): 20–34.
Risse-Kappen, Thomas, Steve C. Ropp, and Kathryn Sikkink, eds. The Power of Human 
Rights: International Norms and Domestic Change. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1999.
Roberts, David. “The Cambodian Elections of 1993.” Electoral Studies 13, no. 2 (1994): 
157–162.
Roe, Charlotte, “The Committee on Free Elections.” In The Lingering Crisis: A Case 
Study of the Dominican Republic, edited by Eugenio Change-Rodriguez. New York: Las 
Americas Publishing Company, 1969.
Rose-Ackerman, Susan, and Jennifer Tobin. “Foreign Direct Investment and the Busi-
ness Environment in Developing Countries: The Impact of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties.” SSRN eLibrary (May 2, 2005). http://ssrn.com/abstract=557121.
Roth, Kenneth. “Despots Masquerading as Democrats.” Journal of Human Rights Prac-
tice 1, no. 1 (March 1, 2009): 140–155.
Sanford, Victoria. Buried Secrets: Truth and Human Rights in Guatemala. New York: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 2003.
Santa-Cruz, Arturo. “Constitutional Structures, Sovereignty, and the Emergence of 
Norms: The Case of International Election Monitoring.” International Organization 
59, no. 03 (2005): 663–693.
235Selected Bibliography
——. “Monitoring Elections, Redefi ning Sovereignty: The 2000 Peruvian Electoral 
Process as an International Event.” Journal of Latin American Studies 37, no. 04 
(2005): 739–767.
Schaffer, Frederic C., ed. Elections for Sale: The Causes And Consequences of Vote Buying. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.
Schargrodsky, Ernesto, and Sebastian Galiani. “Property Rights for the Poor: Ef-
fects of Land Titling.” SSRN eLibrary ( January 28, 2010). http://ssrn.com/abstract=
1544578.
Schedler, Andreas, ed. Electoral Authoritarianism: The Dynamics of Unfree Competition. 
Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006.
Schedler, Andreas. “The Menu of Manipulation.” Journal of Democracy 13, no. 2 (2002): 
36–50.
——. “The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections.” International Political Sci-
ence Review 23, no. 1 (  January 1, 2002): 103–122.
Schedler, Andreas, and Frederic C. Schaffer. “What Is Vote Buying?” In Elections for 
Sale: The Causes and Consequences of Vote Buying, edited by Frederic C. Schaffer. Boul-
der, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2007.
Schelling, Thomas C. The Strategy of Confl ict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University 
Press, 1960.
Schraeder, Peter J. “The State of the Art in International Democracy Promotion: Re-
sults of a Joint European-North American Research Network.” Democratization 10, 
no. 2 (2003): 21–44.
Schultz, Kenneth A. Democracy and Coercive Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 2001.
——. “Domestic Opposition and Signaling in International Crises.” American Political 
Science Review 92, no. 4 (December 1998): 829–844.
Sen, Amartya Kumar. “Democracy as a Universal Value.” Journal of Democracy 10, no. 3 
(1999): 3–17.
Simmons, Beth A., Frank Dobbin, and Geoffrey Garrett. The Global Diffusion of Markets 
and Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008.
——. “Introduction: The International Diffusion of Liberalism.” International Organi-
zation 60, no. 04 (2006): 781–810.
Simmons, Beth A., and Zachary Elkins. “The Globalization of Liberalization: Policy 
Diffusion in the International Political Economy.” American Political Science Review 
98, no. 1 (February 2004): 171–189.
Simpser, Alberto. “Making Votes Not Count: Strategic Incentives for Electoral Cor-
ruption.” PhD Dissertation, Stanford University, 2005.
——. “Unintended Consequences of Election Monitoring.” In Election Fraud: Detecting 
and Deterring Electoral Manipulation, edited by R. Michael Alvarez, Thad E. Hall, and 
Susan D. Hyde, 255. Washington DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008.
Simpser, Alberto, and Daniela Donno. “Can International Election Monitoring Harm 
Governance?” Manuscript, University of Chicago, 2010.
Sives, Amanda. “A Review of Commonwealth Election Observation.” Commonwealth & 
Comparative Politics 39, no. 3 (2001): 132–149.
Slater, Jerome. The OAS and United States Foreign Policy. Columbus: Ohio State Uni-
versity Press, 1967.
Smith, Tony. America’s Mission: The United States and the Worldwide Struggle for Democ-
racy in the Twentieth Century. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994.
236 Selected Bibliography
Snow, John. On the Mode of Communication of Cholera. 2nd edition. London: J. Churchill, 
1855.
Spence, Michael. “Job Market Signaling.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 87, no. 3 (Au-
gust 1973): 355–374.
Stalin, Joseph, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and Winston S. Churchill. Text of the Agreements 
Reached at the Yalta (Crimea) Conference between President Roosevelt, Prime Minister 
Churchill and Generalissmo Stalin, as released by the State Department. Text, Febru-
ary 11, 1945. http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp.
Starr, Harvey. “Democratic Dominoes: Diffusion Approaches to the Spread of Democracy 
in the International System.” Journal of Confl ict Resolution 35, no. 2 (1991): 356–381.
Sugden, Robert. “Spontaneous Order.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 3, no. 4 (Autumn 
1989): 85–97.
Tannenwald, Nina. “The Nuclear Taboo: The United States and the Normative Basis 
of Nuclear Non-Use.” International Organization 53, no. 03 (1999): 433–468.
Taylor, Lewis. “Patterns of Electoral Corruption in Peru: The April 2000 General Elec-
tion.” Crime, Law and Social Change 34, no. 4 ( December 1, 2000): 391–415.
Thomas, Daniel C. The Helsinki Effect: International Norms, Human Rights, and the De-
mise of Communism. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2001.
Tomz, Michael. Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt across Three Cen-
turies. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2007.
Tomz, Michael, Jason Wittenberg, and Gary King. “Clarify: Software for Interpret-
ing and Presenting Statistical Results.” Journal of Statistical Software 8, no. 1 (2003). 
Available at http://www.jstatsoft.org/v08/i01.
Trounstine, Jessica. “Challenging the Machine-Dichotomy: Two Threats to Urban 
Democracy.” In The City in American Political Development, edited by Richardson Dil-
worth, 77–97. New York: Routledge, 2009.
United Nations, Declaration of Principles for International Election Observation and Code of 
Conduct for International Election Observers. New York: United Nations, 2005.
Vachudova, Milada Anna. Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after 
Communism. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.
Vreeland, James Raymond. “Political Institutions and Human Rights: Why Dictator-
ships Enter into the United Nations Convention Against Torture.” International Or-
ganization 62, no. 01 (2008): 65–101.
Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of Alliances. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987.
Wambaugh, Sarah. A Monograph on Plebiscites, with a Collection of Offi cial Documents. 
New York: Oxford University Press, 1920.
——. Plebiscites Since the World War, with a Collection of Offi cial Documents. Washington 
DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1933.
Wantchekon, Leonard. “Clientelism and Voting Behavior: Evidence from a Field Ex-
periment in Benin.” World Politics 55, no. 3 (2003): 399–422.
Weingast, Barry R. “The Political Foundations of Democracy and the Rule of Law.” 
American Political Science Review 91, no. 2 ( June 1997): 245–263.
Welt, Cory, and Ian Bremmer. “Armenia’s New Autocrats.” Journal of Democracy 8, no. 3 
(1997): 77–91.
Whitehead, Laurence, ed. The International Dimensions of Democratization: Europe and 
the Americas. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
World Bank. World Development Indicators. Washington, DC: World Bank Group, 
2007.
237Selected Bibliography
Young, Oran. “Regime Dynamics: The Rise and Fall of International Regimes.” In 
International Regimes, edited by Stephen D. Krasner, 93–114, 1983.
Youngs, Richard. The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2001.
Zacher, Mark W. “The Territorial Integrity Norm: International Boundaries and the 




Abstention buying, strategic manipulation 
and, 180 – 81, 184
Abu Seda, Hafez, 86
Advocacy-based theories of norm creation, 
15–18, 203 – 4
Afghanistan, 76
Africa
criticism of monitoring in, 164
democracy-contingent benefi ts and, 68, 
101–2
strategic manipulation in, 175, 182
trends in election monitoring, 67
See also specifi c countries
African Union, 89, 105. See also Organiza-
tion of African Unity (OAU )
Akerlof, George, 9, 10, 11
Algeria, 84 – 85, 195
Aliev, Ilham, 179 – 80
Alliance for Progress, 97
Angola, 164
Annan, Kofi , 86
Arab League, 89, 170
Argentina, 97
Aristide, Jean-Bertrand, 116 –17
Armenia, 111, 113, 128, 129, 132– 42, 195
checking “as if” randomization, 138– 40
data and results, 140
effect of monitors on vote share, 141– 42
natural experiment research design, 135–38
Asia, trends in election monitoring, 67. See 
also specifi c countries





decision to invite observers, 103
election monitoring in, 195–96
norm diffusion and, 41
See also specifi c countries
Axelrod, Robert, 10 –11




Batista, Fulgencio, 1, 57, 95–96
Belarus, 47, 111, 176, 178, 185, 192, 195
Belgium, 41, 74, 86, 194









Boutefl ika, Abdelaziz, 85
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros, 100
Boycott of elections, by opposition parties, 
182– 83
Bratton, Michael, 175
British Parliamentary Human Rights 
Group, 64, 99
Burnham, Forbes, 99
Bush, George H. W., 103







Canas, Dr. Alberto F., 56 –57
Candidate exclusion, as strategic manipula-
tion tactic, 177
Carothers, Thomas, 160, 169
Carroll, David, 105
Carter, Jimmy, 18, 103, 132
Carter Center
Declaration of Principles and Code of 
Conduct for International Election Obser-
vation, 169
democracy-contingent benefi ts and, 102
Ethiopia and, 85, 89 –90
Haiti and, 18
Indonesia and, 132, 143, 145–54, 156
Jamaica and, 61
Nigeria and, 18, 181
Peru and, 118–19
role of, 18, 34
strategic manipulation and, 170
Togo and, 120
Zambia and, 60
Castro, Fidel, 1, 57, 95
Central banks, as signal-based norm, 
199 –201
Chavez, Hugo, 33
Chile, 6, 33, 38–39, 75, 87, 122
Chiluba, Frederick, 61
China, 33, 74, 102, 195–96
Chirac, Jacques, 104
Clinton, Bill, 103, 201
Cold War
democracy promotion during and after, 
36 –37, 94 –100, 190 –91
election observation during and after, 28, 
47, 67–73
Commonwealth, 59, 105, 164, 170, 172, 173
Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), 159 – 60, 170, 185, 195
Commonwealth of Independent States-
Elections Monitoring Organization 
(CIS-EMO), 159 – 60
Commonwealth Secretariat, 61, 102
Conference on Security and Cooperation in 
Europe (CSCE), 101
Consolidated democracies
election observation as international 
norm and, 193 –95
norm diffusion and, 41
quantitative analysis of invitations to 
observe, 74 –75
See also True democrats; specifi c countries
Cook, Robin, 104
Cooperative norms, 15, 18–19, 203 – 4
Copenhagen Document (1990), 101, 111, 
195
Costa Rica, 30, 31, 56 –57, 58, 96, 98, 99
Côte d’Ivoire, 177, 180 – 81
Council of Europe, 105
Cranenburgh, Oda van, 182
Cuba, 1, 2, 56 –57, 86, 95–96, 97, 122, 192, 
194
Czech Republic, 75, 122
Davis-Roberts, Avery, 105
Declaration of Principles and Code of Conduct 
for International Election Observation, 7, 
63, 169
Declaration of Santiago, 96
Demirchian, Karin, 134
Demirchian, Stepan, 134
Democracy, election observation as inter-
national norm and, 5– 6, 13 –15, 21, 
186 –91. See also Consolidated democ-
racies; True democrats
Democracy premium, 35–38, 45– 46, 106
Democracy promoters and promotion
benefi t-seeking signals and, 44 – 48
during Cold War, 36 –37, 94 –100, 190 –91
as common post–Cold War goal, 
100 –109
implications and future research, 207– 8
norm diffusion and, 41
pseudo-democrats and, 109 –25
quantitative analysis of invitations to 
observe, 73
role in benefi t-seeking behavior, 33 –34
Democracy-contingent benefi ts, 43, 52–53, 
89 –125
democracy premium and, 35–38, 45– 46, 
106
democracy promotion and Cold War, 
36 –37, 94 –109, 190 –91
Ethiopia’s 2005 elections and, 89 –91
international benefi ts consequences, 
113 –21
negative reports and, 109, 110 –13
Democratic Republic of Congo, 162
Dobbin, Frank, 21








Egypt, 7, 30, 76, 79, 85– 86, 113, 122, 123, 124
Eisenhower, Dwight D., 96
El Salvador, 59
Election day fraud, 164 – 65. See also Strate-
gic manipulation
Election observation and observers, 34 –35, 
95, 126 –57
Armenian presidential election in 2003, 
128, 129, 132, 133 – 42
democracy and, 5– 6, 13 –15, 21, 186 –91
democracy-contingent benefi ts and 
refusal to invite, 121–24
domestic and international observers, 
166 – 67
Indonesian presidential election in 2004, 
128, 129, 132–33, 142–57
need for credentials from host govern-
ment, 6 –7
observers’ strategies for dealing with 
strategic manipulation, 163 –74
pre-election conditions and, 110 –11
risks of, 8
theory and testing methodology, 126 –33
trends and, 66 – 67
See also Election observers, state decision 
to invite; Signaling norms
Election Observation Handbook (OSCE/
ODIHR), 169
Election observers, state decisions to invite, 
50 –52, 56 – 88
Cold War and, 67–73
early inviters, 58– 62
normalization of, 83 – 88
quantitative evidence, discussion of 
results, 78– 83
quantitative evidence, methodology, 
62–78, 216 –23
Elkins, Zachary, 20 –21, 197, 198
Ethiopia, 85, 89 –91, 123, 179
Europe, trends in election monitoring, 67. 
See also specifi c countries
European Commission, 102, 120
European Union ( EU), 6, 34
Belarus and, 185
democracy-contingent benefi ts and, 105, 
106
Ethiopia and, 85, 89 –90
Peru and, 119
strategic manipulation and, 170
Zambia and, 111
Zimbabwe, 172–73
Eyadema, Gnassingbe, 120, 121
Fearon, James, 23 –24, 25
Figueres, José, 31, 56 –57
Finkel, Steven E., 107
Finnemore, Martha, 16 –17, 23
Foreign aid. See Democracy-contingent 
benefi ts
Foreign Assistance Act, of U.S., 119
Foreign direct investment, BITs as signal-
based norm and, 197–99
France
decision to invite observers, 74, 86, 87, 194
democracy-contingent benefi ts and, 104
Togo and, 120
Franck, Thomas, 51, 106 –7
Francophonie, La. See International Orga-
nization of La Francophonie
Fraud. See Strategic manipulation
Free and Fair Elections: International Law and 
Practice (Goodwin-Gill ), 169
Freedom House, 114, 115
Frondizi, Arturo, 97
Fujimori, Alberto, 3, 32, 117–19
Fukuyama, Francis, 102
Game theory, benefi t-seeking signals and 




Georgia, 84, 111, 116, 160, 162
Gerber, Alan, 128–29
Germany, 38, 94, 95, 104, 120
Ghana, 33, 164, 175
Gleditsch, Kristian, 21, 102
Goodwin-Gill, Guy, 169
Government types, pre-election uncertainty 
about, 71–72, 74 –75





Guei, Robert, 180 – 81
Guidelines for International Election Observing, 
169
242 Index
Iran, 1–2, 7, 47, 86, 113, 122, 123, 
194
Iraq, 64, 76, 104 –5, 123, 201







Kaunda, Kenneth, 33, 60 – 61
Kazakhstan, 195
Kelley, Judith, 17, 40, 81, 102
Kennedy, John F., 96 –97, 103
Kenya, 109, 164, 172, 175
Keohane, Robert, 23





Laos, 47, 122, 123, 192
Latin America, trends in election monitor-
ing, 67. See also specifi c countries
Laws, changes in and strategic manipula-
tion, 176
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